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24 January 1986

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

GCC SUMMIT EXAMINES PROBLEMS FACING COOPERATION, INTEGRATION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 9 Nov 85 pp 34-35

[Article by Sulayman Nimr: "Muscat Summit: Conference of Gulf Ambitions; in Harmony with Muscat Summit's Balanced Tackling of Iraq-Iran Conflict, Riyadh Awaits Iranian Foreign Minister's Visit and Gulf People Await Joint Saudi-Omani Position To Open up to Tehran in Preparation for Comprehensive Mediation To End Iraq-Iran War"]

[Text] Muscat--When the leaders of the Arab Gulf states arrived in Muscat last Sunday, they found that there are numerous issues that need to be decided and settled by them even though the ministerial meetings, crowned by the preparatory meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs, had prepared the necessary studies on these issues. This is why a Gulf official described the sixth Gulf summit in Muscat as "one of the most difficult summits." It seems that because of this, the summit lasted 4 days, during which collective and bilateral meetings continued day and night.

The difficulty of the Muscat summit emanates from the fact that the area has begun to enter a new phase in its modern history, namely the phase of intensifying the Gulf presence as a single regional entity. It is indubitable that this situation saddles each of the six Gulf states with responsibilities and duties which it could have perhaps spared itself if it had remained on its own amidst the sea of dangers and ambitions. These responsibilities and duties also require each of the Gulf states to reexamine many of the work methods of its executive and administrative agencies so that it may implement the Gulf resolutions and agreements already concluded or to be concluded. This means that each state will have to make sacrifices. Nobody other than the heads of state and leaders can make the decision on the sacrifices. If the leaders decide, then the others will have to implement. This is what is being so far demanded by the GCC General Secretariat so that "the GCC General Secretariat may not be turned into an organization similar to the Arab League," as stated by the annual report submitted by 'Abdallah Bisharah, the GCC general secretary, who read this report before the Gulf leaders in the summit's first session.

In essence, this report, prepared by the GCC General Secretariat, demands re-examination of the method of implementation by the executive agencies of all the resolutions made, especially implementation of the joint economic agreement approved by the Gulf leaders in the fourth summit in Doha. Some of the

provisions of this agreement continue to be unobserved by some member states. The report also complains that the executive and the decision-making agencies of the member states are slow to implement the resolutions agreed upon, even those approved by the higher political leaderships. The GCC general secretary's report, which the Gulf official described as being frank as can be, also urges the "need to schedule any agreement reached by the Gulf states because some states fail to abide by implementation of the agreements under the pretext of achieving the possible." The report explains that "this does not mean a call for haste and for disregarding gradualism in our steps at joint cooperation. It rather means stressing the need to implement the commitments within the framework of a timetable for which each state becomes accountable to the other members."

It seems that this report was behind the announcement of a timetable for implementing the economic agreement's provisions and behind the efforts to draw up a timetable for implementing the provisions of the joint military strategy--a timetable that began with the establishment of a joint radar network and a joint air defense network based on sophisticated antiaircraft missiles to protect primarily, the area's airspace and regional waters.

But the question that poses itself is: If the GCC member states resort to a timetable to implement the integration steps among them, then does this mean that the problems that have been encountered in implementing the integration and joint cooperation agreements--problems emanating from the lack of commitment on the part of some executive agencies, especially in the economic and military fields--have ended?

Before answering this question, some problems encountered during the procession of the past 4 years of the GCC's life must be pointed out. Let us begin with the economic problems.

It is well known that at a time when the GCC member states are moving with rapid steps to achieve the joint military cooperation and integration which started 3 years ago when the joint Gulf maneuvers, called the "Island's Shield," began, a resolution had been made by the third Gulf summit, held in Bahrain, to advance material aid to the Sultanate of Oman and to the State of Bahrain to bolster their military capabilities. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar did actually pay their share of this aid in 1983. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait continued to pay in 1984 and Qatar was able to continue its payments until 1984 whereas the UAE has not been able to pay any part of the share to which it committed itself. When the time for payment of the 1985 share arrived, Kuwait demanded that all the member states pay their obligations so that there would be "fairness." Qatar expressed its readiness to make full payment whereas the UAE demanded a rescheduling of the obligations it owes, pledging to pay them if the rescheduling is done. Here emerged the problem which has been left to the Gulf leaders to make their decision on. A Gulf source expects Saudi Arabia to advance the UAE a loan that enables it to pay its obligations so that this problem may be solved.

The Gulf states were able to overcome a problem which materialized at a later time and which concerned the difference in viewpoints on the issue of forming

the "Peninsula Shield" forces, considering that some states found themselves unable to supply the joint forces with a large number of their own troops due to a lack of manpower. But the position of these states was appreciated and it was decided to be content with a symbolic participation by a small number of their troops in the joint force, whose number ranges from 6,000 to 9,000 troops.

This concerns the military aspect. To tell the truth, this aspect has experienced the fewest problems in implementing what has been agreed upon. But at the economic level, the execution and implementation problems have been big ones, beginning with the fact that Oman has not so far been convinced of permitting the Gulf citizen to enter its territories without a visa and ending with the problem of Dubai's foundation of Emirates Airline at a time when the Gulf states seek to bolster Gulf Airways. These problems have given rise to questions as to which is the party trying to fragment the existing joint institutions, according to Bahrain's ADWA' AL-KHALIJ which urged in its editorial last Saturday the Gulf leaders to exert efforts to prevent the breakdown of the existing Gulf institutions.

Sultan Qabus' Address

In his address to the sixth summit's opening session, Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id, the sultan of Oman, spoke of the commendable efforts exerted by the Arab Gulf states to end the Iraq-Iran war and appealed to the leaders in both Iran and Iraq to "display greater flexibility in responding to these efforts."

Some observers have paused before these words and wondered if they mean a new Gulf position toward this war, considering that the Gulf states always support and laud Iraq's response to the various peace efforts seeking to put a stop to the war and to end the conflict. The sultan of Oman, the summit chairman, appealed to both Iraq and Iran and it is the interpretation of some observers that these words equate Tehran with Baghdad and that this means a new Gulf position. The Gulf summit's discussion of the issue of Iranian-Gulf relations has raised additional questions in the minds of the same observers on the Gulf position toward the war even though "Abd-al-'Aziz al-Rawwas, the summit's official spokesman, pointed out that "the issue of the Gulf-Iranian relations has been discussed as a means to find a solution and an end to the Iraq-Iran war."

Muscat summit circles said that there is no change in the Gulf position supporting Iraq. But the Gulf states which believe that the hope to end this war is still remote now that all the mediation efforts have reached a dead end think that bilateral relations must be established with Tehran but that this must not be done at the expense of Baghdad. Therefore, the Gulf capitals believe that there must be a balance in the relations with Tehran without a commitment to abandon support for Iraq. These capitals believe that the two capitals capable of achieving this balance are Riyadh and Muscat because Riyadh began the process of dialogue with Tehran as of last summer and because Muscat and Riyadh together enjoy a political weight capable of influencing any dialogue whereas Kuwait has, in Tehran's opinion, become a party to the war with Iraq and the UAE is incapable, because of what is happening in Dubai, of achieving the balance the Gulf people want as a beginning for a dialogue

capable of producing, for a start, positive results in preventing an escalation in the war at least. Thus, the Gulf leaders in Muscat supported the dialogue with Tehran, which will be bolstered during the visit the Iranian minister of foreign affairs is to make to Riyadh later this month.

In the same way that a balance on the issue of the Iraq-Iran war has been the objective of the Muscat summit, such a balance has also been the objective of the Gulf summit when discussing the concerns of the Arab house.

The Gulf Arabs have held their sixth summit in Muscat in the last 5 years whereas the other Arabs are still looking for a way to convoke their summit, which has been postponed again and again for the last 3 years. But this should not mean, as a Gulf official put it, that the Gulf states are flying independently of the Arab squadron. Arab concerns are raised by the Gulf people in every meeting they hold. At the Muscat summit, the Gulf leaders heard the Saudi monarch's words on Arab reconciliation endeavors. One such endeavor is headed by Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and has already succeeded in initiating a Jordanian-Syrian dialogue. These words have made the other Gulf leaders feel optimistic at the Arab level. In the face of this optimism, they have been discussing the means to prepare the path for the Riyadh Arab summit. Reports from the Gulf say that Syria has promised to attend the Arab summit.

In Muscat, the song "I, the Gulf Citizen," which was heard repeatedly on Gulf television screens and radios, gave the impression that the Gulf people no longer have anything to do with Arabism or, at least, with Arab concerns. But the Gulf summit communique has come to reaffirm that the Gulf is Arab in affiliation, identity, heart, and aspirations.

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24 January 1986

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF OMANI-SOVIET RELATIONS EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 9 Nov 85 pp 32-33

[Article by Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis: "Gulf Summit in Wake of Soviet Relations: Policy of Searching for How and How Much"]

[Text] The question raised in the lobbies of the GCC summit in Muscat last week centered mainly on the motives that urged the Sultanate of Oman to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, on the political and security ramifications of this development to the Gulf arena in its entirety, and on whether the timing in which it was announced has a certain significance.

The answers given by the circles of the sixth Gulf summit to this question have been numerous and conflicting. To my recollection, Sultan Qabus told me in an interview AL-MUSTAQBAL had with him nearly 2 years ago (29 October 1983), i.e., at or near the beginning of the Omani-Soviet contacts: "I look forward to the day when I will look at the world map and see no enemy of Oman on it." From this, answers can be found to all these questions from the Omani position.

In the first place, Oman has been able, after building the mainstays of the modern state over a period of 15 years, to deal with the international reality with great confidence by virtue of its status and role and by exerting constant efforts to establish a balance in its international relations that are governed by a specific perspective of each circumstance separately. This is why Oman did not hesitate to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC 7 years ago when China abandoned its support for the Dhofar revolution and adhered to the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs. This step also coincided with the death of Mao Zedong and the fundamental changes that have occurred in China since then, beginning with the elimination of the "gang of four" and ending with the economic and political open-door policy which China practices nowadays.

What happened with China has happened with the Soviet Union. When Oman found that its problem with South Yemen was solved and that the rapprochement with Aden produced good-neighbor relations and diplomatic and ambassadorial exchanges encouraged by Moscow through its ceaseless urging of the Aden regime to repair its relations with all the Gulf countries, and with Oman in particular, and that 2 years of contacts eliminated many of the suspicions governing Moscow's relations with Muscat and vice versa--when Oman found this, it embarked on the step of exchanging diplomatic representatives to prove the

credibility of the independence of its political decision-making. This step also coincided with the arrival of Gorbachev's new administration with its new political tendencies and its different approach toward the international issues.

Second, Oman realized that the Iraq-Iran war, which has now entered its sixth year without any real solution to end it looming on the horizon, is a war that nobody knows when it will end. So that the Arab Gulf man not be turned into a conflict arena for the two superpowers, Oman wanted to emphasize that the interests of these two superpowers are preserved by establishing the desired balance in its relationship with the two of them so as to prevent the flames of the war from spreading, if it cannot extinguish them, and consequently, to prove to the world, and to friends before enemies, that Oman is in nobody's pocket and that the Omani policy is not a bill endorsed for the benefit of the West at the expense of the East.

Third, Oman felt that the GCC, 6 years after its creation, its meetings, its summits, and its plans, has begun to give people the impression, at least politically and militarily, that its member states' foreign policy is of one piece. Oman has felt that this is not true, first, because the GCC is not an alliance, second, because it is not a federation and, third, because it is just a cooperation council, as its name indicates, nothing more and nothing less. Sultan Qabus did not hesitate to deny strongly that any Gulf state had had any role in the contacts with Moscow or had been a party or a middleman playing a role in this regard. The denial came in the wake of numerous rumors to the effect that Kuwait had been a party to this issue. But Sultan Qabus did ascertain that a state from outside the area friendly to both sides had been a party and a middleman who played a role in the rapprochement between the two countries. In the same interview, Sultan Qabus did not hesitate to tell me: "I do not agree that the GCC should have a say on this issue." But all this does not preclude the fact that Oman wishes to employ its new relations with the Soviet Union within the framework of the GCC and in the interest of the Arab Gulf and the service of its states. This is another affirmation of the independence of Omani political decision-making.

The rationality of the Omani policy, in the wake of Oman's opening up to the world after completing its internal structure by a large degree, has motivated Oman to establish this balance in its foreign political relations. This bolsters stability in the Arab Peninsula and spares the GCC member states the consequences of international conflicts. Consequently, it makes it difficult, rather unlikely, for Oman to use the U.S. facilities agreement because it will not be compelled to use it in the absence of the reasons that call for such use, and herein lies the importance of the new Omani step.

But the date of the announcement of the Omani-Soviet relations was no more than the outcome of contacts which had reached a ripe phase when a positive step toward these relations had to be taken. The timing was not tied to any development, either Gulf or Arab, other than the desire to have the announcement made in New York and from the United Nations during the presence of the foreign ministers there to attend the General Assembly session. This session is ordinarily convened from mid-September to the end of October. Consequently, the announcement had to come before the date of the convocation of the

Gulf summit which usually convenes every year in the first half of November. The Omani circles are amazed by the enormous interest aroused by the announcement on the establishment of relations because they mostly believe that this step is a natural development of the opening of an Omani foreign policy which acknowledges the influential Soviet role in the Arab world and the need to pay attention to this role, to find out its viewpoint and, in return, to give it the Arab viewpoint, be it an Omani or a Gulf viewpoint.

As for timing the exchange of ambassadors and of opening embassies between the two countries, this is still a subject of discussion that will take more time. It is most likely that this exchange will not materialize before the second half of next year. As for the size of the diplomatic representation, it will be limited and will be within the minimum permitted by diplomatic usage.

The lobbies of the sixth Gulf summit at al-Bustan Palace in Muscat have not been content with this level of questioning but have begun to speculate whether the Omani step of establishing relations with the Soviet Union will not be followed by other GCC member states that have no relations with Moscow. Excluding Kuwait, which was the first Gulf state to establish relations with the Soviet Union, it is likely that the UAE will follow Oman, but not immediately. However, it is unlikely that either Bahrain or Qatar will take a similar step because the two countries' position on this issue is closely tied to the Saudi position. The Saudi position is governed by considerations totally different from the Oman's, Kuwait's, or even the UAE's considerations. The Saudi considerations are more difficult and delicate than those of the others.

The Saudi position perhaps makes a bigger distinction between something called "dealing" and another called "relations." Moreover, the Saudi position is governed by a certain history with the Soviet Union that is not shared by the other Gulf states. This position is also governed by a circle broader than the Gulf circle, namely the Islamic circle. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognizes the Soviet Union and it once had diplomatic relations with it. Saudi Arabia did not terminate those relations. The side terminating them was the Soviet Union when it withdrew its mission from Jiddah in the 1930's. Here enters the issue of "dealings." The Saudi opinion in this regard, as expressed by Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the Saudi minister of foreign affairs, in an interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL (1 December 1984) is that withdrawal of the Soviet mission from Jiddah "was not because of hostility to the kingdom. What led to that withdrawal was the absence of dealings between the two countries." Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal added: "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not have relations with many countries of the world, not just the Soviet Union.... This is not because we do not recognize these states or because we ignore them but rather because there weren't dealings between us in the past to justify the presence of diplomatic relations." So relations are, from the Saudi viewpoint, governed by dealings.

As for the broader Islamic circles which influence the Saudi decision-making, they have their utmost importance to the kingdom. This is why the Saudi position on the issue of relations with the Soviet Union is tied largely to the Soviet policy in Afghanistan. Even though the kingdom appreciates the Soviet position toward the Palestinian issue and toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in

particular, it hopes--a hope expressed by the kingdom's minister of foreign affairs in his interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL--that "there will not be contradiction in the Soviet Union's policy in the area and that it will view the Afghanistan issue from a position of right and justice. The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and its denial of the Afghan people's right to self-determination are something negative.... The Soviet Union must demonstrate to the world that it acknowledges the Afghan people's rights as it has acknowledged the Palestinian people's right."

It is evident from this that Saudi Arabia expects that with the passage of time, contacts and dealings with the Soviet Union will be intensified so that there may be a justification for relations. The latest such contact was the "athletic visit" paid by Prince Faysal ibn Fahd, chairman of the Saudi Youth Welfare and Sports Council, to Moscow last September. At the same time, Saudi Arabia awaits a clarification, if not a change, in the Soviet position on Afghanistan (from Gorbachev's administration) in Geneva next month. However, Saudi Arabia does not object to the other Gulf states establishing relations with Moscow if they find this to be in their interest.

The UAE position on establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union differs greatly from the position of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. It is a position that is closer to the Omani position than to any other Gulf position. The Omani-UAE rapprochement is complete, having been crowned by two visits made by Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, the UAE president, to Oman last July and September where he met with Sultan Qabus for several days in Salalah and Muscat. Moreover, many of the UAE's political and personal sensitivities toward and fears from the sultanate have been eliminated, especially since the settlement of border problems between the two countries and since Oman considers that there are actually no border problems with the UAE to merit estrangement or remoteness in their relations.

This is why the possibilities that the UAE will be the second state after Oman to take the step of establishing relations with the Soviet Union are big possibilities compatible with the ambitious tendencies of the UAE foreign policy that have been shackled in recent years. The UAE established relations with the PRC 1 month before last year's Kuwait summit. It was the second Gulf state after Oman to establish relations with Beijing. (Kuwait established such relations several years ago.)

The UAE has had the desire to deal with the Soviet Union since the first GCC summit, which was held in Abu Dhabi at the beginning of June 1981--a summit which laid down the bases of the GCC and announced its establishment. In an interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL (6 June 1981)--an interview which aroused at the time a big clamor and various reactions--Shaykh Zayid said to me in response to a question on how he views the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union: "Let us first listen to the opinion of those who want to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the opinion of those who oppose it. If those who oppose establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow base their opposition on the argument that it is in conflict with the Islamic faith and with the religious rites and that Moscow contributes to spreading atheism and similar destructive ideas in the country, then this is

an obsolete argument. But if their opposition is based on other tangible and real issues of which we are not aware and which confirm that establishing the relations poses a danger and a threat to us, then we can be convinced that these dangers do actually threaten us and we will side with their opinion. Those advocating the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union must also convince us of the benefits and advantages of such a step, and we may be convinced."

This answer makes evident where Shaykh Zayid's sentiments on the issue of establishing relations with the Soviet Union lie. He was the first Gulf leader to express frankly his opinion in the same interview on whether he considers the Soviet Union, as some Gulf states once considered it, a main enemy of his country. He said at the time: "We do not so far consider the Soviet Union our enemy. We believe that the real enemy and the real usurper resides in Palestine and in the heart of the Arab nation, stabbing it daily. This Zionist usurper has been tearing the Arab world apart for more than a quarter century, i.e., before the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the downfall of Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia and of the shah in Iran.

Since the convocation of the GCC's constituent assembly on its soil, the UAE was the first to urge, implicitly and explicitly, through Shaykh Zayid, its president, and Ahmad Khalifah al-Suwaydi, its former minister of foreign affairs, the need to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow so as to achieve the desired balance in the Gulf's relations with the world. After a passage of 6 years, the UAE seems now to be on the threshold of taking within months this step which it has long sought and wanted. The path for this step between Abu Dhabi and Moscow is now paved, after having become open between Muscat and Moscow. It is no secret that a prominent Soviet journalist paid in August a visit to Abu Dhabi which led the UAE government to grant Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, a permit to open an office in the UAE. It is also no secret that a warm atmosphere currently engulfs UAE-Soviet contacts.

If these are the questions of the sixth Gulf summit, convened in Muscat, on what developments will follow Omani-Soviet relations, then the more important questions raised in the summit lobbies concern the Omani positions on the GCC's various tendencies and numerous policies--positions expressed a few days before the summit by Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id in the first conference he has held throughout his 15 years of rule. The press conference not only reflected the human and humanitarian face of a ruler who is well known for not giving public interviews frequently and for rarely mixing with journalists but allowed him to express clearly his country's positions on several issues preoccupying the GCC and its member states but it also reflected him as a skillful player in the international arena, experienced with its rules and aware of its pitfalls. Sultan Qabus was also able to declare frankly that full security coordination among the GCC member states requires more time and that, consequently, the emphasis must be put on the "how" and not the "how much." He asked the GCC member states to turn their attention to methods and qualifications and not to focus on quantity by purchasing equipment and gathering machinery they cannot use. Therefore, a distance must exist between ambitions and capabilities. Ambitions are boundless when compared with capabilities and they must be "cut down to the size of capabilities," meaning that true defense and security

capabilities must be viewed realistically and that it must not be said that we have achieved what we want just because the council has prepared a bill to that effect.

Omani realism has not been confined to the security-defense issue but has extended to the other economic and political issues that demand a clear GCC position more than they demand "theorization" in a number of papers skirting the issues without penetrating them. It has been evident from the conversations of the summit lobbies between al-Bustan Palace and the Sheraton in Muscat that the Omani path is the path open nowadays in the corridors of the GCC.

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ALGERIA

CO-OP CONSTRUCTION MAY SOLVE HOUSING SHORTAGE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by A. Chenouf: "Public Interest, Individual Initiative"]

[Text] "The idea is to build decent, affordable housing, and to achieve this in a carefully supervised and efficiently guided collective effort."

One of the solutions the government is currently contemplating to improve family housing is the real-estate cooperative. This was one way to ease the housing shortage and to lighten the burden of construction costs on the budget. The burden of the measure is an appeal to groups of individuals wishing to form a cooperative, and, with that as a beginning, to establish a particular pattern of relations between the individuals involved and the legal entity they are creating: the cooperative.

In actual practice, though, none of this has been formalized, for several reasons.

Reason 1 is the fact that getting the option to buy a piece of land has become an obsession in some quarters. The upshot is that once the land becomes the property of the cooperative, it is transformed into a free-for-all race to build according to one's personal preferences: a house, a warehouse, a retail business, whatever. There is no lack of such examples in the co-op settlements of Cheraga, Birkhadem, or Staoueli.

Once distracted from its initial purpose, the costs incurred for individual constructions outstrips imagination. Utterly devoid of respect for that consistency that is the soul of all sound and rational urban planning, the "wonders" erected on the fringes of the capital offend passers-by with an ostentatious style, a model that is utterly alien to our culture and our values.

All kinds of fantasies are projected upon or acted out in construction: plans are altered twice a week, reinforced concrete beams and plexiglass doors are hung crooked, they thumb their noses at their neighbors and competitors in the race: "Anything you can do, I can do better!" The colossal sums sunk into these houses truly exceeds all understanding.

Sometimes, a man will take as much as 10 years or more to complete construction. And during that time, what an orgy of fraud, price-raising, and shady dealing goes on over cement, foundation stability, faience tiles, or woodwork!

Some citizens who have held title to land for 4 or 5 years have not even begun excavation or grading, for "lack of funds."

This state of affairs is clearly covered in the text. Belonging to a cooperative means, among other things, being able to pay for part of the construction, and finding the money for the balance in loans.

But how and why did we get into such a situation? Why have citizens moved heaven and earth to get title to a piece of land, and then deviated from the spirit of the agreement? "Because land is now a scarce commodity," we are told by the president of one APC. To this, we must add the not always legal shortcuts some institutions take in conveying hundreds of square meters. And the result, as we can see today, is that only those who already had the money have built on their land. People living on modest incomes take a long time to build their houses, bit by painful bit.

There are, accordingly, those who got title to land and those who did not. This is the second reason.

The charter for the building cooperative was aimed primarily at middle-income people who did not own their homes. To avoid any confusion, it is well to bear in mind the fact that the "occupant" and the "owner" are totally different.

That's being the case, groups of individuals in a neighborhood started spreading the word that a cooperative might not be a bad idea.

All that was needed was to fill out a printed form and deliver it to a delegate of the group, who would take care of the paperwork at the level of notary surveys, and forward it to the APC. At this level, everything suddenly ground to a screeching halt. They waited for the issuance of a building-site permit, which never came. Because there is no vacant land, this feature is still acceptable for big cities, especially for the capital, where a whole battery of measures has been arrayed -- paradoxical though they may sometimes prove -- to govern land use.

The situation surrounding land reserves still suffers inadequate management mechanisms.

Reason 3: Confidence. The citizen's capacity for putting his faith in individual construction schemes where there are certain

ground-rules all members must abide by is by no means a matter of course. For instance, there are certain rules of the game that all must abide by, or the whole enterprise will fall apart. The coop member doesn't know what lot he is going to live on, nor how much his house is going to cost, nor yet the architectural style and design he will have to live with. All these matters arise after a lot of procedures: meetings of co-op members, and discussions in the general assembly. It is these petty, plaguey annoyances that cause the interminable delays, and the individual wants to have everything done, and done right now. Hence, the concept of time is critical to this kind of relationship, just as is, first and foremost, individuality.

When the APC is laggard in its response to requests for title, and all too aware of the implacable environment in which building is besieged, owing to the combined effects of the housing shortage and demographics, it becomes difficult, on top of everything else, for the co-op member to go on believing in the feasibility of building collectively. Since none of the attempts to regroup people has led to any concrete results, it was only natural that discouragement should overtake some co-op members thus giving rise to "the breakup of cooperatives," even though in fact they may have existed only on paper, and that, in the event, they strayed away from their original objectives.

Furthermore, in several APCs, the agreement never took effect. Perhaps this was because the statute did not provide for an educational, informational, and motivational campaign. That explains why, in the course of our wanderings, we have seen only lovely villas, warehouses, or vacant lots, areas acquired in toto under the cooperative law. There was one lonely building cooperative, built well before the statute was adopted.

The Model of the Algerian Heritage

Behind the premises of the Professional Training and Labor Ministry, in the Panorama neighborhood, stands a multitude of identical houses, indistinguishable from one another. Same type of construction, same architecture, and an artistic consistency of style that contrasts oddly with the surrounding buildings. This cooperative is actually an old story, dating back to the late Sixties.

The wedge was a subdivision of lots, part of which were built up by a cooperative. They were built either as rental housing or with an eye to future sale. This HLM (moderate income housing) policy had an impact that is clearly marked on housing of that period.

And it is on the basis of that cooperative and that text which set out detailed regulations for the machinery of management and spelled out the kind of relationship that would govern co-op members

over the time-span between inception and completion of the project. The initiative, the courage, and the determination of one man gave life to the idea of setting up a cooperative. In those days, who would even have listened to somebody talking about a housing cooperative? This men's cogent and persuasive arguments won over the people around him. Their decision, neither fish nor flesh nor good red herring, led them along the road of certainty. And people believed in the plan.

Of delays, there were plenty, even before work began. The project was no small undertaking: 80 villas, 18 apartments in collectively owned buildings, and all of them on rolling ground. The whole thing was completed in 27 months.

How did they do it? The co-op members in general assembly elected a management council to take the entire operation in hand. That working group got into touch with the land-registry administration, talked to the building contractor, and consulted a studies outfit as to the best way to present a proposal, kept a close eye on work under way, and monitored the construction site. As for the individual co-op member, he had nothing whatever to do with all that.

When everything was finished, the house-keys were turned over to the new owners. There was one clause that all the members had accepted! No dwelling was owned by anybody; they all had to wait for final approval before, in general assembly, every member knew precisely where he would be living. They did it by drawing lots, or reached consensus, or based it on affinity, or on ties of family or friendship.

"In this way, the co-op member, not knowing which lot would be his, maintained a keen personal interest in the overall project, and everybody put something into it." A 5-room house on a pile foundation cost around 15 million centimes, including the land, and a 4-room apartment cost less than 7 million centimes, including interest, and the savings-and-loan at that time charged 3.5 percent interest.

"The low costs astonished the financial comptrollers more than a little."

Nowadays the pretty villas stand as the result of a long-term undertaking, of belief in the plan, and of a uniqueness that was never for a moment challenged.

In the co-op's offices, located in an apartment building that belongs to the cooperative, there is an incessant coming and going indicative of uninterrupted work. The cooperative is still alive. "We take care," Yazid told us, "of all the occupants' maintenance and administrative problems."

This office hires maintenance and repair personnel, makes the necessary outlays, and keeps the property records. When the resident is not yet full owner, he contributes 0.3 percent per year to his equity until he has paid off all his shares. "Only those who pay their debts regularly can be members."

And when all the shares have been redeemed, what will become of the cooperative?

"If there is no program, we shall have no reason to exist. But the cooperative will still be there, with its architectural plan, its internal settlements made by each resident and forwarded for scrutiny by the notaries.

"We asked for a site approval for construction of 700 housing units at Birkhadem, but somehow the APC's response never seems to come.

"We have a lot of experience, and no direct personal interest. The only interest we claim, as we have done with the co-op members here, is the interest of the group. The results are there to prove it, and under this formula, everybody wins."

There you have statements clear enough for all to see, innocent of any ambiguity.

The cooperative has been misunderstood, because those who needed land thought that this was the surest way to get it. They bought shares at the APC, then each individual went ahead and built as he pleased. This sort of thing skews the architectural plan, and is very costly indeed.

In other words, the cooperative is a unit. It embraces a body of individuals who have common interests. If there is no oneness, there is no co-operative. That means a lot of construction sites, a lot of unnecessary expenditure, and a dispersion of efforts.

The seminar held recently in Algiers on this question revealed that the speakers had failed fully to grasp the operations, the scope, and the objective of the cooperative. This meeting made it possible to pinpoint the evidence of shortcomings and to propose a set of measures for awakening the cooperative movement. The end-goal was to enable citizens to live in decent housing in this particular regrouping pattern.

By the Housing Ministry, we were told that all our recommendations would be passed along in instructions to the wilayas and communes.

Obviously, that leaves the basic problem of land. In Algiers, all land reserves are frozen. At the Rais-Hamidou APC, citizens can obtain the forms. At present, the battle is joined over the size of the area to be built up. Once that obstacle is cleared, half the problem will have been solved.

Mr Abderrahmane Belayat, minister for city planning, construction, and housing, explained all the ins and outs for us:

"The problem is this: the idea is to build decent and functional housing and to do it in a collective approach, with adequate expertise and sound guidance. There are certain economic, social, and architectural interests to be protected and enabled to survive in a legal and administrative system that has been proposed to us. To deny this need for organization is to open the gates to anarchy and improvisation for which we should all pay heavily indeed in the long run."

"There are certain rules that are the foundation of the collectivity and which every member of the cooperative must abide by.

"The cooperative movement is pregnant with high hopes for providing access to housing, but on condition that it is soundly managed at the local level and well directed at the new central. We are counting heavily on the power of example."

Pending application of the instructions, local determination and commitment constitute, for the moment, the one mechanism that requires regular and thorough oiling. It is a long-term job, one calling for flawless coordination among the various people involved.

National Council for Building Cooperatives

Survey of recommendations by the seminar on access to ownership

Urban Planning, Construction, and Housing Minister Beleyat Abderrahmane presided yesterday over a meeting of the National Construction Council for Housing Cooperation.

It should be noted that this body, created under decree 83.283 on 30 April 1983, was designed, according to its provisions:

- To study questions of a general nature brought to its attention by the city planning, construction, and housing minister in connection with building cooperatives;
- to be consulted on all pending bills and regulations affecting cooperative housing;
- to monitor the application and regulations enacted in that area;
- To examine the appeals brought on behalf of cooperatives which did not succeed in obtaining approval;
- To hand down opinions and formulate helpful recommendations in such cases.

During this meeting, the National Real Estate Cooperation Council was tasked with studying and screening recommendations and proposals for legislation recommended by the commissions set up in the course of the national seminar on property ownership in the coop environment, which met in Algiers on 11 and 13 November 1985.

Practical steps have been set in train in compliance with the instructions to be given to the sundry local operators to put more steam into a new dynamics in the cooperative movement.

In other action, and insofar as concerns measures calling for application of regulatory laws, working groups have been formed within the Council to put the finishing touches on drafts of proposals for submission concerning several points requiring studies in greater depth.

The conclusions reached by the various groups involved will be submitted to the National Council, whose next meeting is scheduled for the end of December 1985.

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ALGERIA

PROGRAM ESTABLISHED TO INCREASE SHEEP, CATTLE BREEDING

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 25 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Omar Berbiche]

[Text] The Agricultural Cadre meeting convened on Saturday wound up its work yesterday after 2 days of intensive and fruitful discussions over the various programs designed to step up sheep and cattle breeding.

Yesterday's work session, attended by Agriculture and Fishing Minister Merba Kasdi, centered on the status of animal production in its various compartments.

Assessment of the program to intensify sheep-raising in relation to the steppe program, improvement of milk yields, and the poultry sector, together with a look at progress reports on planned operations and introduction of the annual plan for 1986, constituted the main points on yesterday's agenda.

How to increase sheep production, a sector to which, as we all know, the government attaches great importance, in view of the erratic behavior of the meat markets over the past few months, was by all odds the question that aroused most interest and most comment.

The machinery of the meat market was vividly demonstrated in the finest detail by the wilaya agriculture directors, who, citing the first-hand experience of each wilaya in this field, sought to find answers to the breakdown the sector is going through, and offering suggestions, some of which were deemed pertinent to the problem of turning the situation around.

The participants tried to answer these crucial questions: first, why is there such an unwarranted disparity between prices paid the producer and those charged the consumer, a discrepancy that even reaches into the government's own marketing services? To cite but one example a food office manager raised: a kilo of beef sold by the Food Office at 65 DA turns up on the counters at the big central markets priced at 90 DA and even more.

There was another concern: why this fluctuation of prices from region to region, thanks to which the price per kilo of lamb or mutton, 75 DA in Oran and 90 DA to 100 DA in other wilayas and, the final irony, in some regions among those recognized as the most productive of all, like the steppe zones?

Furthermore, how to explain this discrepancy between, on the one hand, the decline in forage and barley prices and the enormous outlays made to bring the growers onto a more even footing, both by support for production and in the form of feed allocations, in veterinary care, and other ways, and, on the other hand, out of soaring meat prices that respond to no known marketing logic?

The red-meat sector is a very complex one and therefore cries out for an appropriate action program and some device for flexible and efficacious intervention upstream as well as downstream of production. This becomes more evident in that the cattle-growing sector as a whole, is the province of the private sector (86 percent of total production), and is all but impossible to manage, with all the untoward impact it inflicts on the stability and regulation of the market. The DAPs, at their own level, have not been remiss in calling attention to the difficulties they are experiencing in building up breeding herds in the steppe zones, owing to the prohibitive prices charged by the growers.

Where is the answer (or answers)? Everyone speaks out of his own experience. "We have to discipline the market." they say in some DAPs. How do you go about doing that? By cutting off un-audited government intervention (local collectives and national corporations) in the cattle marketplace. By substituting imported meat for the breeding herds so as to increase national production. Still more specific and more realistic is this suggestion from a speaker who argues that the best way to change course is to establish contractual relations with the growers, on terms which would clearly define the forms of intervention and assistance (feed, veterinary care...) which the State, via the growers' cooperatives must provide, and clauses concerning the selling price of their product.

This formula, already in effect, would make swift headway and gain strength as it proves more viable. That was the admonition given the DAPs when Kasdi Merbah took the floor in the course of the debates.

Analyzing the situation in animal production, the farming and fishing minister pointed out that this sector has not benefited in the past by the full attention it requires, adducing as sole evidence that the combined sheep and cattle herds, whose level had not perceptibly varied in a century, has now declined from 15 million head to a mere 19 million, even as the human population has been growing very fast.

Accordingly, said Kasdi Merbah, the whole portfolio must be taken over seriously by the whole body of structures.

The measures already taken in this direction would gain by consolidation.

Among them are some alterations in the mission of the Meat Offices, whose chief calling nowadays it to help production rather than focusing solely on meat imports and marketing. Strengthening the growers' cooperatives and expediting their necessary move toward parallel status with the individual growers, continuation and consolidation of fattening and breeding operations in the North, and upgrading the means for doing so are all activities that deserve encouragement.

Increasing milk yields was also on the working agenda for yesterday. The debates on this issue, which, as Kasdi Merbah pointed out, is also one of major importance to the country, centered on how to go about increasing yields, which are still abnormally low if there is to be any visible improvement this year.

The 10-liter goal set for the HAS has not yet been reached by the wilayas, while the national mean stands at 6 to 7 liters.

The decline in the herds reflects the kinds of reforms undertaken, poor herd management, the lack of follow-up in feed supplies and veterinary care are at the root of the failure of this domain to thrive economically. An intensification program has been established to correct that sorry state of affairs, and it is already beginning to bear fruit.

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EGYPT

PLANE HIJACKING DEMANDS REVIEW OF PRIORITIES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 24 Oct 85 p 7

[Article by 'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan, governor of Giza: "National Will Is Stronger"]

[Text] The official and popular Egyptian position is intent on not losing its freedom of movement in the face of the American administration's stance on the Egyptian airliner. It realizes, however, that the incident must be placed in its right political framework and must be put in its proper perspective so as not to fall prey to the waves of exaggeration and browbeating or to be dragged by problems and exigencies into the pitfalls of simplification and belittlement.

The fact is that the dimensions of the Egyptian airliner incident are extremely complicated and carry meanings which may outline the secrets of the American administration's political strategy toward the region and the Palestinian cause. Hence, the contention that this incident was motivated by the American administration's desire to regain its self-esteem in the wake of the successful TWA hijacking and its submission to the hijackers' demands or by its wish to flex its muscles and show its military strength in the region, or the contention that Reagan is a lame-duck president who wants to manifest his strength to the American people and end his political life as a hero who triumphed over terrorism, may be a superficial analysis of the incident and a simplification of the American decision. This matter no doubt is closely linked to a previous military failure, for the echoes of the Iran hostages are still resounding in the American administration's ears as it attempts to regain its self-respect.

On the other hand, we find that the American decision to hijack the Egyptian civilian airliner primarily carried a message to several parties simultaneously.

It is a message that we believe is directed at the Soviet Union before the anticipated summit meeting between Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev where the Middle East problem and the Palestinian question are scheduled for discussion. Perhaps the American administration wished to settle the debate before it began, so it expressed its position toward the Palestinian people, defining its policy toward the problem accordingly. The American administration wanted

to say openly that it will not hesitate to use military force to protect its interests in the region and that certain fundamental points in its policy are not open to discussion or debate.

It is a message directed at the Arab nation, with all its various political orders, that Arab regimes must restrain and freeze, if not liquidate, the Palestinian resistance. The other side of the message is that there can be no solution without the participation and approval of the United States. And lest anyone imagine that this is an exaggeration, witness Tunisia's withdrawal of its permission to the Egyptian airliner to land on its territory and the British government's refusal to negotiate with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, all because of American pressures in accordance with the declared American policy of not recognizing the PLO or its demands for the right to self-determination. If only the matter stopped at that. The incident also created a crisis with the Italian government over its refusal to turn over the Palestinian fighter, Abu-al'Abbas, who helped negotiate the release of the Italian ship. What made things worse was its refusal to boycott the UN General Assembly session if 'Arafat was invited to deliver a statement at the UN. All these things may have deeper and more significant meanings.

It is also a message directed at Egypt that its active diplomatic endeavors to meet the Middle East problem head-on must at least be slowed down or must assume a different philosophy. A careful study of the incident's dimensions and meanings leads us to say that the only thing left for us to do is to unite the national will in pursuit of the goal of enhancing our economic, political, and social strength to a degree that realizes the concept of self-sufficiency and self-reliance. All this can be achieved by raising production to the highest possible level in confirmation of the adage that economic conditions are a pillar of political strength and that people who rely on others for their needs may one day lose some of their freedom of movement.

We in Egypt have come to realize that the time has indeed come to rearrange economic conditions in Egypt through greater participation by the people so that they may see how things are and how they should be. We must go beyond the expression of good national intentions to embark on real deeds and to check all forms of extravagance by rational spending and consumption. All partisan and popular organizations must assume their role in educating the masses and mobilizing their efforts, not from a partisan perspective but rather from a purely national one which defines the goal, assigns roles, and offers a variety of ways and means, provided that we meet at the point where the goal is attained. It has become urgent that the ruling party assume its popular responsibilities by clinging to the masses and organically joining forces with their endeavors in order to render them more effective and more influential in the Egyptian street. What we do not wish for is to live again in a political void or to suffer from intellectual confusion or from conflicting and contradictory interpretations which have nothing to do with reality.

Moreover, national will cannot be separated from pan-Arab will. Events have proven that a minimum degree of pan-Arab unity is the true guarantee for

protecting national sovereignty and safeguarding peoples' destinies. Contemporary evidence confirms that Arab disintegration has opened the door wide to unrestrained contentiousness on Arab soil. This is reflected on the region's security, holding the rights and values of people in disdain. Hence the need to search for a formula to clear the Arab air and unite the Arab rank has become a first priority. Indeed, Arab rapprochement at the present time, no matter how different opinions and visions may be, is the decisive factor for bringing problems under control and rebuilding the Arab nation. Unity of Arab ranks must be followed by unity of Palestinian resistance detachments and the rationalization of the Palestinian movement in order to convince the international community of the fairness of our cause.

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EGYPT

EDITORIAL WARNS ABOUT DEPENDENCY ON IMPORTED FOOD

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 25 Oct 85 pp 1, 3

[Editorial by Ibrahim Nafi': "We Need Bold Imagination"]

[Text] Times of hardship bring to light the intrinsic nature of people and bring out their true personal traits. During the last crisis, the most important revelation and the most outstanding result of the experience revealed Egypt's true personality.

To keep the flame alive, we must pursue our march with the same enthusiasm that has been burning in our hearts for the last few days.

I said before that in order to free national opinion from any foreign pressures, we must own and produce our daily bread and our weapons, for producing countries, as President Mubarak has said, are the only ones capable of safeguarding and defending their national honor.

Although both elements are very important in implanting self-reliance, countries may have some alternatives in making available the element of weapons, unlike bread, in which they have no option room for choices.

We may be able to obtain weapons from more than one source if need be because the First World countries have all entered the arms market. Their need to export arms is as great as our need to import them. Arms have been flooding the area during the last two eras at unprecedented rates in order to soak up the oil fortunes which have come upon the countries of the region.

The weapon about which we have no choice is food. It is the weapon of the future which the rich First World has put off using, it appears, until it disposes of its military weapons, which soak up the peoples' wealth.

Suffice it to take a look at the figures of world wheat production and at our imports of this commodity in order to show the danger of this secret weapon which may one day bring more pressure to bear on the peoples' freedom and national will than any other weapon known to mankind throughout history.

According to the average figures of the last 3 years, the world produces 460 million tons of wheat, 90 million tons of which are surpluses earmarked for

export. The Arab world imports 13 million tons, or 14 percent of the world's surplus.

How many of these 13 million tons does Egypt import?

Egypt, unfortunately, imports 6 million tons of wheat, almost 50 percent of the total amount the Arab world imports and 7 percent of the world surplus!

Is not this figure astounding?

Egypt's population has no more than 1 percent of the world's population, so how can we import, in addition to domestic production, 7 percent of the world's wheat surplus?

How can Egypt, the gift of the Nile, the cradle of ancient agriculture, and the mother of the oldest civilizations which sprang up along the rivers, fail to feed its people in such a miserable fashion as to be forced to import 6 million tons of wheat a year?

Another equally important question is: who exports wheat to the world?

Wheat, of course, is exported by the world's wheat farms, that is, the United States, Canada, Australia, and some European Common Market countries.

Does this not mean clearly that there is no alternative to the wheat weapon and there is not much choice?

I always like to ask the following questions: what would happen if we were unable one day to import wheat and what would we do if our resources were unable to pay the bill?

Some imagine that the arms bill is more dangerous with respect to our peoples' independence and free will. This is true in some respects. I still believe, however, that wheat will soon become more dangerous and more crucial to our national independence and political will.

I have said that higher production is no longer a purely economic issue but rather a matter of national honor and a question of self-defense and national independence.

I am not exaggerating when I say that the wheat weapon is the most sensitive aspect of this national issue because, on the one hand, there is no alternative to it and, on the other, we may be able one day to deflect an arrow aimed at our hearts.

The issue of agriculture in Egypt must be our primary national concern during the next few years without neglecting, of course, our other national concerns related to industry and all forms of development.

We need to dig out the rocks with our nails in order to enlarge our agricultural land by an average of between 200,000 and 250,000 arable feddans

a year so as to add to our map between 2 and 2.5 million feddans of green land in 10 years.

We have no time for frivolity in this regard. We are facing a danger engulfing our country and our future and must repel it with every drop of sweat possible.

We must go out to the desert to invade its unexplored regions just as the pioneers invaded the unknown regions of the American West to cultivate the land and sow the seeds of construction and development, thus transforming their country in a matter of 200 years into the greatest economic, military, and technological power in the world.

We must pave the way for our pioneers with facilities, not mines, which force them to give up in despair.

I openly and clearly say that cultivating the desert is an extremely expensive proposition which our country's strained budget cannot endure. This must be an individual rather than a government endeavor. We must only act as their guides and advisors.

Our government is strongly urged to lift all obstacles in the way of any person wanting to reclaim and cultivate any piece of the greatest sea of sand surrounding our valley.

Our government is strongly urged to offer the desert sands on a silver platter to anyone wishing to reclaim and cultivate it for the good of the nation and for the future and security of its land.

Our government is strongly urged to take upon itself the task of providing water, electric power, and roads to desert land and thereafter to offer it free to anyone wishing to reclaim and cultivate it in order to transform its yellow sand into green land.

There is no time to philosophize or get carried away with theoretical debates. We are in a state of self-defense which does not afford us the luxury of wasting time in trying to determine whether government agencies or individuals are best suited for this task.

China, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, for a long time, have been veering toward solving agricultural problems by expanding the scope of private endeavors in agriculture by making use of personal incentives in raising agricultural production. Many previously sacred and untouchable ideas and theories have fallen away for the sake of this great goal.

So what are we waiting for? Why do we not take advantage of the importance of personal incentives to expand our country's agricultural land and provide food for our people in order to diminish our reliance on the outside world for food?

We want to reach a level of awareness which renders any obstacle in the way of higher agricultural or industrial production an act of treason against our people's future and a detriment to their interests and aspirations.

When will we reach this high peak of national loyalty? When will we put an end to any sensitivities between the public and private sectors whereby each one will employ its expertise and capabilities in the service of higher national production?

The greatest challenge facing us is the development of self-reliance and a reduction of our reliance on others. All of us have a burning desire to realize this great goal in defense of our national honor. So how can we allow some small obstacles to stand in our way?

Anyone who adds one more drop to the sea of production is a patriot, regardless of whether he belongs to the private or public sector.

And anyone who creates a new job opportunity and contributes to the realization of social security and stability is a patriot, regardless of whether he belongs to the private or public sector.

And anyone who adds to his community's structure a new school, university, college, hospital, factory, or club is a patriot, regardless of whether he belongs to the public or private sector.

And anyone who adds a drop of public money to the state coffers, be it from taxes, customs fees, export surpluses, or import cost savings is a patriot, regardless of whether he belongs to the private or public sector.

We want to become a nation of producers who benefit their country and their communities as much as themselves, regardless of definitions and appellations.

In order to be a nation of producers, we must change our attitude toward old appellations and things which have become implanted in some people's consciousness as indisputable principles.

Why, for instance, don't we raise the income tax exemption rate in exchange for contributions from 3 percent to a reasonable rate that would encourage the able to serve their local communities through large, useful projects. I am aware that the Ministry of Finance may be annoyed by this proposal because it might affect revenues which need to be increased, not reduced. But I am also aware that a reduction in limited revenues may be made up by money saved through such projects which the state would have to undertake if individuals did not volunteer to sponsor them as a service to their community.

The matter requires imagination which can see long-term interests, not just immediate benefits. And if it is the minister of finance's affair to deal with abstract figures as the head of a household who is required to meet his family's inexorable needs based on the resources available to him, it is certainly necessary to reconcile the two: urgent short-term interests and the more general and universal long-term interests.

We must also look at all our problems with an eye which combines these two objectives in favor of the Egyptian people. And we must also look ahead with bold imagination and a sincere desire to work and produce in order to solve our country's problems.

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EGYPT

PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION OF GAS RANGES DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 24 Oct 85 p 9

[Article by Usamah Saraya: "Gas Ranges: How Many Do We Produce, How Many Do We Consume?"]

[Text] The gas range is a necessary commodity in every household, be it in a city or a village. How many of them do we produce locally and how many do we import? Notwithstanding that the raw materials used in manufacturing ranges are Egyptian and ranges can be totally processed in Egypt, thus expanding production with a capacity for export, Egypt has not entered the world market by exporting gas ranges. Despite the existence of two public-sector and six private-sector companies which produce ranges, we are still importing! How can range production be developed to compete with imports and to dispense with the foreign-made units that Egyptians bring in from abroad? There is not a public-sector company which specializes in the production of ranges. The minister of supply has issued an order banning the exportation of public-sector products. The public sector is facing difficulties in exporting its products! A study prepared by the Ministry of Economy, Foreign Trade Section, reveals several important points regarding the development of gas range manufacturing and consumption in Egypt. This study was prepared by Ministry of Oil and Industry experts in collaboration with Ministry of Economy specialists.

Ministry of Economy Undersecretary Ahmad Fu'ad al-Tatriq presented the study's contents and recommendations to the minister of economy and foreign trade, Dr Sultan Abu 'Ali, reviewing the development of production and consumption and showing how importation can be curbed and production expanded.

The study--which was prepared by a committee chaired by Muhammad Ahmad 'Abd-al-Fattah, first undersecretary of war production, and which included the Committee for Investment Commodity Planning made up of representatives from the ministries of industry, planning, electricity, and higher education, the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, the Industrial Energy Department, and the Industrialization and Standardization Department--revealed the following:

--The necessity to maintain the current system of rationalizing the importation of gas ranges in view of adequate local production and to reduce the demand for gas tanks used to operate these ranges in order to lower subsidies;

--The need to stop expanding the production capacity of any public- or private-sector factory producing ranges operated by gas bottles with a view to switching gradually to models that operate on natural gas in order to popularize their use;

--The need to stimulate the selling price of public-sector gas ranges in order to realize a profit margin to cover production costs and help the public sector improve production to bring it up to export standards; and

--The need to take advantage of the relative importance of the local production of gas ranges, represented in the use of a large proportion of domestic raw materials, by manufacturing sophisticated models, first as an alternative to those imported by the Egyptian Free Zone Company or brought in from the outside by individuals, and, second, for export to Arab and African countries.

The study focused on the necessity to reconsider the Ministry of Supply's decision banning the exportation of gas ranges while modifying present designs and specifications of local products to bring them up to foreign standards. The study recommended that such ranges be manufactured in specialized factories in view of the fact that the public sector is not deeply involved in this type of production and therefore it is beneficial to sponsor their manufacture in specialized private-sector factories.

Production capabilities point to the existence of an Egyptian factory capable of undertaking this task, for it has been involved in exportation and has a production capacity of 40,000 ranges for export [a year]. However, such a factory must be offered incentives such as Ministry of Industry studies and technical assistance for design or the defraying of some of its costs.

The government must assist in the cost of conducting studies and research in foreign markets as well as in advertising costs and must offer exporting factories some tax breaks and assistance in solving problems faced by exporters regarding refunds of production taxes and fees paid on imported equipment when they export their products.

The public sector produces 156,413 gas ranges a year valued at 11,617,000 Egyptian pounds. In other words, the gross national production of gas ranges is 240,760 units valued at 18,573,000 Egyptian pounds. These figures show that the public sector accounts for about 64.9 percent of local production while the private sector produces 35.1 percent. These are 1983-84 figures. Public-sector production is concentrated in the Hulwan Company for Metal Appliances' "War Factory 360", and the Alexandria Metal Production Company, the two major companies which produce gas ranges.

As for the private sector, Egypt has six licensed factories which have won the Bureau of Standards high-quality seal. They are the Atlas Factory and the Industrial Federation of Shubrah al-Khaymah, and the Ammun, Fajr, Sido, and Gold factories of Alexandria.

General Comments on Production

1. It is noted that public-sector companies produce a large number of gas ranges which exceed their quotas set by the General Industrialization Authority.
2. Local production of ranges still relies on outmoded prototypes obtained when the factories were first constructed, with the exception of some plants which have modernized their gas range production, such as the Hulwan Company and the Atlas Factory. Moreover, Hulwan Company's "War Factory 360" has come out with stainless-steel four-burner stoves which are being manufactured in larger numbers to meet local market demands.

Egypt's Need for Gas Ranges

The study shows that the factors influencing the estimation of the country's needs during the period 1984/85-2000 are:

A population increase of about 2.3 percent a year; a higher cost of living, as a result of higher incomes, of about 8 percent a year; a shift in consumption patterns, particularly in the rural areas, as a result of changes in lifestyles and a tendency to construct better housing which can accommodate gas ranges, and the low cost of operating gas stoves due to government subsidies; the high cost of agricultural byproducts such as wood and corn stalks; and the shortage of manpower, in addition to high transportation and storage costs.

Add to these factors the projected number of new households, future trends in subsidy policies, and the widespread use of natural gas as a source of energy throughout the country. Figures of the Ministry of Economy study regarding projected 1984-87 needs show that overall demand for 1985 is for 400,000 units; for 1986, 415,000 units; and for 1987, 435,000 units. National needs have been growing by 4.9 percent a year, a rate which is expected to rise to 5 percent in 1985-87.

Egypt's imports of gas ranges in 1984 dropped to 8,000 units valued at 701,000 pounds, as opposed to 20,128 units imported at a cost of 2,344,000 pounds for 1983; 64,689 units imported at a cost of 2,402,000 pounds for 1982; and 123,078 units at a cost of 1,127,000 pounds for 1981.

Gas ranges are imported from Italy and the United States.

Orders regulating the importation of gas ranges have been issued in light of import rationalization committees and in the wake of adequate local production. This is in addition to easy-to-use ranges and prohibitive customs duties of up to 2,500 percent of the cost price.

The study's pointing to the absence of gas range exports is worth mentioning. If we want to consider exporting this commodity in the future, we will be faced with Order No 72 for 1980 by the minister of supply and domestic trade banning the exportation of supply goods and the subsequent orders adding other

commodities to the list, including gas ranges produced by the public sector. The Ministry of Supply in 1982 imposed a temporary ban on the exportation of gas ranges which is still in effect. With regard to public- and private-sector production, the production capacity of a new factory was geared toward the export of 40,000 top-quality units, but difficulties encountered in refunding production fees paid by producers have resulted in losses to the factory, thus forcing it to halt its export activities.

Moreover, domestically manufactured gas ranges in their present state will face stiff competition from foreign markets which produce sophisticated models. Therefore, it is necessary to develop and upgrade domestic production to compete with foreign units and to flood foreign markets with high-quality Egyptian products.

Gas ranges are considered a basic commodity used by a broad cross-section of the Egyptian population. There were 4 million ranges in use in 1983, the great majority of which were produced domestically.

The majority of the public-sector products was made up of the 2.5-burner one-oven model which used to represent 68 percent of Egypt's total production. In 1982-83, however, this model began taking a back seat to the three-burner one-oven or the sophisticated three-burner one-oven models.

There are no public-sector companies specializing in the manufacturing of gas ranges because none of these companies is involved in the production of this commodity as a primary item. The private sector is producing high-efficiency ranges and some of its factories are not honoring their production quotas.

Growing national demand will be met through expanded public-sector production and the next few years will witness a surplus.

The production of gas ranges is one of the Egyptian industries which uses domestic raw materials extensively in their production, although high-quality and high-efficiency units contain a higher percentage of components than the small units.

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TUNISIA

COMMENTARY ON GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION RELATIONS

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 14 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by Z. Amara]

[Text] Of all the events that have taken place in Tunisia over the past several weeks, there is one that, while happening almost unnoticed in the pushing and shoving of October, is nevertheless one of special significance. Its scope, though relatively limited, shows, should anyone need proof, a special state of mind that raises Tunisian society to a higher level than the one on which it has vegetated for so long.

We have seen a procession of spokesmen for the various national opposition movements winding in and out of the Prime Minister's office. These audiences, even though they were granted at the direct request of these movements, do not constitute, by any means, a demonstration of allegiance. It was actually a demonstration of support dictated by the tragic circumstances the country is going through. It was a statement that, even so, has a symbolic value in that it is evidence of the new state of mind that prevails in Tunisia's political life.

Even so, it does not deter the different parties from talking about their inability to agree. That very inability is, for that matter, deemed healthy insofar as it is interpreted an index of rich diversity. It does a great deal more than that: it symbolizes the right to differ.

Notwithstanding the special circumstances gripping Tunisia, it is a fact that nobody dare dismiss as unimportant, much less trivial. Tunisia now has both a government and a counter-government. Far be it from us to claim the ability to sound out the national psyche so as to assess the real influence of either component. The ballot-box and, to a lesser degree, opinion surveys provide us with two instruments for undertaking that task with the utmost possible objectivity. Even so, it is well to underscore the point that the historical legitimacy it can cause to prevail and the record of these 30 years in existence endow the present government

with an advantage that even its opponents do not challenge. That advantage is further confirmed by the support of a broad swath of opinion which, held in line by the structures of the Socialist Destourian Party, particularly in the interior of the country, constitutes for it a wealth of support that allows it to claim, without hesitation or fear of contradiction, that it is truly representative. It goes without saying that that quality can be measured objectively only in a clearly democratic environment. Yet, having remained alone on the political scene for three decades, the current regime, thanks to its vocation, its philosophy, and its way of managing public life, has somehow found its way deep into the citizen soul.

Mutations

The sociological mutations to which it has moved (democratizing education, opening up to the outside world, etc.) have nevertheless favored the emergence of a new category of citizens who, while grateful to it for its great achievements, are beginning to challenge, more or less noisily, some of its decisions and on occasion even its way of governing. This trend was visible particularly in the middle of the last decade. We had, at that time, been witness to the spectacular expansion of the political role of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT), which, as the only people's organization that was not always willing to conform, constituted a kind of melting-pot that drew in all the contesting factions. It took the 1978 breakup of that organization to make way for the debut on the public scene of avowed opposition movements that formed alliances how and where they would, providing an outlet for discontent, exacerbated though it was by the absence of democracy.

Democracy: there you have a magic word that leaves almost no one indifferent, and which crops up more and more often in conversation. A word whose use mirrors the changing state of the Tunisian soul.

When Mohamed Mzali took over the office of prime minister in 1980, he understood at once that he could not govern the country without giving that word its true meaning. A few months later, it was the Chief of State himself who announced at the PSL Congress that a multiplicity of parties would be the rule from now on.

Forthwith Tunisia marched through the front door into a new era. And people watched with genuine admiration the joyous change of our political mores.

It is at this stage that one can observe the differing assessment of the completed work.

Meanwhile, down at the Kasbah...

On Place de la Kasbah they blame the opposition movements for failing to recognize that work at its true value. Far more, we were told by a source close to the government which we contacted as part of our inquiry, "the opposition has gone so far as to question the government's commitment to continue and consolidate the democratic experiment. They have accused it of wanting to push the opposition onto the sidelines and repeatedly charged it with malicious intent. The opposition movements have been lacking in the clear-headed and responsible attitude they needed to respond properly to the opening."

Right there, you have the root of the problem laid bare. The question is: from which end of the process should you start. Contemporary history affords us numerous examples of these experiments that have failed miserably because they tried to go too fast. The Tunisian opposition is suspected of wanting to start the job right now and get it done fast. "They (the opposition) have behaved as if this were a country with a centuries-old history of democracy," they will tell you down at the Kasbah. "With that approach they hamper the government, or rather those in it who are putting forth enormous efforts to make sure that this experiment in democratization leads to the necessary success."

On their side, the opposition movements contacted for purposes of this survey are unanimous as to the need for reopening the dialogue on sound foundations, "especially" as the Movement of Socialist Democrats argues, "since there is no shortage of urgent business at hand."

But, before we get down to cases on this urgent business, we must first of all define the institutional framework within which that dialogue is to take place. While, from the government's point of view, that framework already exists, in that the Tunisian State is endowed with modern institutions, for the opposition, while admitting the existence "at least theoretical" of such institutions, it nevertheless considers itself excluded... pushed to the sidelines. "Dialogue between the government and the opposition parties is so rare," observer Hassib Ben Ammar maintains, "that when it occurs, it constitutes a major event."

Mohamed Harmel, secretary-general of the Tunisian Communist Party (PCT) feels that there are problems "so grave, dangers so threatening, and differences so serious between the government and the opposition that dialogue ought not only to be restored, but, most important of all, to take on a new and deeper dimension."

Needless to say, in its latest analysis of the current political situation, the PCT is doing its best to turn the conflict between the government and the UGTT to its advantage, just as it sought to capitalize on the deterioration of American-Tunisian relations in the wake of the Israeli raid on Mammam Beach. Its efforts proved vain, because there were not a lot of people lining the

Avenue de Londres, despite the widespread anger triggered by the unfriendly United States attitude toward Tunisia. The PCT was unsuccessful even in its attempts to convince "fellow-travelers" of its ability to stand up for their cause.

Demand-Orientated Unionism

In its attempts to grab a ride on the UGTT train, the PCT, taking its cue from other political movements with limited audiences, is trying to exploit the popularity and even the structures of the union labor central. A number of union people, not necessarily Destourians, have grasped that fact. These people also know that these movements draw their sustenance basically from supporters of a demand-focused labor movement devoted entirely to fomenting conflicts that can serve nobody's interests but their own.

The Change

This is, however, not the case in all opposition movements whose role, as the MDS underscores, is "to encourage change within the law."

They add, though, that this is no easy task because, they tell you on Rue Jemal Abdes'asser, if the MDS "enters into serious dialogue with all factions in the opposition ...) its doing so does not mean that it has decided to break with the government. It is, on the contrary, the government that doesn't seem to be getting used to the multi-party situation."

It is not in the least unexpected that this analysis should be spurned in the Kasbah, where they make it a point that it is the present government that engendered multi-partyism.

"If you want to conduct an unbiased analysis, you would need first of all to assess the significance of the progress made since 1980, progress that should have evoked less animosity on the part of the opposition. And they add: "As for this crisis that grips Tunisia, if other countries were to find themselves in the same situation as ours, they would seize upon it as a pretext for getting rid of the opposition. Mzali, quite the contrary, has just reaffirmed the democratic process before the Chamber of Deputies."

Once again, the differing perceptions of the progress that has been made underscore a profound divergence that only a cool and objective analysis could dissipate.

In the government, as in the opposition, people seem aware of the need to get on with this analysis so as to raise debate to a loftier level. This is especially true now that the search for consensus, as Hassen Ben Ammar puts it, "is thrust upon us: because of Tunisia's geo-political environment;

- lest, from the very outset, we doom the 7th Plan to failure;
- against the day when Habib Bourguiba will no longer be with us."

Pluralism

The Popular Unity Party (PUP) feels the same concern, as noted by its secretary-general: Gen Mohamed Amor considers it "imperious" to institutionalize concertation and to elevate pluralism to the status of a formal given."

In this context, two deadlines seem to loom at top priorities in the PUP's program. Preparation of the Plan, which must be brought into consonance with the law so as to bring into it all the parties as well as the next general elections, "A propos of which," says Belaj Amor, "We have received assurances from the Prime Minister."

Such assurances are in fact confirmed at the Kasbah, where they still believe that what happened in November 1981 was altogether alien to the Prime Minister's vision of that election, which he expected to "crown the first step toward bringing democracy into our political life."

To be persuaded of that, one has only to recall the conditions under which that campaign was conducted: "It was in the ballot-counting process that this experiment was sabotaged by the former interior minister."

Is this a promise for the forthcoming general elections, or a mere official finding of what transpired 5 years ago? One is tempted to lean toward the first assumption, especially at the Kasbah: after all the opprobrium heaped on the opposition, it is asked to "have confidence in Mzali."

And so it comes to pass that the drawbridges between the government and the opposition have been let down again. They will be made sturdier by a new law about to be enacted to regulate formation of political parties. Let us look together toward the future. Democracy is as fragile as it is in our country because it is so new, because it needs to be tenderly nurtured and lovingly cared for, especially by those who clamor for it most loudly.

[Editor's note] This survey was conducted prior to Mohamed Mzali's Friday 8 Nov 85 speech. We would further point out that we could not include the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in the survey, owing to our inability to talk with one of its leaders, despite repeated attempts to do so.

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BAHRAIN

BANKS LOOK TO FAR EAST INVESTMENTS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 1 Nov 85 p 55

/Article: "Bahrain Banks Look to Far East"/

/Text/ The Bahrain banking sector has begun to realize--with bold realism--that its golden age has passed and come to a close, and that the stage through which it is passing currently is a stage in which it needs to guide and control expenditures in order to confront the challenges of the market and competition.

Since the beginning of last year, a number of financial institutions moved to close their doors and leave the island completely. Among them were the American Continental Illinois Bank, the Brazilian Sao Paulo Commercial and Industrial Bank, the American Security Pacific Bank, the Italian Banco di Roma, the French Banque de l'Union Europeenne Bank, and the Royal Bank of Canada.

The withdrawal of all of these banks from the Bahrain market alarmed Bahraini officials, as if it were the first of a flood. But the situation currently shows that the wave of departures has nearly come to a halt, and that the remaining financial institutions on the Bahrain scene are pursuing their operations as usual. Some are hoping for a near-term abatement of the stagnation from which the banking sector on the island is suffering.

It would be difficult to deny that the foreign banking units in Bahrain received a major blow in 1984 and 1985. The announcement by the United Gulf Bank of its intention to reduce its loan portfolio and to concentrate on investments did not dispel the fears of the foreign units, rather, it increased their calculations of difficult days ahead. The truth is that expectations for the future seem unpromising in light of the downturn in the volume of syndicated loans and the decrease in the number of development projects in the country and the region. Nineteen eighty-four was the 1st year in which the assets of the foreign banking units have fallen since the arrival of these units in Bahrain more than a decade ago. The value of their assets fell from \$62.995 million at the end of 1983 to \$62,742 million at the end of 1984.

A number of other banking units preferred to decrease the size of their operations rather than shutting down completely. The most noteworthy example of these units is the measure resorted to by the Barclays and Midlands banks of Britain, which dispensed with their headquarters operations in Bahrain, consequently

reducing the number of employees by one-third. To compensate for this decrease, the banks both announced that they intend to extend the work hours of the headquarters of their international operations in both London and the Middle East.

As for the Arab Bank for Industry and Investment (BAII) /as published/, it chose a gradual accommodation, when it undertook to reduce its expenditures over a period of 3 years and decreased the number of its employees by one-quarter, in addition to decreasing the number of marginal customers and focusing on financing commercial operations rather than big contracts and projects.

The way out of this situation found by the Arab Banking Corp may be an example that could be emulated by these units. It has turned abroad with the aim of reducing its dependence on the regional market. It proceeded to purchase a bank in Hong Kong, the (Sun Hong Kay) Bank for the sum of \$46 million this past March. This raised the number of its branches and sister banks in the world to about 100.

Moreover, the largest number of foreign banking units has begun to make plans to enter Far East markets as an appropriate means to restore their profitability. They were encouraged in this by the success achieved by Far Eastern financial institutions operating in Bahrain.

For example, the seven Japanese institutions that conduct financial operations in the Middle East from their headquarters in Manama have realized uninterrupted profits since their entry into the Bahrain market. Likewise, the government-owned Bank Negara of Indonesia made profits by transforming its branch office in Bahrain into a foreign banking unit this past August.

However, opening Far East markets is not devoid of dangers, since it is difficult for a bank experienced in Middle East markets only, to deal with the adversities of Far East markets without previous preparation, particularly since the competition in these markets is strong and relentless.

In spite of these cautions, the Far East markets provide a broad opportunity for financial investments for institutions that possess field experience with conditions in these markets. Some Arab banks have begun to purchase shares in banks and financial institutions in the Far East, particularly in Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Singapore. In this regard, the Bank of Kuwait and Asia took a pioneering step by acquiring 3 percent of the first foreign bank investment in the People's Republic of China, and it is currently studying the possibility of purchasing a bank in Hong Kong.

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IRAQ

INFORMATION MINISTER DESCRIBES WAR ATMOSPHERE IN NATION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 25 Oct 85 pp 36-38

[Interview with Latif Nasif Jasim, Minister of Information: "The War Will Stop if the Aggression Stops: The Road to Jerusalem Is Open before Iran"]

[Text] War, by its nature, is a painful, cruel phenomenon which hinders the nation's progress, threatening to obstruct its civilized course and imposing a specific, particular program for dealing with it on all levels of life.

The phenomenon of war also brings literary production to the fore whose innovative self-sacrifice is colored with a distinctive hue.

What road has Iraq followed in dealing with its long war with Iran? Have other nations had specific experiences by which Iraq has been inspired and which it has emulated, or has it charted a special course for itself which is founded on resources derived from Iraq's history and social conscience? What are the features of the literature of the war and ways of acquiring a sense of its features?

These are questions which were raised during a conversation with the Iraqi minister of information, Latif Nasif al-Jasim, who follows up on the war as he prepares to open an exhibit of working sketches or sends out invitations to attend cultural festivals Baghdad is hosting.

AL-HAWADITH: War, by its nature, is a cruel human experience which requires specific, special conduct on various levels, from society, politics and the media to the visual arts and various other means of creativity.

Has Iraq in its long war benefited from the experiences of other nations and countries in order to chart a course for itself which might enable it to deal with the harsh experience it has been involved with for 5 years?

Latif Jasim: There is a fact which must be mentioned which is that in life the course of war is an exceptional one in the lives of peoples and consequently its effects are profound, whether those are positive or negative -- profound in the context of life, culture and human relations.

War therefore is a great fate which entails great challenges in the framework of the nation's being. Therefore, as I mentioned, war as a human experience entails great challenges and risks which might loom over the issue of the nation's existence and survival. Therefore I can say that this painful experience, war, has a historic dimension and has obvious effects on the course of civilization in any country. There are wars which mankind has witnessed which have had profound positive results, such as World War One and Two, whose effects manifested themselves on Europe and other regions. Such wars might lead to instances of a collapse of values, traditions and customs in society and after they end lead to a state of fragmentation and perhaps the breakup of society.

We can say confidently and truthfully that we did not plan for the war with Iran and did not choose it and venture upon it of our own will. I am not making this statement in defense of Iraq. This fact has become well known to the whole world and even the Iranian people. We entered the war with Iran by force after it had committed numerous aggressions, more than 200 in number, against our borders and cities, preceded by open, clear statements issued by Iranian officials clearly underlining their desire and determination to invade Iraq in accordance with what is called the philosophy of the tutelage of the Islamic jurist which Khomeyni advocates.

It is necessary to say that Khomeyni's residence in Iraq for the period of 14 years and his dealings with groups during that period which were not influential in the society conveyed to him a wrong impression of the state of affairs in Iraq, the political regime and the leadership. All these fragmented, erroneous facts made him succumb to an illusion concerning the true nature of conditions in Iraq and he believed that the proliferation of religions and sects in our nation would make it easy for him to penetrate Iraq's wall after he had reached the summit of power in Iran.

AL-HAWADITH: As you mentioned, war, by its nature, is a cruel experience which was imposed on Iraq and was a gamble prompted by illusions which sought to portray a mistaken picture of Iraq's cultural and religious pluralism. How did you manage to devise the approach of thwarting the people who wanted to change the facts and turn them around with the objective of exploiting them? Have you benefited from the experiences of other peoples in similar circumstances?

Latif Jasim: Actually, as officials, the details of the media treatment of the war were not present in our minds. Rather, at the beginning we relied on the platform of stating the truth with its bitter and sweet aspects alike. We were concerned not to fabricate the facts and make up situations which did not exist in our daily life or on the battlefronts. This was because we realize that the world has become small in spite of its vastness, in view of the great development in advanced means of communication.

Our platform has always been to say the truth and to speak about real conditions. This experience has made us open up toward the international media. Since the war broke out, tremendous numbers of world and Arab media correspondents have come to Iraq and have become informed about the facts themselves, domestically or in the theaters of combat.

During this period, we have not asked any journalist or paper to portray a situation which did not correspond with the real situation and the truth, or as we wanted and hoped these facts to be. The result has been broad relations on a basis of truth and frankness with all the Arab and international media.

With the passage of time, with the strengthening of the bonds of these friendships founded on truth, frankness and clarity, these media managed to convey the facts, Iraq's political situation and view regarding war and peace, and its view of a peace founded on justice and respect for sovereignty. On 28 September 1980 the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, declared on television Iraq's readiness to withdraw from Iranian territory if the aggression stopped. Iraq for its part also took the initiative a number of times of declaring a cease fire in hope that Iran would respond to such a position, but the Iranian regime rejected all Iraq's peaceful initiatives.

On the other hand, we always felt that the battlefield and the front of domestic life were interconnected and that any disruption or confusion in one would affect the other. Therefore the leadership's platform has been to create a state of balance, that is, not to have life with all its ramifications stop because of the war, lest such a disruption lead to a state of psychological frustration and dejection. Therefore, cultural activities have continued with their various rhythms, the arts have flourished and citizens have been given the opportunity to engage in their ordinary lives as they liked in the context of the new circumstances which the war has brought to the fore. Therefore, when Iraqi fighting men, soldiers or officers, have returned from the front, they have felt that society was going through its regular cycle, that life was continuing with its various rhythms and that the development plans were flourishing as circumstances permitted.

AL-HAWADITH: In the first stages of the war, benefiting from the state of geographic proximity to the southern regions in Iraq, Tehran gambled on the possibility of changing the loyalty of the inhabitants of these regions. How did the Iraqi media manage to cope with this approach?

Latif Jasim: It was tangibly confirmed to us that national resurgence, salvation and loyalty to the nation are the decisive, effective response to any situation the adversary exploits. It is as if it was resorting to exploiting the Iraqi cultural situation, distinguished by a proliferation of ethnic groups or sectarian and religious plurality. This war has been an element in the purging of people's spirits and consciousnesses, because it has been founded on blood. The other important, influential thing is that the Iranian media with the designs they have openly declared, aiming at all Iraq, have stirred up the feelings of all Iraqis, and defense of Iraq has become a rigid presence in people's spirits. There is evidence and proof of what we are saying. The southern governorates, including the Governorates of al-Qadisiyah, al-Najaf and Babil, all of which lie in the central Euphrates, have witnessed the highest enlistment rates.

The Iraqis have proved through the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah and through 5 years of war that they are a coherent unit in conscience, intentions and unanimity in protecting the national soil and defending sovereignty.

As to the methods we have used, I must say that the Iranians have helped us regarding their intentions through their media. They have consistently declared that they have sought the liberation of Iraq and have wanted to take off from Karbala' to liberate Jerusalem. We will not oppose them if they want to go to Jerusalem, and the proof of that is that when the invasion of Lebanon by the Zionists took place and some Iranian officials said that they wanted a road via Iraq to send their forces to Lebanon in 1982, we told them, "Be our guests, as long as some arrangements are made as required by the entry of an army into another country." The Iranians rejected this and considered it a conspiracy against the Iranian army in order to annihilate it.

The Iranian regime bet on a number of cards. It cut the pipeline passing through Syria, in consultation with Damascus and by its agreement. However, we say that the planning for this goal was not a success; our economy grew and flourished and we came to have other alternatives for exporting oil. We no longer needed the Syrian line or exportation via the Gulf.

AL-HAWADITH: It is noted that the Islamic experience in Iran is experiencing a renaissance and it is being viewed as a model and example to be emulated in more than one Arab area, east and west. Has a sort of media coordination been arrived at, in the context of the Arab League for example, to benefit from Iraq's expertise and knowledge of the true nature of conditions in Iran after 5 years of war with it?

Latif Jasim: Actually, there is no coordination in this context. However, the regime in Iran has started to change from within. Conversely, the ability to mount confrontation has increased among Arab citizens and this phenomenon has started to be condemned internationally. Coordination is required and it is desirable to disclose the facts and present them to the Arabs. We have held two Islamic conferences, which a large number of the world's Moslems of various sects have attended. Many Moslem scholars have spoken of the dangerous nature of this phenomenon, which will lead to the fragmentation of the Moslems' unity because Islam is a unificationist religion, not a divisive one. Zionism has applied this program by the negative exploitation of the national and religious patchwork in the Arab nation.

The laboratory that exists in Lebanon is a Zionist one and the instruments have been moved to extend the influence over the whole Arab area.

AL-HAWADITH: How do you explain that this phenomenon has spread in more than one Arab country, to the point where interested persons are trying to consider it a model, regime and government to be emulated and desire its application?

Latif Jasim: In order for us to be realistic, it is necessary to acknowledge that dejection over the national condition and the absence of romance even in militant Palestinian action are among the causes which have promoted the phenomenon. In other words, the state of vacuum currently existing in the Arab nation is primarily responsible, as well as some cases of political corruption. All these causes have led to the emergence of the phenomenon of extremism.

We have often been asked, Do you believe that the war will end when Khomeyni is absent? Our answer has been based on what the president and commander has said, to the effect that the war can end while Khomeyni is alive, and it can end with his death. It can even continue after his death. Otherwise, why did the war occur? Why is the war continuing while Iraq is calling for peace and an immediate withdrawal of forces to international boundaries in accordance with a cease fire along with a comprehensive exchange of prisoners and the commencement of negotiations through a third international party?

If Tehran realized that it would not be condemned when the records of the war were opened and the peace process was discussed, it would have agreed to the Iraqi peace offers.

AL-HAWADITH: I agree with you that the regression of the nationalist platform opens up dark areas with uncertain features in the face of platforms based on opposition to nationalist thinking and founded on invisible bases.

Do you believe that the Arab area will witness a stage that is worse through the regression of the nationalist platform? Is the future ripe for waves of extremism preparatory to the establishment of religious entities? Do you consider that something can be done to rectify such a great collapse, or is it too late?

Latif Jasim: From our viewpoint, the Arabs must agree over a minimum beyond what we call the state of deterioration, which is the dominant situation. This is what is leading the caravan to the unknown. Any consensus regarding a minimum will be reflected positively on the state of the masses and will revive the national situation and the state of solidarity.

It is also necessary to point out the wrongful actions of some Arab leaders, including those who call for unity and in practice carry out actions against it, and those who call for Arab nationalism then stand alongside Iran in its war against an Arab country, Iraq, as well as supplying Tehran with arms, and openly declare these practices. This is one of the most extreme states of deterioration the Arab nation has reached.

AL-HAWADITH: A person visiting Baghdad is struck with amazement when he discovers upon coming into the city the opposite of what he had imagined and the images which had crossed his mind of a city living in an atmosphere of war for 5 years. The streets are lit and life goes about its normal course. There are no first-aid vehicles or night blackout policies. Culture is experiencing an active course of prosperity and the state of war people have become accustomed to and familiar with has brought innovative output to the fore in the arts and in literature in the form of poetry, short stories and novels.

What is the thinking behind the pursuit of this course in Iraq? Do the media have an effective role in this context?

Latif Jasim: This matter was actually endorsed at the beginning of the war by directive of the president and commander Saddam Husayn, who said "The war may be long, it may be short, but life with all its ramifications must

continue to proceed as it is, indeed flourish and be strengthened in the cultural and social areas, lest dejection occur in people's spirits, and if citizens lose something, they should try to get it after the war ends."

Thus life has continued, brimming over with art and life, and marriage, child-rearing and weddings have continued.

Because the fighting man's psychological hinterland is represented by society, we must be concerned with this hinterland and preserve it as we preserve the people who are manning the nation's defense. The fighting men themselves are not prohibited from pursuing their ordinary life. They come to the city on monthly leave and spend that where they want. They frequent public places in their regular fine clothing with their wives and children. If the fighting men came and found that the restaurants were closed, the movies were not qualified to work, and basic things were not provided, there is no doubt that they would be beset with dejection and sorrow. There is no doubt that the fighting men are gladdened by the issuance of volumes of poetry singing the struggles of heroism and stories of martyrdom for the sake of the nation, and there is no doubt that the fighting men's spirit grows calm when they realize that an exhibit of visual arts will be opened in the city this evening.

We have always directed all the tributaries of culture, that is, the specific forms of culture, in the form of the stage, television, studies and research, into media situations for building up the Iraqi spirit; poetry, songs and books have also been used for tactical purposes.

AL-HAWADITH: Might one say that the attributes of a war literature and the arts of war have assumed concrete form in Iraq? What are the most conspicuous characteristics of the literature of combat, in the visual arts or in literature, for instance in stories and poems?

Latif Jasim: The most conspicuous characteristic of this literature is the expression of the pace of life, movement, and the enduring desire to live among the fighting men in their forward positions. The most conspicuous characteristics of the literature of this stage is the glorification of martyrdom, the evocation of honor in the Iraqis' consciences and the attainment of brilliant hope in people's spirits, a hope without limits.

AL-HAWADITH: It is observed that the program pursued in Iraq for dealing with the war as a cruel, painful experience mixes the execution of the war and its social atmosphere and consequences with planning for the postwar stage. Has any model or example to be emulated been in your minds?

Latif Jasim: Absolutely not. We have not benefited from anyone's experience, and no one has benefitted us or offered us advice. Rather, the real interaction has been between the leadership and the people, and the human link which the president and commander has established with the people has stood above this unique process, which has resulted from the pursuit of the human civilized program among citizens. This is what has transformed all the Iraqi people into a coherent family.

ISRAEL

BACKGROUND, WORKINGS OF IDF GENERAL STAFF REVIEWED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 20 Sep 85 Weekend Magazine pp 10-13, 40

[Text] Chief of Staff Major General Moshe Levi, climbed the rocky hill in the heart of the Golan Heights swiftly and followed the fighters of the paratroop unit who were training for the capture of a fortified target.

The chief of staff is a large man. He is tall and broad-shouldered with the hands of a farmer and huge strides. Each of his steps is equal to about two fast steps for the average man. Measure them. It is not for nothing that he is nicknamed Moishe-and-a Half.

Since assuming his position, he has not missed a single exercise of the ground forces. He visits IDF units frequently. He observes, studies, asks lots of questions, investigates and makes suggestions. When the IDF was in Lebanon, Major General Levi used to spend a lot of time with the soldiers in the area. He encouraged them to talk, to get things off their chest, to tell about their problems and fears. It is said that it was not only the urge to be in the area that motivated him to pay so many visits but also the desire to bridge the big gap between himself and the majority of IDF leaders. The fact that he did not command forces during the war gave him substantial feelings of inadequacy. These feelings represented an important factor in the appointments he made after he became chief of staff. During the Six Day War, Levi was head of the school for paratroops. In the Yom Kippur War, he was chief of staff of the Central Command. For some reason, the wars passed him by. Although he had no control over it, certain associates in the staff have not forgiven him, and they make use to remind him of it constantly--behind his back, of course. For this reason, Levi did everything in his power to stop the appointment of Major General Dan Shomron as head of the Northern Command and later as deputy chief of staff. It was natural that he would try to surround himself with people whom he would personally advance in rank and position and who would, therefore, have to be loyal to him. He would likely choose officers for whom he represented authority and whom he could relate to from a position of strength. Dan Shomron did not fit the bill.

IDF appointments are an important measure of the functioning of the army. Appointments in the upper echelons radiate directly downward. The criteria by which this or that general is appointed to this or that post represent a clear

message to the other ranks in the army, and, in a country as small as Israel, nothing remains a secret for long. Moshe Levi did not invent this system. All the other major general who preceded him made sure to surround themselves with their friends, or, in army lingo, with those who had been with them in the same tank. As a result, officers are appointed to head up complex and intricate systems solely on the basis of their abilities on the battlefield.

By these standards, Amos Yaron, an old combat commander, ended up in an administrative position such as head of manpower instead of an operational position such as head of a command. And Major General Hayim Erez, a man of extensive experience with armoured forces, was convinced to give up his post as head of the Northern Command and take over the quartermastership of the General Staff. Head of a manpower group in the air force, Brigadier General Ya'akov Turner, a veteran pilot, good at management and administration, left the IDF when his hopes to be appointed someday as head of the Manpower Branch were not supported by the General Staff. Moshe Levi designated the post for another brigadier general, an excellent field man whose experience was not especially in the area of administration. But Levi felt obligated towards him, and the post of head of the Manpower Branch was the only one likely to be vacated soon, and so that would solve the problem.

Hayim Erez was far from pleased when he was appointed, almost by accident, head of the Quartermaster Branch. But, for the chief of staff, it solved the problem of appointments which had run into obstacles because of the problem of Dan Shomron. In light of the stiff resistance of the chief of staff to appoint Shomron as major general of the Northern Command, a compromise was found. Shomron was appointed head of field forces headquarters which Moshe Arens, defense minister at that time, had decided to establish. Moshe Levi hoped that the position which Shomron filled would keep him far from the center of power and that no one would be breathing down his neck. But Shomron was not relegated to a dark corner. Quite the opposite. He had a promise from Arens that he would succeed Moshe Levi. So, when Rabin joined the defense ministry, Shomron asked for the post of deputy chief of General Staff--not as a title to hide behind but as proof of the seriousness of the promises that Rabin had also agreed to.

Rabin supported the appointment of Shomron as deputy chief of staff, but Levi did not give in. He proposed, instead, Major General Amir Drori who was just completing two years of study in the United States. In doing so, Levi hoped to set aside the immediate threat of Shomron and to leave open the question of his successor. Drori is a silent introverted man. He is not made for these kind of battles. Many in the IDF were shocked to hear that he was planning to go to the Prime Minister with the issue. When it turned out that Shomron was appointed to the number two post, Levi convinced Drori not to give up and not to quit but to accept command of the field forces headquarters. In this way, Drori would remain in the picture, and when the time came he would be one of those considered for the position of chief of staff.

Drori is a professional general, very experienced at all levels of command. At one time, he was one of the harshest critics of the establishment of the field forces headquarters. He even threatened to resign over that issue. His friends in the command branch were amazed at the news of his appointment. It doesn't make sense, they said, to appoint a man to a position that he does not

believe in. This is a clear example of the negative message which the senior command sends down the line. There is in it a negative educational value for the army. The chief of staff did not accept this critique. On the contrary, he said, this is an example of accepting authority and obeying orders.

This conflict between Moshe Levi and Dan Shomron should not necessarily be seen as personal. It is a conflict between two professional levels, but the difference is often artificial. Shomron is one of the aristocratic kibbutzniks. He was a rich boy from Ashdot Ya'akov whose advance through the IDF was smooth and even natural. Everything came easily to him. His fame, his rich experience in commanding battle forces, the Entebbe raid, his charisma--all these unsettled Moshe Levi who was himself from the Shapira neighborhood in Tel Aviv. To this should be added another trait which, according to his friends, characterizes Levi. He does not like confrontations. They say that there is no one to compare with him when it comes to carrying out orders when it is a matter of an operational issue or a clearly defined subject whose implementation has already been determined. Conflicts are not his strong suit. Levi was afraid of Shomron's domination since his ideas are not always accepted and routine. Shomron knows how to argue his views well even though to many they may seem to be borrowed from star wars. Levi was afraid that the army would identify more with Shomron as deputy chief of staff than with him as chief of staff.

Whoever thought that the sparks would fly after Dan Shomron's appointment as deputy chief of staff would be wrong. The relationship between them is cordial. They talk over only what is necessary. The chief consults more with the head of the Manpower Branch, Major General 'Amos Yaron. In general, the chief has several teacher's pets whom he speaks of in a different way. Major General Amnon Lipqin is one example. He also has a special relationship with Ori Or. He values and respects Amir Drori. He relies on Yosi Peled, a fighter of the first order and a good operations man. He also has a special relationship with paratroop officer and head of the infantry, Brigadier General Yitzhaq Mordekhay who will soon join the generals' club. Those who are really close to him wear red paratrooper boots.

Head of the Southern Command Major General Moshe Bar-Kokhba (Berel). is an exception in the General Staff. No one contests his extensive knowledge and understanding of battle armour and battle formations. Berel is also the most senior member of the forum of the General Staff and he raises the average age. He is an officer with the gracious manners of a Polish aristocrat and the ideology of the greater Eretz Yisrael movement. The views he expresses in the forum sessions sound ancient, and even fanciful, to the younger generals. It is said that every theory which he presents begins in Tel Aviv and ends in Istanbul.

Another exception--head of the Intelligence Branch--is Major General Ehud Baraq who is known for his extraordinary wit. Baraq is a brilliant officer and quite an intellectual. His skill in analyzing an issue, beginning with the lowest tactical level and going to the highest strategic levels in a logical and very capable manner has made him a phenomenon. They say about Baraq, who was born on Kibbutz Mishmar Hasharon, that he is an aristocrat who does not try hard to cover an intellectual snobbism which he is immersed in.

With Ehud, the senior officers report, you have to be very sharp intellectually. It is not pleasant to argue with someone like Baraq.

The General Staff of 1985 does not have the prestige of the General Staff of 1967 nor even of the high command during the time of Lt General David Elazar, of blessed memory, until the Yom Kippur War. The IDF no longer produces stars. Today's General Staff is rather nondescript. It is forced to operate within a reality in which the nation, to a large extent, has lost its positive attitude towards the IDF. This whittling away process began in October 1973. The erosion of the status and prestige of the army increased during the war in Lebanon. This is no longer an invincible omnipotent army. Service in the army is no longer seen as a mission. When salary increases in the economy are discussed, people do not hesitate to compare a soldier to a government worker.

The chief of staff assumed command of the army during a period when the IDF was embroiled in the Lebanese situation and when morale was shaken. This was an army that was suffering losses every day. The best of its fighters were ashamed of their position in Lebanon and spoke openly about fear. This was an army which was not getting adequate support from the nation. Moshe Levi had to be a commander and babysitter at the same time. He had to devote lots of energy and time to preserving what existed and to raise spirits.

Critics of the defense establishment say that this was a time that really needed an impressive General Staff which could overcome the painful problems. Even after the IDF left Lebanon, Lebanon did not leave the IDF. Discipline weakened substantially, men and equipment were ground down, and skilled manpower in the echelons of field and maintenance did not want to continue in service. And if that was not enough, even before the chief of staff had a chance to recover from the shock of Lebanon, he already had to deal with the decrees of painful cuts in the budget. Those cuts influenced not only the size of the army but also the quality of its commanders and its power.

In recent years, the military has grown and expanded in terms of many intricate frameworks and weapons systems. In order to be able to confront these problems, particularly in a period of budget cuts, it needs leaders of a high intellectual caliber and broad knowledge who can make the army better so that it can fight on the future battlefield. For this purpose there is a need for a change in frameworks, for the determination of new and clear orders of priorities, and for a strong program. What is needed, a senior officer told me this week, is to build a model of a quality army which could make the best of what it has. Since 1978 the IDF has been in the red. Since that year, it has been forced to cut back on training, on the levels of inventory, on equipment and development.

The poor economic situation has forced the army to cut back last year even in the units. In such a situation, our respondent said, we are speaking not only of the threats which face us but also of the best army we can build given the current budget. Thus, for example, we must determine our order of priorities with respect to the development and training of manpower. We must not speak in terms of what we need just now. We have to look ahead. The results is that the budget that you could have divided more easily within a small force, you now have to divide among the components of a larger force and give each one much less. Does this produce a better army? You can always intimidate

the people with the ratios of forces, but that is not the only factor which will determine the outcome of the next war. It will be the quality--better quality of arms and combat systems at a higher level than the enemy's systems. In this respect, the budget cuts in the IDF are not balanced. Sometimes cuts are made even from what is allocated. What interests the commanding generals is the moment, and the chief of staff does not want difficult struggles. It is hard to go to a unit and say that from now on it will receive less.

It is said that the forum sessions of the General Staff are carried on with too much harmony. Gone are the penetrating arguments which characterized former general staffs. Arguments? There is no such thing as a forum without arguments, says one of the members of the General Staff. There are discussions and arguments and opposing viewpoints. The difference is one of style. Ori Or is not Yanosh Ben-Gal. The qualifications of those or other generals do not take away from the qualities of today's generals who are not less professional than their counterparts in the past. On the contrary, the knowledge and qualifications demanded today of the commanding general are many and incomparably more varied than in the past. And the arguments are no less penetrating or at a lower level. But a general like Menahem Eynan will express his opinion more elegantly and without shouting.

Lt General Levi is not greeted by IDF units with the same awe tinged with fear that his predecessor, Rafael Eytan, was. This is connected, perhaps, to his easygoing personality. They say that kind of authority that Levi demonstrates reminds one more of a principal than a commander. Opinions about his authority are divided in the IDF. There are those who love it and there are those who miss commanders like Raful, Yanosh and even Gorodish. Levi exudes an air of restfulness. He speaks often with commanders and soldiers of every rank, demonstrates a sensitivity to the soldier's troubles, to the bereaved families, and to injustices directed at an individual or a unit. No appeal from the public is ignored. He pays attention to all the letters of readers published in the newspaper which pertain to the army. More than once he has dealt with a complaint and made sure that the wrong was corrected. Conversation with him is free and flowing. Commanders and soldiers do not hesitate to tell him now what they were afraid to say in Raful's time. Major General Levi oozes fatherliness--he rebukes someone here, he advises there, and all is done quietly without raising his voice. With Moishe-and-a-Half you are not under pressure.

By nature he is a compromiser, and he leans more towards being a teacher and an educator. Since he does not make farreaching decisions about budget cuts, the IDF is spread out over too wide a range of activities despite the impact on human life. His critics argue that the army does not demand high achievement of itself either in current defense or in training. In the territories, for example, there is no law and order. It is up to the army to enforce law and order. It is unlikely that people will throw rocks at military vehicles and not have soldiers chase them and capture them. Even the training is not always conducted as it should, and this happens routinely. Deviations from allocations are accepted easily. A senior officer is promoted to a higher position and a higher rank despite the fact that, in the units under his command deficiencies in everything related to qualifications and the level of training have been found as well as a large number of accidents. The value of full and exacting achievement, as one of the cornerstones of the army, has

eroded. This is not a problem of control. The chief of staff has good control over the system. It is a problem of compromise, of execution of judgement and of strictness with regard to large and small subjects. It is compromise with mediocrity.

Officers with whom I spoke said that Moishe-and-a-Half is not a worse chief of staff than his predecessors. The fact that he did not command troops in the war does not necessarily disqualify him from leading the IDF to victory in the next war, if one breaks out. We have seen what officers who were highly experienced and renowned brought us to. Even the previous chiefs of staff were subjected to harsh criticism and examined under a magnifying glass. It is tougher to be a chief of staff in quiet times than it is in wartime. It is also easier to be chief of staff when the coffers are full. From this perspective, it could be said cynically that nowadays the chief of staff needs a good war to silence his critics. There are those who believe that Levi is likely to surprise people for the better.

In general, the scale is tipped in his favor. In his own way, Levi knows how to get what he wants. He knows how to analyze situations. In his time, he has drawn much praise about the way he presented the withdrawal from Lebanon and its meaning to the government. He will be remembered as the chief of staff who got the IDF out of Lebanon. In the final analysis, he is like by the soldiers. Even the media likes him. They love to go over this Cinderella story. He interviews well. The public loves the confidence he exudes in speaking. Levi, they say, knows this. He is wise not to become embroiled in conflicts. With great skill, he successfully hides his political views. When he goes back to the open market, many political factions will probably seek him out.

Will this be in the near future? In about 6 months it will be 3 years since he became chief of staff. Levi is hoping that the government will extend his tenure for another year. Traditionally, extending the length of service of a chief of staff is intended to express esteem. Also, an additional round of appointments in the general staff is expected soon. Within that context, regional commanders are expected to be changed. The chief of staff will advise the defense minister with regard to these new appointments. Yitzhak Rabin will be asked to approve. On the question of the continued tenure of the chief of staff, Rabin cannot decide right away, even though Levi would like to see the appointment all sewed up. It is almost certain that the defense minister will approve it. Whatever happens--the successor will also not have a bed of roses.

[Box on p 40] A Forum With No Leaks

Every Monday the IDF generals get together in the debating hall of the chief of staff's office for the weekly session known to the public as the General Staff Forum. In recent years, the forum has also met outside the General Staff headquarters in settlements near the line of conflict in the north, in the air, and in Judea and Samaria.

The forum is the highest authority in which subjects concerning the image and mode of operation of the army which have a direct impact on our way of life are discussed and analyzed. They start with current actions, the structure

of the army, and issues of development and equipment, and end with discipline, accidents, and appointments of officers and promotions.

The forum takes place around a U-shaped table. At the head sits the chief of staff, Lt General Moshe Levi. Next to him sit his assistant, Colonel Aliq Hermetz and the acting secretary of the High Command. Around the table sit the commanding generals, the department heads and the commanders of the armed forces: Deputy Chief of Staff General Dan Shomron; chief of Intelligence, Major General Ehud Baraq; chief of Manpower, Major General Amos Yaron; chief of the Quartermaster Corps, Major General Hayim Erez; chief of Planning, Major General Avihu Ben-Nun; Director of the College of National Security, Major General Avi'ezer Ya'ari; commanding generals--Ori Or (North) Amnon Shahaq (Central) and Moshe Bar-Kokhba (South)--; commander of the Air Force, Major General Amos Lapidot; commander of the Navy, Major General Avraham Ben-Shoshan; commander of field forces, Major General Amir Drori; chief of the training department, Major General Yosi Peled; assistant chief of the Operations Branch at General Headquarters, Major General Uri Sagi; chief of Operations, IDF spokesman Brigadier General Efrayim Lapid, as well as paratroop officer and commander of the infantry, financial advisor to the General Staff, chief of the defense ministry, and military secretaries of the prime minister and defense minister. There are three generals who are not members of the forum: president of the military appeals court, Major General David Maymon; chief military Rabbi Major General Gad Navon; and Major General Imanu'el Segel who has a senior position in the field formation. These people, like the commanders of forces and those who occupy other professional positions in the IDF, are invited to forum discussions only when the agenda includes topics which pertain directly to their spheres of activity.

The average age of General Staff forum members is 48. The youngest (Shahaq) is 42, and the oldest (Bar-Kokhba and ya'ari) are 55. The great majority (except for four were born in Israel, are married and have children. This is the generation all of whose military careers unfolded within the ranks of the IDF. Some are decorated for excellence in battles. They all have academic degrees from universities in Israel and abroad.

Every session of the forum has two parts. The first part is devoted to a review of intelligence information from the chief of Intelligence and reports from heads of departments and army forces on prominent subjects in their areas. Then there is a recess, and the generals are served modest refreshments in the spirit of the times. They include soft drinks and sandwiches from the IDF canteen service. The second part of the session is devoted to a subject chosen by the chief of staff. With every subject, background information is presented for consideration. For example, the subject of casualties, which includes a description of the circumstances of the strike and the conclusions drawn, merits in-depth discussion and wide-ranging attention. There is a great deal of sensitivity to this issue in the IDF today. One could say that the forum of the General Staff is a barometer of the army, that the generals who are members of it express feelings and concerns and encompass the current moods in all the IDF ranks and even problems of salaries and conditions of service.

The order of discussion is as follows: everyone is allowed to express his opinion. But unlike the directors' council, decisions are not determined by

vote. The chief of staff listens and summarizes, and his summary represents the decision which has the force of an order. The entire debate is conducted in a relaxed atmosphere. For example, the chief of staff does not insist that those present not smoke. He himself smokes a lot. The entire discussion is recorded and, after the session, the tape recording is transcribed and the protocol and summaries are written down as well. Forum members are proud of the fact that this is one of the few public institutions in Israel in which none of the discussions are lost.

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ISRAEL

INTERVIEW WITH MANPOWER BRANCH CHIEF

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 20 Nov 85 pp 9-10

[Interview with General 'Amos Yaron, head of the IDF manpower branch, by Lieutenant Colonel Ehud Prawer, Yosef Argaman, and Barukh Ron: "Hold on a Little Longer"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] General Yaron, is it true that there are today regular army men whose living standard is approaching the poverty line?

[Answer] Unfortunately, yes. Those are usually warrant officers, but there are also officers who find themselves in this situation. Many have mortgages and heavy payments to meet, which are, of course, adjusted according to the index, while the pay is not. The disposable income has been eroded; people cannot borrow money, because they would not be able to pay it back. It is a vicious circle.

[Question] By how much has the pay of regular army men been eroded in the past 2 years, in comparison to the other sectors of the economy?

[Answer] By a total of 15-18 percent. This trend began already 1 and 1/2 years ago, even before the Knesset elections. The Shamir government ruled that the regular army men should be compensated for the pay erosion they had suffered until then, which was about 25-30 percent. The compensation amounted to 18 percent--which means a loss of about 7 percent. We decided not to distribute the compensation evenly among all the regulars. People with special jobs--pilots, field officers, engineers, technological manpower--were granted the entire supplement, while the others, only half.

And then came the package deals, and the Finance Ministry refused to give us the erosion compensations granted to all the other sectors of the economy, claiming that we had already been compensated. That was the famous 8 percent erosion. A joint commission of the Foreign and Defense Commission and the Financial Commission, which wrestled with the problem, unequivocally decided that we are entitled to supplements. The Finance Ministry has refused to accept the ruling to this day. The total erosion: 7 plus 8 percent, at least 15 percent.

[Question] What is the influence of this situation on the work of the regular army?

[Answer] Morale is falling, and so is motivation. Every week I receive tens and hundreds of letters from warrant officers and their families, asking how one can feed a family on such pay. Many write that they have fights with their wives because of the low pay. We had had problems with the warrant officers in the past, after the Yom Kippur war. We looked then at the condition of the YMH [expansion unknown] and realized that it was due to the fact that the warrant officers in charge of them had no motivation to work. We decided to improve the service conditions of those warrant officers, and among other things, to buy cars for them. In fact, we asked ourselves why we had not invested in them before. Now we are returning to the situation before the Yom Kippur war.

[Question] Will you approve requests for additional work?

[Answer] Under no circumstance. The reason is a matter of principle: I am not prepared to compromise on a key principle: Service in the regular army is a calling, and a man with a calling must be 24 hours a day inside his work. If his head is elsewhere, he cannot do a good job. I am not prepared to give way on this matter. Definitely not.

[Question] Does the IDF grant loans?

[Answer] Definitely. Regular army men who have a serious financial problem can come to us, through the customary channels, and can receive loans. However, the matter must be solved through pay adjustments.

[Question] Is there a problem today about men signing up for the regular army?

[Answer] There is no problem about officers up to the level of company commander, but we do have a problem above that level. Currently, the pay influences pilots, too, as well as battalion commanders. Those have to explain at home why they should actually stay in the army and not leave. And if the home is not in good order and there are problems, they cannot function properly, and certainly not enthusiastically or be willing to take personal risks, as is sometimes required. In the final analysis, they have a wife and children to take care of... In the past, it was easy for me to convince them to sign up. Now, if there is no money, there is no point in talking about values, mission, or ideals.

[Question] On the other hand, the pay causes many to leave of their own accord.

[Answer] True, usually because they have a better alternative outside. I dread the possibility that in the end we will be left with only those who have no alternative outside--the less than good. That will mean less quality and less ambition, which is the worst possible thing.

[Question] What does the army request from the Finance Ministry today?

[Answer] To allow us to build a separate pay scale and to do the internal distribution within the army budget. We are the ones who know what is good for the IDF and what it needs. And we would submit our pay scale to the approval of the defense minister and the government.

[Question] If the national budget is not affected, what is it that bothers the Finance Ministry?

[Answer] They are afraid that we would be the spearhead for other categories, such as the police, for example. But we want our pay to be separate from other sectors. The IDF is a special body: it does not have employer-employee relations, allowances, and bonuses, and it does not allow second jobs. Perhaps the police has problems, too, but in matters of defense there can be no compromise. Israel needs a strong army, and for that it needs high-caliber people to serve in it.

[Question] When do you think the problem will be solved?

[Answer] In the next few weeks. We have already met with the prime minister and with the Histadrut. Both evinced great understanding and things are beginning to move. A proposal will most probably be presented to the government soon. A solution must be found; the deterioration must be stopped. I do not want to consider the possibility of this situation continuing.

[Question] How many regulars are expected to be laid off in the coming work year?

[Answer] In the 1986-87 work year another 1,500-2,000 IDF regulars will be laid off, in addition to the several thousand who have already been laid off.

[Question] How did you decide whom to lay off?

[Answer] First, according to the level of performance. Those who perform less well as the first out, then according to profession. Some professions had to suffer cuts, much to my regret. Drivers, for example. We were painfully compelled to lay off excellent drivers. One must not attach the stigma of not good enough and not devoted enough to every man who was laid off, because it was not always the case.

[Question] Nevertheless, there is an acute sense of insecurity among the regular army men. It would seem that no one is sure of his job anymore.

[Answer] Good people should not be worried. Not the pilots, engineers, maintenance men, company or battalion commanders. There will be no cuts in their area. Layoffs are generally in services and administration, and affect people who are relatively less important.

[Question] But there are also colonels and generals who left the army and are now unemployed?

[Answer] In the past year more than 100 colonels and brigadier generals left the army. I would estimate that some 20 of them are still trying to find a job, some of them because there are no openings, or because of obstacles put in the way of their hiring; the others, because they are not suitable. And I admit it. In my opinion, much of the ado around this matter is artificial. The great majority of the officers do settle down in the end, because they are hard working people.

[Question] Of course, engineers and technicians are immediately grabbed, but what about a 40 year old division commander who spent 22 years in the field and is now out of the army?

[Answer] Indeed, for him it is more difficult, and I am not denying the responsibility of having put him in that job; we talked him into being a commander. Once he is outside, and his "record" is "only" command over people--in my view that is a lot--he has difficulties managing. The public sector is the loser for not coopting him: he has very high work standards and morals, higher than those in the civilian sector.

[Question] You said before that there are officers who do not find a job "because of obstacles put in the way of their hiring."

[Answer] If a position becomes available at a government office, first they advertize it internally among the office staff, and only if no one suitable is found among them is the position "opened up." There is no justification for this: Many times there are regular army men more suited to the position than the office employees. We do not ask to be given preferential treatment, only an equal and fair chance to compete. We have brought the matter up with the State Comptroller, but unfortunately nothing can be done because of opposition on the part of workers councils.

[Question] How do you help former regulars to find employment?

[Answer] We have a very small apparatus that deals with this. Our people run around tryinkg to locate jobs, to give assistance, and to provide training.

[Question] A special training system for army regulars is said to have been organized within the Ministry of Labor and Welfare.

[Answer] I am not aware of any such system. We incorporate departing regular personnel within the already existing professional training of this ministry.

[Question] From the situation you have depicted it is not difficult to see why the self-image of army regulars has also been eroded. Do you think there are additional reasons for that?

[Answer] The army is not isolated from society. If a reservist runs into an inadequate service, his criticism is clearly justified, except that he immediately derives implications for the entire army and concludes that it is inadequate. Justly so, perhaps, from his point of view. The criticism is sometimes exaggerated or irrelevant, and often unjustified.

In the past year we were exposed to too much unjustified criticism. From everyone. I am not opposed to criticism, on the contrary; but on one condition, that it be constructive. What there is to be done among ourselves, we will do. The IDF is improving on itself day by day and hour and hour, perhaps more so than any other body.

[Question] General (Res) Moshe Nativ, your predecessor, recently said that "the IDF does not receive sufficient support from the political arm, and the decision-makers have to justify the army's actions to their protectors."

[Answer] The political arm has recently taken steps to meet us half way on this matter. Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement. Both the government and the Knesset must give us full support.

[Question] Some IDF people claim that the media, too, has been detracting from the image of the army regulars.

[Answer] My only problem about the media is that it sometimes airs things without checking them thoroughly, or malicious personal gossip. We are a democratic state, and it is very important that the press be free and able to criticize. That is, the army is open to journalists. A journalist wants to pay a visit? Welcome. But let him first check his facts with the competent figures. He must not allow himself to be fed information by an embittered officer.

[Question] To conclude, what can you tell the warrant and other officers who are going through hard times?

[Answer] To hold on for another relatively short period of time; we are doing the most that can be done for them, and I am convinced that we will shortly manage to solve the problem.

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ISRAEL

CHILDHOOD OF HISTADRUT SECRETARY GENERAL QEYSAR

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 30 Oct 85 pp 20, 21

/Article by Yosef Bar-Yosef: "I Helped My Mother Wash Floors"/

/Text/ Histadrut Secretary General Yisra'ei Qeysar has not been in his post long but already it is difficult to remember his predecessors. This is not uncommon in politics but in his situation there are other factors. He is an energetic person who speaks in sharp tones; he is aggressive and demanding without being nasty, all this with a mischievous twinkle in his eyes.

Let us sit and quietly hear him talk about his childhood and adolescence during the 1930's and 1940's in Jerusalem, a childhood that was hardly peaceful and quite different from what we had though til now.

"We emigrated from Yemen to Israel in 1933 when I was 2 years old. My parents lived in Sanaaa, made it to Aden by donkey and from there traveled by boat. The name Qeysar comes from the verb 'qeysar,' which means to break. My grandfather was successful in his trade and people said that he took over the market, from there he received his nickname that later became the family name. There were also rabbis in the family; it was a wellknown family in Yemen, and they had a large house with a beautiful garden. The Imam, who used to stroll through the town would come and visit in their garden. My father was orphaned at a young age and his family cheated him somewhat out of his inheritance, but he worked in the garden and managed it, working with his hands as a farmer."

"Yemenites had emigrated to Israel at the end of the last century. They emigrated for religious-messianic reasons and most became farmers or artisans. We already had some family members in the country. When we emigrated my mother's brother got us a room in the Hassan Beq section of Haifa. On the floor beneath us lived Arabs. I dimly remember women wearing veils over their faces."

"When I was 3½ years old we moved to the Nahalat Ahim section of Jerusalem. There were four of us children when we came here, I was the youngest. Two had died in Sanaaa. My parents had three more in Israel so altogether there were seven kids. We lived in a one-room apartment that had toilets in the courtyard. We did not have running water. There was some kind of a tank that we would fill with well water and from which we could get a thin stream of water

through a small copper faucet. We called this 'hanafiyah.' We would take baths in a tub while pouring water on ourselves from a cup. Of course, there was no electricity. We had a small oil-lamp that used little fuel, which we called a 'gazguzi.' Our refrigerator was a small open closet that stood near the window in order to catch the breeze. During those years we used to move every year, during the summer month of Muharram. We had many apartments, but the basics almost never changed, one room with outdoor toilets."

"My father worked for awhile in construction, and after that worked in a factory. His eyesight deteriorated so he began to work as a sexton in a religious school in Nahalat Ahim. He earned very little. He was a modest man, not ambitious, a believer but somewhat liberal and had a great sense of humor. It was a pleasure to spend time with him and people really liked him. During the month of Elul he had a special job of waking people up for the Selihot prayers. He would wake up and leave the house at 2:30 in the morning. I would wake up with him and go to the synagogue, where I would prepare coffee and tea for the worshippers. This was a great honor. I still remember those nights with great fondness. Afterwards I would pray along with the others and I will never forget how sweet those prayers sounded."

"It was my mother who worked the hardest, in addition to tending to her children and the house she had to earn some money. She worked as a washer-woman. In those days there were no washing machines and no laundromats. Housewives who could afford it would have a washerwoman come to their house once a month or once a week. My mother had two friends, and together they formed a type of a cooperative. They would get together and wash clothes on the roof for a few families. Why was this better? It would make the work more interesting because they could gossip while doing the wash. We children would pitch in from time to time, helping to put the wash on the line. She also worked as a housekeeper. I remember her working for a Professor Wilhelm, who had a small synagogue in Ma'alot Street called Emet Va'emuna."

"On Fridays after school I would help her clean there. I would sponge off the staircase that faced the street. I remember doing this as quickly as possible so that the other children walking and playing in the street wouldn't see me. During the afternoons and evenings she would also do some embroidery work, which she would sell. It wasn't easy to feed a family of nine mouths. We helped a lot doing chores around the house because she was rarely home. Father was practically blind so we would do all the washing, cleaning dishes and cooking."

"She was the dominant one at home. For all financial matters, as well as matters related to school and friends we would come to her. She was very wise and was full of self-pride. All she lacked was a sense of humor; it was impossible to make a joke at her expense. She would get insulted even if we teased her in a loving way. I inherited my sense of humor from my father. Her main thing was to avoid being dependent on anyone else and do all one can for oneself. Once, we were in a tight financial squeeze, and some neighbor suggested that we get some welfare aid; she acted as if she had been stabbed with a knife. Her brothers, the 'Amar family, were all financially better off than us. But she found her consolation in us, her children. She would always say that her wealth was her children. She was very ambitious for us, and was always proud when we did well in school."

"Later on, when we started to work and better ourselves, one of my brothers became an accountant and another one became a foreman. My mother would say, 'Thank God, all my children are bosses, what else could I possibly want?' Among the Yemenites in the neighborhood, not only was it something special to be a manager but even to be a plain clerk could be the height of someone's career. If someone from the Qeysar family became a postal clerk, everyone talked about it."

"I began my studies at the Yemenite religious school in the Nahalat-Ahim neighborhood. My mother wanted me to better myself and had me transferred to the Doresh Ziyon school that was near the Edison cinema. It was a boys-only religious school that was very strict. I remember that on Hanukka we would carve ourselves tops out of wood. There was no money to buy tops, so we would carve them and insert a bit of metal for them to spin. Playing with these tops at school was considered a sin, a distraction. The principal would go from class to class with a basket and force everyone to throw their tops into the basket. We were afraid, so we threw ours into the basket. When he finished going to all the classes, he would light a fire and burn all the tops. We would fall over the ashes to find the metal bits in order to make new tops. In all, I never had in my hands a game that was bought from a store. If we wanted to play ball we would take a sock and fill it with rags. We also played games that didn't need equipment: hide-and-seek and catch. But there really wasn't much time to play."

"Subsequently, my mother transferred me to a more advanced school, the Mizrahi religious school in Mishkanot. In order for me to advance even further, she arranged for me to have evening lessons with an old Yemenite teacher, Mori Otros, who would teach me the Yemenite way of reading the Torah. She paid him pennies, and I would make up the tuition difference by cleaning his small room. And after this, I would still go over to the synagogue to study Mishna. In grade school as well as afterwards in a Mizrahi seminar, I was a diligent student who spent much time on my studies. So did my brothers; we were all excellent students so the time we spent on our studies was justified. When you see your mother word to death so that you can learn and get ahead, you've got to do well. You also want to escape from poverty, and education was the way to leave."

"In high school and in the Mizrahi seminar, I felt my poverty even more. Until then, I went to Yemenite grade schools and religious schools where there were only Sefardim, mostly poor like myself. In the seminar there were Ashkenazim, some were children of elite or wealthy parents. When someone would invite the others to his house, I wouldn't go, knowing that I would have to reciprocate; I was embarrassed. Society was still closed to me. Others had new leather briefcases, I had a linen one that my mother sewed. They had bicycles while I couldn't even dream of things like that. Buying a new book was a major event. When I needed a book, my mother would send me to Professor Wilhelm, whose house she cleaned. She would say to me, "Go there and ask, he has closets full of books, he'll give you one." He had these huge volumes in German and English, where would he have a school book that I needed. She didn't understand. And I would feel even more strongly about the gap between me and my surroundings. I would pass by the Rehavia high school, and see the wide staircases, the nice park, boys and girls together, modern, dressed well and laughing; my eyes would practically come out of my sockets."

"And together with this, at the same time I began to develop and go out into the rest of the world. An older sister of mine joined a pioneer youth movement, went for training with the rest of her group in Sedom and afterwards went on to settle in Kibbutz Qedma, one of the 11 other settlements that were founded in the Negev shortly before the War of Independence. My oldest brother joined the Hagana at a young age as a guard, and when the world war broke out, he joined the British Army as a sapper. He was taken prisoner by the Germans, along with the same group as Ben-Aharon and Almogi. We went through the worst torture when we found out that he was missing until we learned that he was alive and a prisoner. It was as if they had shown me that there was another way."

"By the 2d year of seminar my friends and I looked to join a youth movement. How did we choose one? We asked which one had the prettiest girls. First we went to Beney Aqiva and then to the United Movement. I began to become less and less religiously observant. I remember the worst crisis I went through; it was when I traveled for the first time on the Sabbath. I was in a work camp in Neve-Etan and everyone was riding to a pool in Sahne. They urged me, 'Come!' I fought with myself, and at the end I got into the car. And when it started to move with me inside I felt as if a large burden fell off me. Afterwards it was easy. My mother tried to guide me back to being more observant, as she tried with my brothers and sisters, but she knew the situation, where and when to relent and to compromise so there would be no break between us."

"It wasn't just for religious reasons that she tried to keep us that way. For example, she was against my joining the work camp in Neve-Etan. I asked why, and she would say, 'isn't enough for me what your brother did?' To leave one's background and tradition was dangerous. Everything different was seen as a threat. Once I went to hear a lecture on Marxism. It was in the Yemenite synagogue of the Darda'im. There were Yemenites who believed in the Zohar, and those who did not; these were the Darda'im, from the words meaning "age of knowledge." There was this somewhat odd man who came to this synagogue to talk about Marxism. Someone whispered to my mother that I was joining some underground cell. She came to the lecture, knocked lightly on the door and entered. She said, 'Yisra'el, come with me!' and gestured with her finger for me to follow her. I came out and asked her what was wrong. She said to me 'I heard that you're one of them.' I said, 'what do you mean one of them? What am I doing besides listening to a lecture?' She said to me, 'It's just like when Jacob said to his sons, Joseph is gone, and now you'll take Benjamin? It's enough that I lost your brother, don't tell me stories about lectures. Come home with me.' Not long after that I joined the Hagana, taking my oath over a revolver at night at the children's park in the Mishkenot neighborhood."

"In 1951 we moved to Holon. My brother was released from prison camp, and because he was a veteran, we received two units in a cooperative, one for us and one for him. Each unit was 20 dunams with a 2-room house. After the poverty of Jerusalem this was a big improvement. I stopped going to school during the day, and began helping my mother, brothers and sisters in the farmstead, the orchard, the chicken coop and the barn. I didn't want to give up my degree, so I continued written lessons by night. I would send in my work through the mail and receive corrections back. A year later, I joined what they called the

'Black Legion' of the Hagana, and began training for raids across the border. Then war broke out, the state was established; I joined another army unit and then returned to the cooperative."

"After we moved to Holon in 1951, my mother continued to work until her last day. With no houses to clean, she worked at her embroidery. She died after collapsing while washing her own floor."

"Today I am a public figure. I don't think often of my childhood, but it's always with me. I remember my childhood as something warm and good, despite the poverty and the struggle. Every pleasure that I had, even something as insignificant as an ice cream bar brought me great pleasure, because I knew how hard it was to obtain."

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LEBANON

PARTIES TO RECENT TRIPOLI SETTLEMENT ASSESS FUTURE

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 25 Oct 85 pp 86-87, 89

[Article by Sharbal Zughayb: "AL-HAWADITH in Tripoli with the Parties to the Damascus Agreement: An Earthquake, from the Al-Tibanah Gate to the Cupola"]

[Text] To talk about Tripoli is not to express the actual conditions on the ground, because one's eye comes up against a great tragic state of affairs, and there are no synonyms in the Arabic language for what it sees. The appropriate word now might be "earthquake."

All the streets behind the contact lines in Tripoli now resemble one another. Whenever you ask about one of them they point with the fingers to debris: the al-Bazarkan market, the al-Tibanah Gate, al-Sha'rani, al-Biqar, al-Sayyidah Street, the Cupola -- all old names which the capital of the north is familiar with, and they have almost disappeared now.

One picture of Tripoli following the battles which gripped it and drove its inhabitants into various exiles was of a resident who had not been married more than 4 months and came back after the storm had calmed to get his wife's trousseau. He could not find his house -- indeed, he could not identify the street he had been living on. What had happened and who was responsible? These are two questions, and the accusations are as numerous and great as the magnitude of this earthquake.

AL-HAWADITH took an excursion through the capital of the north and tried by camera and words to take a survey on the answer to who was responsible. It circulated about the sections of Tripoli and met the three parties taking part in the Damascus agreement.

At a distance from the charges and countercharges among the parties and the Unification Movement, the people of Tripoli are trying to bandage up their wounds. They have all turned into laborers helping to repair what is left with their own hands, because a workforce is lacking and the need for shelter for people is urgent, especially now that the October rain has aggravated things.

The hospitals have all been destroyed and their equipment is scattered about now, like that of the internal security and civil defense forces. Seventy

percent of the schools have been destroyed and 25,000 families have been jammed into the rest, although they also need repair. Meanwhile, the electricity, telephone and water systems have been totally shut down. This all reaffirms that Tripoli will not be able to rise up from the debris of the catastrophe if it does not get aid from the Lebanese government and Arab, indeed international, assistance as well.

But has the war in Tripoli really ended, after everything that has happened? Have its causes been uprooted, or is its flame hidden among the mountains of debris?

The parties, especially the National Social and Communist Parties, the organization of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Arab Democratic Party, have gone back to their offices, although they have not yet resumed their activity. The Unification Movement accuses them of having disrupted the Damascus agreement and brought their weapons back into the city, while the movement is being stripped of them; this is in violation of the provisions of the Damascus agreement, as the Unificationist fighting men say. They add that they stipulate that the Syrian forces are not to enter the al-Zahriyah and al-Tibana Gate areas and are to be concentrated in just five points, contrary to what has happened.

Some security sources say that the Damascus agreement also stipulated that the al-Jarmuq Brigade and some Moslem Brothers are to be sent off to Tunisia by sea before the Syrian forces enter the city. However, Arab Democratic Party sources state that what they consider an agreement is not an unconditional and unrestricted Unification surrender and that the legitimate forces have entered the city to restore security and stability to it.

In the midst of the statements and counter-statements, it was necessary to learn about the views of the main signatories to the Damascus agreement, the Arab Democratic Party, the Islamic Unification Party and [former] prime minister Rashid Karami.

Muhsin 'Id, the commander of the Forces of Arab Knights, the Arab Democratic Party's military wing, said, "Our premise is security and stability. We are not satisfied with an alternative to the legitimate Lebanese authorities. For the 10 years we have been enduring the war among aliens on our territory, they have not let us as Lebanese become stable or live in security."

AL-HAWADITH: Was the war of Tripoli a war among aliens?

Muhsin 'Id: Certainly. It was Abu 'Ammar's group that fabricated the problems here through their agents in the city. We are proceeding from a purely Lebanese premise. No intelligent Lebanese would attack the Lebanese army's barracks or the centers of the internal security forces and the organizations belonging to the legitimate authorities. Every citizen must side with the legitimate authorities and work to preserve them, whatever the price. That is how he can demonstrate his Lebanese identity.

AL-HAWADITH: How do you view the current period in Tripoli?

Muhsin 'Id: The step which has been taken is the first one in the framework of security in all areas. The decision President Hafiz al-Asad made to close the security dossier in Lebanon is concentrated on Tripoli as a first step, provided that security then be in general effect over all Lebanese territory.

AL-HAWADITH: Where will the next step be?

Muhsin 'Id: What we know is that the first step has been taken in Tripoli. On the basis of this, the effort will be made to apply the laws in full to everyone in Tripoli, by deploying the legitimate authorities and pursuing and imprisoning wanted persons.

AL-HAWADITH: Who are these wanted persons?

Muhsin 'Id: They are people alien to the city who have committed crimes against its people, as well as some people from the region who have also committed crimes and disrupted security and are wanted by the legitimate Lebanese authorities.

AL-HAWADITH: Who will be in charge of pursuing, arresting and trying them?

Muhsin 'Id: The Lebanese authorities, of course, because we side with any agreement which favors security in Tripoli and Lebanon. We have taken stock of the problems the war has created and the problems the city has suffered from at the hands of the people manipulating its security. Once these people have surrendered we will work to lighten the terror of the destruction and ruin they have caused.

AL-HAWADITH: There are people who hold you responsible for this destruction, on grounds that you are the ones who invaded the city.

Muhsin 'Id: To the contrary, we defended it. We are the true people of Tripoli in this city which was never familiar with factional fanaticism or religious extremism. Tripoli belongs to everyone and Islam belongs to everyone. It does not stipulate the killing of Christians and the annihilation of other creeds. Rather, they are the ones who have twisted religion and exploited it in order to control this city.

AL-HAWADITH: Was the Damascus agreement made among parties with forces that were in balance or among victorious and defeated persons?

Muhsin 'Id: We are basically against fighting and against bombing, but Abu 'Ammar's rockets took us by surprise and destroyed our homes and sections. Therefore we have set out particular conditions for reaching a comprehensive security agreement. They have submitted to them and surrendered to the legitimate forces which have been assigned to maintain security in the city.

AL-HAWADITH: There are complaints that the parties have brought their weapons into Tripoli while the people of Tripoli are being stripped of their weapons.

Muhsin 'Id: The parties which have come into Tripoli, ourselves included, will play no security and military role in the city. Indeed, we will just engage in social work and political organization. The statement that they have brought their weapons into Tripoli is contrary to the truth, because the freedom to express opinions exists not through weapons but through the force of argument and persuasion only.

The commander of the Unification Movement, Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, said: "The earthquake which struck the city was a conspiracy against the movement and against the fundamentalist policy it is pursuing, by which it is working to unify the Moslems in Lebanon so that they will become people with a common sovereignty. Tripoli has undertaken the mission of unifying the Moslems in all Lebanon, and they have sought to fragment this unification by weakening it. No one can imagine rancor poured on a city the likes of that of the parties against Tripoli, since it was not security that was sought but the impugning of security. Although some excesses were involved, they were nothing worth mentioning compared to those in Beirut.

"Security cannot be imposed in this way. Tripoli is now experiencing an Islamic awakening which has caused it to become aware of many Islamic truths it had been ignorant about, or had ignored.

"How can there be security in Tripoli when parties are bringing all their weapons in while the people of the city have gathered up weapons? How can this crooked agreement which has been made between us and them in Damascus have come about? I believe that the security will be temporary, because the parties will scheme to destroy Tripoli's security through the internecine fighting which they will resort to.

"We believe that the new stage will not constitute a solution."

AL-HAWADITH: What you call an agreement they describe as a surrender by the Unification Movement.

Shaykh Sha'ban: If we had surrendered we would have allowed the parties to come in. Moreover, the biggest countries sign agreements. Let them call this agreement in effect between us and them what they want. However, we know that things can be called by other than their own names. Parties call themselves progressive while they are not. In any event, we know that we have dealt with a country which has self-respect.

AL-HAWADITH: Politically, you negotiated in Damascus in the name of the Islamic meeting, and it appears in actual conditions that the fighting men are taking a stand against the agreement. How have you been able to reconcile the political role with military beliefs?

Shaykh Sha'ban: The fighting men are not against the agreement. The total discipline is the proof. We agreed to it and continue to be committed to it, although others have not honored it.

AL-HAWADITH: You say that the parties have disrupted the agreement. Do you have the intention of responding with disruptions on your part?

Shaykh Sha'ban: We have not acted out of force inside the city. Indeed, we will face all excesses through another method, through the people, which may be more useful; for example, there is the method of the people of the south, who mounted a defense against the Jews with their own bodies and finally managed to expel them. After all the people mobilize themselves against the parties and things come to a head, we will hold a confrontation as the people in the south did, through sit-down strikes, demonstrations, strikes and ultimately by useful means.

AL-HAWADITH: However, the parties are Syria's allies.

Shaykh Sha'ban: I ask the Syrians to commit themselves to what we agreed to.

AL-HAWADITH: The parties say that security will be commonplace throughout Tripoli in all its sections but some wanted persons will be handed over to the forces of justice. What is your answer?

Shaykh Sha'ban: According to the Damascus agreement, no one will be handed over as a consequence of the events. Syria will submit lists of the people it wants and will look for them. We do not have any wanted persons or persons who are being protected by us, because it has not been our custom to protect anyone. Everyone in Tripoli is an inhabitant or resident of it. We are not insinuating ourselves into maintaining security in the place of others, especially now that security has been assigned to those who have chosen to bear the responsibility for it.

AL-HAWADITH: But it is said that there are people who have been protected by you, such as some Moslem Brothers and some people from 'Arafat's group.

Shaykh Sha'ban: Do not believe it. No one in Tripoli is fighting alongside us.

AL-HAWADITH: Are there any sections in the Damascus agreement which stipulate the places where the Syrian forces are to be positioned in Tripoli?

Shaykh Sha'ban: The Damascus agreement has specified five places for the concentration of Syrian forces, but they have gone into 50 places. If they perform well, that will be beneficial for us and them. If the opposite happens, they will have harmed us and themselves.

[Former] Prime Minister Rashid Karani revealed that numerous attempts had been made for years with the aim of avoiding what has happened in Tripoli, and that that had been expected. "Even a few days before the most recent fighting, meetings were held whose purpose was to break away from this discord and suffering to which we have succumbed. We reached something close to an agreement at that time. It would have been possible, if agreement had been reached to this, for us to be spared what has happened, but that has nonetheless been the inevitable outcome. After all that has happened, we directed an appeal to various influential persons and private and official organizations, domestic and foreign, to give aid to the oppressed people of Tripoli. I am confident, now that these days have passed, that everyone has emotions of enthusiasm and laudable brotherly humanitarian sentiments. We

are seeking to coordinate these efforts for which preparations have been made so that action may be taken to have them yield their desired fruit in helping these people whose homes and shops have been destroyed and so that we can alleviate the effects of this ordeal on everyone. I am confident that Tripoli will regain its role and will perform its duty in a manner which will serve the national and public causes and will spare them further destruction and ruin. Let the course of life resume and let each of us devote himself to his own livelihood by the sweat of his brow. That is what we hope will happen soon."

AL-HAWADITH: There has been much commotion over the Damascus agreement, especially among the conflicting parties in Tripoli. What is the truth about this agreement?

Premier Karami: The purpose in the Damascus agreement is to bring about conciliation among all groups, strengthen the foundations of unity within the Tripoli family and break the chains about this city so that it will progress into the field of action and regain its role. Tripoli's history gives testimony that it is the city of values, affection and brotherhood. Proceeding from this premise, we find that the purpose in the agreement which was reached to everyone's satisfaction is to guarantee this city's dignity, preserve its people's rights and create a scope and atmosphere for love among them, so that everyone will quietly absorb themselves and be given the guarantee that they can carry out their vital humane role, so that we can resume the course of work and construction in our society and city and so that Tripoli, with other cities, can contribute to everything that will serve the liberation of Lebanon and strengthening of its sovereignty, unity and life of dignity.

AL-HAWADITH: There are complaints to the effect that weapons have come in with the people who have come into Tripoli, while all the weapons present in the city had been gathered up and taken away.

Premier Karami: I cannot say that the agreement was applied in its totality or in accordance with all its sections from the very beginning. A large portion of the weapons still are in the possession of the people, if not out in the open at least in their homes. However, the purpose of the agreement is to gather up all the weapons in everyone's possession, so that Tripoli can regain its calm, security and safety. We have made an absolute promise on this and we are cooperating over it with the various influential persons and forces. I am confident that everyone in the next few days and weeks will feel that their dignity is inviolate and their rights have been protected and that the city has returned to its normal life.

AL-HAWADITH: There are parties which were basically present in Tripoli and have not come back to it since the agreement. Does this mean that there is a prohibition against the return of some parties to the city?

Premier Karami: I do not think that is a factor in anyone's mind. Indeed, Tripoli, which always was blessed with freedom and political rights for everyone, insists that the freedom of political action be guaranteed to everyone. Therefore, its doors are open and it welcomes everyone who wants to

work as long as their work involves nothing which might disturb the laws and public order.

AL-HAWADITH: Do you believe that the statements being issued by certain parties might disrupt the Damascus agreement and consequently the security in Tripoli?

Premier Karami: I am confident that the guarantee of security in Tripoli now is this agreement which everyone has become satisfied with and committed to. Moreover, the forces of legitimacy in the form of the internal security forces and the army will be able with the help and support of the Syrian deterrent forces to protect Tripoli's security from all manipulation in the framework of preserving the freedom, right and dignity of all its people.

AL-HAWADITH: Has the city received Arab or international aid, which is more than necessary in these circumstances?

Premier Karami: We can actually sense sympathy and a dignified, brotherly readiness to extend the hand of aid to the oppressed city of Tripoli. We are waiting for this readiness to be translated into direct action so that we can help people who have been hit as a result of these events and enable them to go back to their homes and shops and what is left of their sections.

AL-HAWADITH: Some people say that after Zahlah and Tripoli, this system will be put into general application in the other Lebanese areas, specifically Beirut. What is meant by this statement?

Premier Karami: I can interpret this as a benevolent attitude toward Beirut aimed at responding to all its people's hopes for the return of normal life to our beloved capital. Therefore I hope and wish that everyone will help purify the area of Beirut of all the chaos and abnormal elements everyone in this precious city is complaining about. We hope that an agreement will be reached which all influential persons will commit themselves to so that Beirut may be given back its security and the course of ordinary life.

AL-HAWADITH: Does the return of ordinary life to Beirut mean the return of the Syrian forces to it, as has been the case in Tripoli?

Premier Karami: I said, and I keep saying, that any agreement not accompanied by a security force which is capable of carrying it out will remain mere ink on paper. More bluntly, I do not find that any force prepared to perform this role exists, except for the Syrian forces. That is my own opinion. I hope that solutions will be found in Beirut which will bring things back to their proper course, in response to the wishes and demands of the people of Beirut.

AL-HAWADITH: What is meant by Beirut -- Greater Beirut or West Beirut only?

Premier Karami: East and West Beirut, of course.

AL-HAWADITH: In your opinion, will the Syrian forces return to Beirut, especially its eastern section, by agreement or by war?

Premier Karami: I believe that agreement is what comes to people's minds, because the president, Lt Gen Hafiz al-Asad, has said that he is prepared to go into any area only by the request and agreement of all the influential people in it.

Therefore, after this excursion among the views of the parties participating in the Damascus agreement, the question remains: Has Tripoli entered the gateway to peace? Will the parade of conciliation set out from there and embrace Greater Beirut and all Lebanon's areas? Premier Karami's words still maintain their optimism; in any event Tripoli, more than other places, is asking for security to be consolidated and for arms to be bade an irrevocable farewell, so that it will be able to rise up from the great earthquake.

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LEBANON

BUSINESS LEADERS COMMENT ON STATE OF ECONOMY

Banking Association VP

Beirut LA REVUE DU LIBAN in French Nov 85 p 46

[Interview with Adel Kassar, vice-president of the Bank Association: "The Increase in the Number of Credit Institutions Was Harmful to the Banking Sector"; date and place not given]

[Text] Despite the unfavorable political and military situation and its harmful repercussions on the national economy, the banking sector has continued its operations, and has even shown development. Nevertheless, events have brought about profound changes in it and have had negative effects.

[Question] Has this sector been affected by events, and in what way?

[Answer] The consolidated balance of the banks has continued to develop in a satisfactory way. Since 1978 it has been multiplied by 8, up from 12,314 billion pounds as of 31 December 1974, to 100,350 billion pounds as of 31 December 1984. Even when one eliminates the twofold effect of inflation and the depreciation of the Lebanese pound in relation to foreign currencies, the growth in volume remains impressive, especially if one notes that the other sectors of economic activity have recorded substantial losses over the last few years.

This development is tied, first of all, to the increasing use of treasury funds which guarantee the banks wider liquidity margins, allowing them to protect themselves against the risks the situation imposes.

Harmful Increase in the Number of Banks

The 1977 financial legislative reforms increased to 91 the number of accredited establishments.

This increase in the number of banks was harmful to the banking sector, and licences were allocated wrongly or in the wrong way, by taking the total capital as the sole criterion rather than the qualitative criteria well-known in the profession. The effects were not slow in making themselves felt and two banking institutions would already have defaulted if it were not for the intervention of the Bank of Lebanon.

Nevertheless, during the last few months, some foreign banks have indicated their intention to turn over their involvement in Lebanese establishments to local shareholders or to already established banks. This phenomenon is due to political and security causes which have affected bank profitability. We think that this trend of foreign banks to leave has been stopped for the time being.

Events have brought about the creation of new urban centers. Lebanese banks have followed this trend and have concentrated their expansion on the creation of new institutions both in Lebanon and overseas.

Consequences of Banking Expansion

In Lebanon, the result has been the proliferation of branches. This explosion in the banking network has entailed several important consequences, particularly:

A sharp increase in capital tied up and as a result, an increase in costs.

A fragmentation of administrative tasks.

An extreme decentralization of personnel; staff who until now had been part of a large team now find themselves scattered among a large number of branches, and are working far from the head office.

A transformation of the environment and a change in the habits of customers who now shop around because of competition.

[Question] What role does computerization play in banking?

[Answer] Under difficult circumstances, the banks have been compelled to computerize their services. This has effected a transformation in their working methods and has brought about a recycling of personnel.

Furthermore, the banks have been forced to modify their operating policies by selecting or restricting their local investments.

As a result, they have been forced to reduce costs as much as possible and to look for new sources of revenue, especially overseas.

In addition, local banks have developed their international activities by establishing new institutions in different forms. This forced internationalization has helped to overcome the present weakness of many Lebanese banks.

[Question] What measures have to be taken so that banks can continue to deal with the internal economic crisis?

[Answer] Several measures need to be taken, including: a move to concentration by a process of merger or absorption so as to reach an appropriate size.

An increase in their own funds which must be done with foreign currency in order to compensate for the continued weakness of the Lebanese pound.

Textile Association President

Beirut LA REVUE DU LIBAN in French Nov 85 p 48

[Interview with Roger Khayat, president of the Textile Industrialists Association: "Today Our Sector Is in the Midst of Change"; date and place not given]

[Text] Ten years of war have given rise to a cycle of violence and destruction, sparing neither human life nor property. There is no need to list the damage suffered by our industries.

But in spite of everything, the textile factories have taken up the challenge and have continued to supply the Lebanese market and even the foreign one. Will this always be the case, considering the serious economic crisis which looks as if it will get worse?

Roger Khayat, president of the Textile Industrialists Association stated that a while ago he would have painted a somber picture of the situation. "Today," he said, "the economy is in the midst of change. Not only is the revenue system undergoing change, but so is its source, based on foreign relations. Basic questions are being asked concerning economic policy and the contribution of private initiative to the development of the country."

"Inevitably, the major topic remains forced unemployment, brought on by the slump of 1983-1984 and the huge exodus of the people."

"If the situation continues, the first priority will be to ensure work and revenue. Everyday experience reveals that there is profound variation in sources of income. Of course, we have lost tourism because of the war and there are fewer and fewer fund transfers. Imports continue to drop and the building industry still seems to be stalled."

Opening of the Local Market to Lebanese Products

"On another level; we have observed a substantial opening up of the local market to Lebanese products and a very noticeable upturn in exports."

"Before the current events, agriculture and industry's share in the gross national product was no more than a third. Industry's contribution was estimated at 1.2 billion out of a gross national product (GNP) of 8 billion. Industry's current contribution can be estimated at approximately 12 billion. Although there are no statistics, several indicators provide these conclusive figures. In this situation, three conclusions can be drawn."

"First, one has to believe that industry, strengthened by new investments and with a reduced capacity for establishing itself because of the stoppage, has regained its prewar turnover."

"Secondly, greatly reduced national revenues are less than half what they were previously."

"Thirdly, industry's share of the gross national product is no longer far from reaching 50 percent. This very new situation for the country is bringing us into line with conventional economies."

[Question] What is the cause of the fluctuations in the rate of the dollar?

[Answer] All the indications suggest that the flux in foreign currency will no longer be so unfavorable to us as in the previous month. In my opinion, that would justify a slow but sure improvement in the exchange rate for the pound. This scenario calls for two statements: a short term speculative trend could always result whether brought about deliberately or not, and could affect development for one, two, or three months, and the pound could experience an economically unjustifiable decline. But in the medium term, 1 to 2 years of economic stability works in favor of the appreciation of the pound.

Our products are benefiting from unequaled competitiveness. As a result, our exports will increase as much as production will allow, and our imports will conform to our new means.

Moreover, the regimentation of credit and the ban on exchange transactions instituted to put a stop to speculation have produced conflicting results. It is obvious that a currency which depends on its industry is at a disadvantage insofar as industry encounters production difficulties.

In my opinion, the depreciation of the pound occurred at the end of 1982 at a time when the dollar, valued at 375 pounds, was like a stretched spring that suddenly snapped after it had reached its limit.

[Question] What was the effect of fluctuation in the value of the dollar on Lebanese industry?

[Answer] I am an inveterate opponent of the position that maintains that a rise in the cost of foreign currency automatically results in a rise in prices. It is not justified either in the short or in the long term. In the short term, reserve supplies dictate the selling price; any business has its payment requirements and its supply contracts, and replacement costs are not an automatic phenomenon.

In the long term, the reverse process is more realistic; rising prices cause a weakening of the currency and a drop in the exchange rate. The dollar's first spurt was not accompanied by a significant rise in the general level of prices. Afterwards, prices caught up with this rise and probably went considerably beyond it.

Retailers suddenly found it more and more difficult to obtain supplies when they were expecting a continuation in the rising trend of foreign currency rates. They increasingly raised their prices, while at the same time restricting sales. Nevertheless, it remains the case, in short, that the currency reflects the relationship of the monetary situation to actual conditions; if salary increases, because of the high cost of living, were to confirm the established situation of the dollar in Lebanon, the pound would definitely lose value. In the opposite case, it cannot be doubted that foreign currencies, and especially the dollar, would soon settle down.

24 January 1986

Government Assistance to the Industrial Sector

[Question] What assistance has the government given to industry during the war?

[Answer] On several occasions during these events, the state has tried to adopt measures favorable to the economic sector. There was a law passed on the rescheduling of debts, and funds were allocated by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) to hard hit businesses; there was the reduction of interest rates for importing industrial machines, and especially the project established by the Ministry of Industry in minister Frem's time which was the plan to restore our sector.

Unfortunately, this plan, which was very well thought out as to its practical application, came to a halt with the departure of the former minister. The prevailing idea today is that the state with its large budget deficit is unable to help in reconstruction and development. However, there is a factor which can overcome the facts of the situation, and that is public initiative. By this term I mean an attitude that is fully the equivalent of private initiative, but whose field of application would be the administration.

[Question] What would be the effects on industry of terminating the policy of subsidizing fuel?

[Answer] A priori, it could reduce waste in the medium term. But there is a long way from there to believing that it would have a beneficial effect on the exchange rate. Whether paid for by the state or by private citizens, it is the same kind of foreign currency that will regulate fuel imports. However, fuel used in industry is discounted in all countries of the world with developing economies. The social and economic advantages are much greater than the cost of assistance. As a result, I favor the elimination of subsidies for consumers but retaining them for producers. Where the restoration of industry is concerned, a plan had been worked out for removing fuel subsidies, spread out over 5 years so as to achieve the progressive reduction of waste, without at the same time imposing too great expense on consumers. We are now in the midst of carrying out this plan and the government has saved a billion pounds.

Bank of al-Biqa` VP

Beirut LA REVUE DU LIBAN in French Nov 85 p 52

[Interview with Georges Fakhoury, vice-president of the Bank of al-Biqa`: "The Economic Situation Is Linked with that of Security"; date and place not given]

[Text] The Bank of al-Biqa`, with its head office in Zahle, was founded in 1959 (after the establishment of the Bank of Lebanon and the promulgation of the currency and credit code), by Wadih Fakhoury, father of the current president of the board of directors, Chawki Fakhoury, and of vice-president Georges Fakhoury. It has undergone rapid expansion and now, apart from its head office whose president is Chafik Assi, includes two branches, in Rayack and Hazmieh.

The sole Lebanese bank in the al-Biqa', it is an example of the courage and daring of the Lebanese who is determined to persevere in his task to assist Lebanon get over the difficult obstacle of the war.

Its current vice-president, Georges Fakhoury, began at a young age to assume his responsibilities. "I mounted the ladder," he said, "a step at a time, and I worked like any other employee before taking on this job."

When questioned concerning the economic crisis which prevails in the country, he answered our questions openly.

The Economic Situation Depends on Security

[Question] How do you plan to cope with the country's economic situation and the depreciation of the Lebanese pound?

[Answer] The economic situation in any country is tied to security and the general political situation.

When a country's political situation is precarious, then of course there are harmful repercussions on the economic sector generally and not only on the banking sector. In Lebanon, the balance of payments has been upset. But I can assure you that in spite of everything, the Lebanese pound is strong because of the margin guaranteed by gold and foreign currency in addition to revenue from taxes which totals approximately 17 billion pounds. The treasury deficit does not exceed this figure. The deficit is not insurmountable, especially if the government removes its fuel subsidies and takes on some foreign loans.

On the other hand, added Fakhoury, I propose putting an end to speculation on the dollar in an exceptional way during the crisis period the country is going through. That would end the psychosis the people are experiencing. We have pointed out that each time something happens in the country and the banks close, the dollar ceases to climb.

Sales of the dollar should be restricted to documentary credit and business trips. On the other hand, Lebanese who have dollar deposits abroad must be persuaded to open accounts at the Bank of Lebanon with lower interest rates on condition that the law allow it.

Conservative Policy

[Question] What is the secret of your success? And why open a new branch in Hazmieh, especially during these difficult times?

[Answer] At the bank, we are following a conservative policy. Moreover, the owner of the Bank of al-Biqa' plays a major role in its direction. Where loans are concerned, these are distributed among 1,200 customers who go all the way from the minor employee to the high volume trader, i.e., all classes of the population. Everyone can take out a loan from us, which is a rare thing.

We opened a branch in Hazmieh because of the insecurity of the roads linking the al-Biqa' to the capital. The majority of our customers wanted to transfer

their accounts to Beirut, so in order not to lose these deposits, we had to establish this branch; and secondly, to facilitate the processing of our customers' checks since the business community no longer accepted checks from the al-Biqa'. Add to this that services were disrupted between Zahle and Beirut because telex and telephone service was cut off. Hazmieh facilitates exchanges because it is located half way between Beirut's two sectors, and therefore offers many advantages. But we will only be satisfied when the Dar al-Baidar road opens once again.

I Am Optimistic

[Question] They say there will be a difficult period for the banking sector. How do you plan to deal with it?

[Answer] I am very optimistic and I think that the war will soon come to an end. Then we will experience a period of prosperity.

But if such a crisis eventuates, I would hike the liquidity rate to more than 35 percent, and legally it should be 25 percent.

Then I think that the crisis will be overcome with the collaboration of the Central Bank.

[Question] Do you believe in the role of computerization in banking?

[Answer] Of course, I do believe in the future of information [as published] in the banking sector, and in this regard we have recently installed a computer in Zahle.

[Question] How do you see the economic future of Zahle and the al-Biqa'?

[Answer] Zahle is presently going through a period of prosperity that it has not known in a long time because it opens onto the plain, and its economy has been strengthened.

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OMAN

EDUCATIONAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS VIEWED

Educational Development

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 3 Nov 85 Special Supplement pp 49-50

[Text] On 18 November 1985, the sisterly Sultanate of Oman will celebrate the 15th anniversary of the welfare procession led by His Majesty Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id, the sultan of Oman. During these years and under his majesty's wise leadership, the sultanate has witnessed activity and development in all the educational, cultural, construction, economic, and social fields. The size and dimensions of the development achieved on the soil of sisterly Oman cannot be imagined without a numerical comparison between the past and the present. The figures provide a clear indication of the efforts that have been exerted and that continue to be exerted in the various spheres to enhance the standard of living in Oman in record time.

Free Education for All

There is no doubt that the progress of peoples and nations is founded on how widespread education is and on the presence of a prosperous educational activity among them. Because education in its modern concept was nonexistent in Oman prior to 1970, the issue has topped the sultanate's list of priorities since His Majesty assumed power. In 1970, there were in all of Oman, which covers an area of 300,000 square km, just 3 elementary schools with only 909 male students. The number of students has multiplied many times, amounting this year to 195,847 male and female students. The number of schools built by the government in the past years amounted to 531 schools, with the number of preparatory schools amounting at the beginning of the past academic year to 297 schools accommodating 156,933 male and female students, with the elementary schools numbering 198 schools and accommodating 29,611 students, and with 36 secondary schools in which 9,303 male and female students were enrolled.

The number of students sent abroad to study on scholarships in Arab and foreign institutes, colleges, and universities came to 2,000 male and female students.

Education includes both males and females whereas it was confined to males in the past. A statistical report by the Ministry of Education and Youth Affairs estimates the percentage of enrolled female students at 46 percent of the total number of students enrolled.

Sultan Qabus University

The government's efforts in the sphere of disseminating education and expanding educational services have not been confined to just opening more schools in all of the sultanate's provinces and districts but have gone beyond to achieve a qualitative leap in the sphere of higher education. This is embodied in the foundation of the sultanate's first university, namely Sultan Qabus University in al-Khawd area, located 50 km west of Muscat, the capital.

The university will begin its first academic year in September 1986 by opening five colleges, namely the colleges of agriculture, education, Islamic sciences, engineering, and medicine and science. The university includes a central library and a medical reference library. It also has four centers under its control, namely the educational technology center, the Islamic sciences research center, a computer center, and a language center. The university has chosen these colleges with which to begin its academic year in response to the aspirations and objectives of the sultanate's educational and developmental policy which is embodied in training Omani youth to hold the vital positions necessary for the achievement of greater development in the various sectors. In the initial phase, the university will be able to accommodate 3,000 male and female students, keeping in mind that the studies conducted to implement and construct the university took into their consideration the question of future expansion in a manner compatible with the increase in the number of students and expansion in the number of the university's colleges and centers needed to serve in developing the university's academic research and studies.

Adult Education

Education has not been confined to minors but has gone beyond to include adults who were denied such an education in past years. More than 1,300 adult education schools and centers have been opened to provide education to men and women.

Youth Affairs

To complete the links of youth development, attention had to be devoted to physical development, in addition to intellectual and cultural development. This attention is reflected in the constant support and care the government gives the youth sector, the youth club activities, and the youth centers in all parts of the sultanate. The government has built a youth complex in Bushar at a total cost of 30 million Omani riyals to serve the capital area. The complex, built over 44 hectares, includes a stadium which can accommodate 30,000 spectators and a vast sports hall containing the facilities and equipment necessary for practicing more than 23 sports.

Health for All

It was said in the past that health is a crown on the head of the healthy. Recently, WHO has raised the slogan of "health for all by the year 2000." In this regard, the Omani Ministry of Health is in a race with time to crystallize the contents of this slogan before the year 2000.

In 1970, there were only 3 small hospitals, 2 health centers, and 11 clinics in Oman. Whereas the number of hospital beds did not exceed 12 in 1970, there are now 15 hospitals and 19 health centers with a total number of 2,043 beds. This is in addition to 64 clinics and 35 mobile medical teams to serve the citizens of the remote areas. In 1984, three health centers were established in Sadah, al-Haqq City, and Kakhyut. Moreover, five clinics were opened in various provinces.

Within the framework of the constant development of the existing health institutions, al-Nahdah Hospital in Rawa has been supplied with two units: a heart unit and an isotopes unit. Khawlah Hospital has been equipped with a surgery room for burn cases. The projects scheduled to be completed this year include five small health centers, seven clinics, and nine units for preliminary health care.

A hospital with a capacity of 565 beds is currently under construction in al-Ghabrah area. This hospital is scheduled to be completed in 1986. A university teaching hospital is also to be attached to the Medicine College of Sultan Qabus University next year. The university hospital will include units for examination by an electronic microscope and for nuclear medicine.

Modern Cities and Quarters

With the sultanate's continued development process, the importance of civil planning has been growing day by day. The comprehensive plan for the capital area calls for the construction of six new residential quarters. The construction of one of these quarters already begun near al-Qarm beach. The plan focuses in the next 5 years on expanding the construction of new quarters and on improving what was built during the first years of the rapid development. As for the provincial cities, such as Nazwa and Sahar, the development will not be as comprehensive as in the capital area and the emphasis will be put on improving the existing buildings so as to preserve their distinctive historical character.

Housing Bank

Within the framework of the efforts exerted by the government in the sphere of construction and of boosting the sultanate's business activity, the Omani government established the Omani Housing Bank which advances loans to citizens with an annual income of more than 1,200 riyals. These citizens are entitled to obtain housing loans amounting to 90 percent of the construction

cost and to be repaid over a 15-year period at an interest rate of 3 percent. As for citizens with an annual income of less than 1,200 riyals, they can obtain loans with very low interest rates, to be repaid over a 30-year period, for the purchase of government-built housing.

The Omani government has also allocated 24 million Omani riyals to landlords wishing to repair their houses, provided that such houses are unhealthy or about to collapse.

The improvement in the performance of the utilities and the spread of such utilities to the various parts of the sultanate have led to a reduction of rural emigration to the cities by nearly 50 percent.

National Labor

With the continued development process and with the efforts exerted to develop Omani society and with the accompanying construction activities, the need for trained labor in the various technical and service fields has surfaced. This has motivated Omani government to devote the utmost attention to this issue and it has begun training Omani citizens so that they may gain skills in the various fields.

In 1978, the Education and Vocational Training Council was established under the chairmanship of Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id to plan and work for meeting the needs of the various sectors of the national economy for trained manpower, with the planning for this purpose done through coordination between the programs of the various ministries, government projects, and private firms concerned with the education and training activities.

The Ministry of Education has set up agricultural and technical training colleges in several cities. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor shoulders a special responsibility in the process of developing and enhancing the sultanate's manpower resources. It organizes training courses in construction, electrical and mechanical engineering, commerce, agriculture, fishing, and mining through the vocational institutes spread throughout the country. In addition to these specialized courses, training courses have been organized on the job to enhance the capability of the workers in the various production projects. In harmony with the policy the government adopts in the sphere of work, the government projects give top priority to manpower development and enhancement. For example, the Omani Mining Company trains local workers to operate various kinds of equipment in the Sahar copper complex and in the oil refinery near al-Fahl Port. As a result of the training courses organized by the management at home and abroad, the percentage of Omani citizens working in the company has risen to 38 percent. The private-sector companies also contribute in this regard. The government gives such companies the priority in setting up projects in the government.

Social Welfare

The government's comprehensive approach has not denied the Omani people the enjoyment of the prosperous years led by His Majesty Sultan Sa'id ibn Qabus. This comprehensive approach gives all the right to live and enjoy life and advances assistance to those needing assistance by virtue of their special circumstances. In 1972, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor began implementing social welfare programs for Oman's citizens. In addition to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, a number of other government agencies have undertaken the responsibility of advancing this care. The total social aid advanced for the welfare of the old, the disabled, widows, and orphans in the various parts of the sultanate amounted last year to 8,974,417 riyals, from which 30,141 citizens benefited. In addition to the social aid, there are programs for the welfare and training of the disabled. The government has set up two training centers, one of them in Muscat, the capital, and another in Salalah and a school for the deaf and mute which accommodates 120 children. His majesty the sultan of Oman has issued instructions for setting up more orphanages and social welfare institutions.

For the further utilization of manpower within the limits of the disabled, each according to his disability, and to crystallize the principle of self reliance, the government provides work opportunities compatible with the capabilities of the disabled. It also supplies some disabled with equipment and machinery such as sewing machines, which enable them to make a living. Within the framework of the program for the development of local communities, the government offers the inhabitants of villages in remote areas assistance to train them to build temporary schools or local roads until comprehensive services reach them. On the other hand, the government offers people with limited income free land and government housing.

Modern Transportation Means

The availability of modern transportation means and routes is considered one of the most important elements needed for society's development. This is why the unavailability of paved roads and modern means of communication was one of the factors delaying the development of Omani society in the years preceding the blessed renaissance procession led by His Majesty Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id, considering that there were then only 10 km of paved roads in Oman and that getting to the sultanate's provinces was not free of hardships and problems. Moreover, some parts of the sultanate could be reached only by sea, as in the case of the town of Khasab located in the northernmost part of the sultanate.

But with the passage of 15 years on the welfare procession, we notice today how it has become possible to reach all parts of the sultanate by land, air, and sea with utter ease and safety. The total sum the Ministry of Communications has spent in the past 5 years on road construction projects amounts to more than 218 million Omani riyals. The length of asphalted roads built in the past 15 years amounts to nearly 6,000 km, including a 1,000 km-long express highway linking Muscat, the capital, with the city of

Salalah in the south. This is in addition to 18,500 km of paved [dirt] roads that are linked at the same time by a network of paved highways. Another highway makes it possible to reach the town of Khasab in the north by land whereas the only way to reach it in the past was by sea.

Suspended Bridges

As a result of the development of society's life and activity, especially in the capital area, this area has experienced overcrowding on the roads and the streets. This motivated the government to implement in 1983 two major road construction projects, the first to build the Darsit-al-Qarm dual highway and the second to build four suspended bridges in the capital. The government also built four overhead bridges at the circles of al-Qarm, al-Khuwayr, al-Chabrah, and Ghala, in addition to a new direct road to al-Sib International Airport.

Domestic Aviation

In addition to devoting attention to the construction and asphaltting of land routes, the government has also devoted special attention to air transport traffic, because passenger traffic at al-Sib International Airport, which is close to Muscat, the capital, increased by 75 percent and at Salalah Airport by 49 percent in the period from 1979 to 1983. The number of passengers using al-Sib International Airport in that period grew considerably, exceeding 1 million passengers, and the number of passengers using Salalah Airport exceeded 57,000 passengers. As a result of this increase, the government found it necessary to expand the two airports. A hall for domestic flights is currently under construction in al-Sib Airport and plans have already been drawn up to build a new passengers hall in Salalah Airport.

Last year, the Omani Airline Service launched regular domestic flights from al-Sib International Airport to Khasab, al-Subay'ah and Limah on Musandam Peninsula, in addition to similar flights to al-Buraymi, Sur, and Masirah Island and daily flights from Salalah Airport to the southern province.

Qabus Port

The building of Qabus Port has rejuvenated Oman's activity and history in the maritime trade. The port consists of nine deep-water piers capable of receiving ships with a draft of 10.4 meters. The construction of another pier will be completed shortly. Construction of the container pier in 1981 has had its extreme impact on boosting the port's traffic and activity and on greatly expanding the trade activity between Oman and the neighboring Gulf area and Arab Peninsula countries on the one hand and the other world countries on the other hand.

As a result of the developments and ramifications of the Gulf war, the volume of cargo unloaded at the port in the first 9 months of 1984 grew by 900 percent over the same period of 1983. The total number of ships visiting

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the port last year amounted to 1,481 ships of various sizes with a load of (2,889,154) tons. The volume of goods exported from Qabus Port amounted in the same period to 43,300 tons, consisting mostly of fish, copper, and crude chromium.

Postal and Communications Services

The Sultanate of Oman is preparing for the most advanced move in the sphere of communications with its Arab sisters via Arabsat--the Arab artificial satellite. This qualitative move has been preceded by no less important moves in the sphere of postal, telephone, and telex services. The number of telephones in the capital area has risen to 83,000 telephone lines whereas it exceeded no more than 200 lines 15 years earlier. The number of telephones has also doubled from 6,000 to 12,000 telephone lines in Salalah.

The construction near Bayt al-Falj of a new communications center equipped with the latest means has led to increasing the capacity and number of lines and has given the citizens the opportunity to make better use of these services. The government has also built a microwave network linking Nazwa, Salalah, 'Abra, Matrah al-Kubra, and al-'Udhaybah to improve the standard of communications and of television reception in these provincial capitals which now get their communication services via the ground satellite station.

The projects listed in the Second 5-year Plan include the construction of a modern coastal radar station and an artificial satellite station to observe naval traffic. The construction of a ground station in the strategic Musandam Island was completed recently. There are also plans to build another satellite station in Masirah.

As for the postal service and for improving the performance of this vital utility, development activity has included all sectors of postal work and postal services have been conveyed to most of the sultanate's areas and provinces. The introduction of the automatic mail sorting system into al-Sib postal center has speeded up the sorting of mail, thus enhancing the standard of efficiency in delivering and exchanging mail with various countries.

Economic Development

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 3 Nov 85 Special Supplement pp 51-52

[Text] The year 1985 represents the end of the first phase of planned economic development in the Sultanate of Oman, since it is the year in which the Second 5-year Plan ends.

Despite the drop in oil prices, the Sultanate of Oman has been able to achieve the objectives charted in its plan.

There is a characteristic that distinguishes the economic development experience in the Sultanate of Oman. One of the manifestations evident to every visitor to the country and to all the economic and press observers from all parts of the world is that Omani economic development has a distinguishing character that makes it a vanguard experience in the sphere of economic development. The most important elements of this character can be summed up in the following:

- The wise distribution of the country's financial revenues so that the spending targeted in the plans may not exceed the available revenues, thus sparing the country the evil of falling into financial crises.
- The realism in selecting the development projects and the economic policies and objectives.
- The preservation of the market economics, i.e., the economics of supply and demand, within the framework of a free economic system.
- The creation of a real economy which encourages economic production and not just a spurt of financial transactions.
- The social and economic compatibility of Omani economic objectives and policies with the Omani environment.

The Sultanate of Oman is one of the few countries that were able to move forward in 1984 in implementing their development programs. The sultanate continues to move with the same strength to implement whatever remains of the programs of the Second 5-year Plan, which ends in 1985. The revenues and the spending activities are proceeding according to the plan and in a manner that has made it possible to achieve a growth rate of 5 percent. Inflation has actually been eliminated and the prices of foodstuffs, drinks, and tobacco have dropped. Oman has been able to achieve the charted objectives by increasing its oil production to 416,000 barrels a day in order to make up for the drop in government revenues.

This year's budget amounted to 1,918,000,000 Omani riyals, with an increase of 153 million Omani riyals in government spending over the 1984 budget. It is expected that the increase in revenues will amount to 158 million riyals, with the total 1985 revenues amounting to 1,719,000,000 Omani riyals compared to 1,561,000,000 Omani riyals in 1984. Therefore, it is expected that the total deficit in this year's budget will amount to 199 million Omani riyals compared to 170 million Omani riyals in 1984. This deficit will be met with withdrawals from the reserves and with borrowing from abroad.

The Omani's riyal commercial exchange value reached a record rate at the end of 1984, rising by 8 percentage points over its value at the end of 1983. The foreign currency factor was behind the drop in consumer commodity prices, especially the prices of foodstuffs, from 118.6 in December 1983 to 108.8 by the end of last year.

As a result of the extreme importance the government attaches to the process of diversifying the economy, Oman has been able to take long strides in the sphere of industrialization. For example, in 1975 and at the start of the First 5-year Plan, there were in the sultanate 10 industrial units with a total capital of half a million Omani riyals.

The year 1984 witnessed two important events within the framework of Oman's march toward industrialization when the sultanate's first oil refinery was put into operation at its full capacity of 50,000 barrels a day, thus giving Oman self-sufficiency in oil derivatives, and when al-Rusayl cement plant, owned by the government and considered the biggest single investment project in the Second 5-year Plan, started production.

It is worth noting that the new plant and another private-sector-owned plant in Raysut, near Salalah, produce nearly 844,000 tons a year or 60 percent of the sultanate's needs of this commodity that is vital to the development process.

In 1984, Oman also became the first country in the Arabian Peninsula to export a natural non-oil resource, namely copper.

Commerce has also begun to regain its place in Oman, keeping in mind that Omani traders were the pioneers in using the naval route to China in the 18th century and that Oman's ports received the maritime ships of various countries at the time. Because of the attacks to which ships are subjected in the Gulf nowadays, a large number of ships of various nationalities head for the sultanate's ports to unload their cargo which can be then transported safely by land to the area's countries.

To secure the increasing financial needs in the industrial and commercial fields, the sultanate's banking apparatus has expanded by a large degree in recent years. There are now in the sultanate 22 commercial banks with a total of 185 branches.

One of the major objectives on which the Second 5-year Plan has focused is the objective of encouraging the private sector to play a bigger role in the economic development process. Government encouragement, through grants and interest-free loans, and the growing demand for all kinds of goods have led to the emergence of more than 600 small and medium-size industrial units in the past 4 years. These units produce construction materials, furniture, home requirements, industrial detergents, and perfumes using oriental frankincense, which is one of the sultanate's traditional exports.

Al-Rusayl industrial zone, located nearly 15 km from al-Sib international Airport, is considered one of the most prominent government projects.

The possibility of establishing a similar industrial zone in Salalah is currently under consideration.

The economic system in operation in Oman is the free economic system and facilities and incentives are offered to local and foreign investors to set up industrial projects that contribute to advancing the country's economic development.

Economically, the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry plays an important role in its capacity as the bridge linking Omani and foreign businessmen.

Muhammad Musa, the undersecretary of the Omani Ministry of Finance, asserted that Oman's financial position is strong and stable, despite the drop in oil prices and despite the international economic stagnation.

He said that the development is proceeding according to its timetables and that no projects have been omitted from the Second 5-year Plan. On the contrary, new projects not included in the plan previously, such as the Sultan Qabus University and the sports complex, have been added.

Regarding the Gulf's economic cooperation and the steps taken by the sultanate to unify the customs tariff within the framework of the unified economic agreement, Muhammad Musa said that the economic agreement's objective is to boost economic development and trade between the council member states. The presence of a unified tariff, especially insofar as customs fees are concerned, is something new, particularly since there are borders and land and sea routes between the council member states so that no state may import goods at the expense of another state or exploit its ports and, consequently, export goods to another state. The presence of a unified tariff helps the state operate its utilities without competition between the GCC member states.

On the GCC member states' freedom to own property in the Sultanate of Oman, the undersecretary of the Omani Ministry of Finance said: Any investor, whether from the Gulf or from outside it, can obtain land in the sultanate through a lease for 25 years, 50 years, or even 90 years. Land utilization in Oman is subject to the land utilization law. As long as the purpose of ownership is not speculation, the sultanate's current laws are flexible enough to permit any investor to obtain land by lease and to utilize it. Consequently, this land utilization is very close to ownership, considering that the investor can utilize the land for a long period. In fact, there are citizens from the Gulf and from elsewhere who have investment projects on the sultanate's lands without owning the land. The current laws open the door for investment.

Regarding the intention to embark on a number of joint economic projects with the GCC member states, Muhammad Musa said: There are in fact important joint projects already in existence, such as the Gulf International Bank which is the first financial institution in which the Gulf states, in addition to Iraq, are partners. It is a major international bank with a good financial reputation which was founded 7 years ago. There are also the Gulf Airline Company which was founded by four states, namely the sultanate, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain; the aluminum company which is headquartered in Bahrain and in which the Gulf states are partners; the Gulf Industrial Investments Organization; and the Gulf Maritime Company in which the Gulf states, in addition to Iraq, are participants.

The undersecretary of the Omani Ministry of Finance explained his view of the sultanate's current financial position in light of the economic developments being witnessed by the world, saying: I wish to stress that economic activity in the Sultanate of Oman continues and that there is no stagnation.

He also said: I stress that we have omitted no projects from the current 5-year plan and that we have added to it new projects not included previously, such as the sports complex and Sultan Qabus University.

By the end of 1984, the sultanate's average daily production of oil amounted to 416,000 barrels, with an increase of 27,000 barrels over the average daily production in 1983. The production was raised to meet the drop in government revenues as a result of the drop in prices. Thanks to the new discoveries, the country's known oil reserves have been increased to 4 billion barrels. This has more than compensated for the increase in production.

Because the sultanate is not an OPEC member, it was not required to reduce its production when the prices dropped sharply in 1983. It is worth noting that the oil-prospecting program within the current 1981-85 5-year plan has achieved great success, considering that the sultanate's oil reserves rose to 4 billion barrels by the end of 1984 compared to 3.5 billion barrels in 1983. (2.5 billion barrels at the start of the plan). Concerted oil exploration operations are currently taking place.

As for mining, Oman obtained in 1984 a certificate from the London Metal market that it is one of the exporters of some of the best-quality copper in the world. This has motivated the government-owned Oman Mining Company to expect its exports of pure copper rods to amount to 14,000 metric tons valued at nearly 7,113,000 Omani riyals this year, thus reviving in Oman a trade that dates back to 5,000 years.

It is worth noting that Oman's success in exporting copper constitutes an important turning point in the efforts exerted to diversify the economy that is based on oil by opening new industrial spheres and by exploiting the country's other natural resources, in addition to distributing employment opportunities more fairly in all parts of the country.

In addition to copper, the Oman Mining Company exported in 1984 a total of 6,000 tons of crude chromium mined in Rahma and Nakhl. Negotiations are currently underway with a number of potential buyers to purchase chromium exports in the future.

At the same time, high-quality marble with good export chances is being quarried at various sites. The sultanate also possesses large reserves of calcareous rock which is used by two cement plants: one in al-Rusayl, near Muscat, and the other in Raysut in the southern province.

24 January 1986

The geological surveys conducted in the northern area of Oman and on Masirah Island indicate the presence of other minerals, such as iron ore, manganese, and nickel.

Further surveys will be conducted to determine the size of the mineral resources. An agreement has been concluded with (Beshmet), a Japanese firm, to prospect for copper in an area of 1,000 square km in central Oman.

Local Community Development

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTihad in Arabic 3 Nov 85 Special Supplement pp 52-53

[Text] Caring for man and achieving all his aspirations for an honorable life have been the main objectives motivating Oman's triumphant procession throughout the years. Reaching every man and offering all services and assistance are objectives which, all attest, Oman has achieved.

There were numerous social needs and there were some problems obstructing the development procession. It was necessary to eliminate the obstacles and to meet all of the Omani citizen's social needs. Thus, the community service and development projects have come as a means toward achieving this end. Throughout their years of efforts, these projects have succeeded to a large degree in achieving their objectives in the various economic and social spheres and in spreading the construction, educational, cultural, health, and social services.

What is more important is the opening up to the world that has allowed modern Oman to play its natural role with its Arab sisters in bolstering the Arab identity and the wise Islamic traditions.

It is indubitable that all this has been the result of the interest of His Majesty Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id who launched his new era by defining Oman's objectives within the following framework: Organizing the state and the government agencies in a modern manner, adopting the latest scientific methods in planning to develop and enhance the country with the purpose of catching up with the bandwagon of scientific and technological progress in the various spheres, beginning where the others have ended, developing human manpower so that it may shoulder its responsibility in the comprehensive development plans, rebuilding the cities and villages, building roads and the needed installations, providing the means of civilized living to the various groups of the people, opening up to the Arab and Islamic world, and taking advantage of the Arab and international expertise in planning the comprehensive development projects.

Thus Came Social Interest

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor was established in 1977 as an independent ministry to shoulder the responsibilities of the Department of social welfare at present and in the future and to develop the welfare so that it may perform its positive role in supporting the state's comprehensive development programs.

Since its creation, this ministry began charting the priorities of social work on the basis of Omani society's main needs and of the tolerant Islamic Shari'a. The ministry has worked for social security plans, women's training programs, the construction of economy housing and the training of the disabled and the lepers. It has also allocated the funds necessary to rescue the victims of flooding, rain, and fire, and funds for vocational training and for labor and workers' welfare. It also exerted tangible efforts in establishing the bases of work in the sphere of youth welfare and in spreading athletic clubs prior to the foundation of a ministry specialized in youth affairs in April 1976.

The ministry currently implements its programs through six social affairs directorates spread throughout the sultanate in the capital, Sur, Salalah, Sahar, Nazwa, and 'Abra. It has also established branch offices of these directorates in al-Mudaybi, al-Rustaq, Ibra', Ja'lan, al-Buraymi, Sama'il, Qurayyat, Khisb, al-Jazir, and Mirbat. This is in addition to specialized central directorates operating through the regional directorates, such as the economy housing directorate and the special welfare directorate.

Development of Local Communities

It is agreed that the development of local communities is a process of mobilizing and organizing the efforts of the individual members and groups of a community and of channeling them toward working jointly with the government agencies with democratic methods to solve a community's problems and to enhance the standard of its members socially, culturally, economically, and in terms of health and to meet their needs by making full use of all the natural, human, technical, and financial resources available to all.

Out of its eagerness to take the scientific and practical steps to implement the sultanate's projects for local community development, the ministry contacted UNICEF to take part with it in conducting a social and demographic survey for two of the sultanate's local communities--Nazwa and Sahar--so as to clarify some facts concerning the Omani society in preparation for planning the development programs. UNICEF responded, thankfully, to the ministry's invitation and participated with it in conducting a comprehensive survey of the beliefs and practices concerning health, nutrition, and child raising in these two areas.

Scientific Method

This study is a clear indicator of the sultanate's adoption of the scientific method of planning generally, of planning the local community development programs in particular, and of defining the main features and problems of these communities. The study produced the following results: there are social and health customs and traditions that impede the process of the comprehensive development of Omani society. It was discovered that mother and childcare required concentrated efforts because the infant death rate, the proportion of children born underweight, and the maternal death

rate were among the high rates. It was also found that some diseases, such as anemia, trachoma, and intestinal and lung infections, were widespread, that the illiteracy rate was high, that few vegetables were cultivated and used in the daily diet, that it was necessary to preserve waterholes and to organize the means of supplying fuel to homes, that fires were widespread because the fuel was unsuitable for the homes that are built of palm fronds, and that there were ponds and swamps, in addition to other obstacles created by the residues of the past and impeding all of the state's comprehensive development programs intended for developing the Omani citizen.

What is well known in the development and enhancement processes is that regardless of how much effort the state exerts at the higher central level of planning and implementation, the objectives cannot be achieved unless these efforts are coupled with programs to prepare the citizens to interact positively with the efforts and to take advantage of them.

The local community problems are problems that are particular to each community separately. However, they are also interconnected. Trachoma, for example, is linked to education, to cleanliness of the home, to childcare, and to social custom, even though it is a medical manifestation. Regardless of the efforts the doctors exert, trachoma cannot be eliminated unless their efforts are supported by concerted efforts to deal with the various factors leading to the disease. Because the problems are interconnected, they have to be tackled collectively and with an interconnected approach. Social development work is not the responsibility of a single ministry but rather the joint responsibility of various service ministries.

Proceeding on the basis of these facts, the ministry concluded an agreement with the UN Development Program to implement a project for the development of the local communities. In accordance with this agreement, the UN program supplied the ministry with an adviser specialized in planning, training, and organization to help it implement a pioneer experimental training project for the development of the local communities in the Nazwa area. Implementation of the project began in May 1976. The ministry also concluded an agreement with UNICEF to supply the project with technical experts specialized in the various spheres of development.

Project's Objectives

The ministry defined in these agreements the project's objectives on two main points: first, training to prepare Omani manpower qualified to work in the community development projects. This objective came as a result of the ministry's belief that Omani communities can be reformed only by Omani citizens themselves because they are the most capable of understanding the nature of the inhabitants of these communities. Second, experimentation until the best means and methods of working in the Omani rural communities, as well as the means and methods of cooperation between the government agencies involved in the project at the local and central levels, are selected so that the experiment may ultimately lead to an Omani strategy for the development of the local communities.

Development in Agriculture, Fishing

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 3 Nov 85 Special Supplement pp 53-54

[Text] The Omani government devotes most of its attention to the agricultural and fishing sectors. This is evident in the enormous financial appropriations allocated to bolster these two vital and lasting sectors.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries works ceaselessly to preserve the conventional irrigation system by maintaining the waterholes [al-aflaj], wells, and springs, in addition to several dams in the sultanate's various valleys, with the aim of nurturing the underground water and of building protective walls against floods. The ministry is also currently conducting preliminary soil and water surveys.

To protect the crops, aircraft spray pesticides against the palm date pest and the mango leaf pest. They also spray the coconut palm trees.

The government also devotes great attention to livestock resources by setting up numerous veterinary clinics and quarantines in the sultanate's various areas and provinces.

As for the state's interest in the fisheries sector, there is complete coordination with the Fund for Encouraging Fishermen to support this sector's workers with boats and equipment.

The ministry also repairs the fishermen's equipment free of charge through the workshops spread along the Omani coastline.

In the sphere of fish marketing, the ministry is building several warehouses to refrigerate and store fish. It also provides training for the local cadres working in this sector. The founding of the Omani Agriculture and Fisheries Bank is nothing but a true embodiment of the Omani government's eagerness to develop its lasting national resource.

Maintenance of Waterholes and Wells

The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries exerts exhaustive efforts to preserve and develop the conventional irrigation system.

The number of waterholes undergoing maintenance this year amounts to 67 waterholes maintained at a cost of 835,733 riyals compared to 22 terraces maintained last year at a cost of 203,000 riyals.

As for the repair and maintenance of wells, the volume of work carried out has increased greatly in comparison to the work carried out last year.

Studies on Dams

As for new projects, the ministry has completed the preliminary and economic feasibility studies on the Tannuf Dam project in Nazwa Province and al-Ghul Dam in al-Hamra' Province. A contract has been concluded with a consultant

to begin the detailed studies and to prepare the bid invitation so as to begin the construction of these dams during the next plan. Preliminary studies are being currently prepared for 17 dams and these studies will be completed in 6 months in preparation for conducting the detailed studies and the bid invitations so that they may be included in the forthcoming 5-year plan.

Agricultural Guidance

The 1985 agricultural program has devoted special attention to training the farmers with the aim of developing the cultivation of fruits, vegetables, and other crops as a result of the application of the results of agricultural research.

In the sphere of vegetable cultivation, several programs have been implemented to develop the cultivation of winter and summer vegetables, such as potatoes and summer tomatoes. Executive programs are also being drawn up to develop the cultivation of Omani garlic and cucumbers. In 1984, the number of model farms amounted to 2,289 farms, with 326 farms in the southern province.

As for the cultivation of field crops, the number of fields scheduled to be cultivated this year amounts to 1,076 fields.

Regarding model fields cultivated with garden crops, 807 such fields were cultivated in 1984. Distinguished guidance programs were also introduced into some of the sultanate's areas, such as al-Jabal, Masir Island, and al-Rustaq.

Supplying Production Requirements

A total of 19,527 kg of various vegetable seeds were distributed in 1984. The subsidy rate for those seeds ranged from 50 percent to 75 percent of their value. The volume of seeds distributed to all districts of the southern province by the end of August 1985 amounted to 922 kg.

Crop Protection

Pesticide-spraying aircraft currently spray an area of 24,000 feddans to eliminate the date palm pest. As for spraying machines, the number of sprayers scheduled to be distributed amounted to 1,630 sprayers. An appropriation of 150,000 Omani riyals was allocated in the 1984 budget for this purpose. Meanwhile, 169 machines will be distributed to the southern area farmers this year, compared to 105 machines last year.

Agricultural Research

A new seed laboratory has been opened and put into operation in al-Rumays agricultural research directorate to examine imported seeds to make sure that they are free of feeds, harmful pests, and dead seeds and to measure their growth capability.

The system of drip irrigation has been introduced in the irrigation research farm. Another irrigation system has been introduced in the fruit research farm. These systems seek to establish the basic measurements on water drainage. A drip irrigation network will also be built in the experimental farm.

A branch research station has been opened at al-Rustaq and it specializes in honey bee breeding and in instructing breeders on the modern methods.

Veterinary Services

A total of 40,000 head of cattle and 400,000 goats and sheep were inoculated against foot-and-mouth disease and cattle plague by July last year.

On the other hand, the ministry opened 14 veterinary clinics between October of last year and October of this year, including 3 clinics in the southern province. The total number of veterinary clinics in the sultanate thus amounts to 33 clinics.

Agroindustries

By August this year, date production amounted to 676 tons of dates valued at 359,000 riyals compared to 638 tons values at 317,000 riyals in the corresponding period of last year.

The volume of dates sold amounted to 806 tons valued at 382,000 riyals. Exports amounted to 512 tons valued at 162,000 riyals and exported to the UAE, Qatar, and Singapore.

As of the beginning of this year, a program was drawn up to develop the date-processing plants by supplying them with all the modern scientific capabilities so that they may package their dates in the best manner possible. This has been done by providing plants for the vacuum dehydration of dates and for automatic filling and packaging.

Crop Marketing

In 1984, the crop-marketing center in the capital set up mobile markets to sell the banana crop in Bahla, 'Abra, and the Eastern province, in addition to the markets set up last year in Nazwa, al-Rustaq, and Fanja'. These markets seek to eliminate the problem of the late marketing of the banana crop in season. This year, these markets' sales amounted to 54,729 riyals compared to 16,157 riyals in 1984. The center also opened a market for exporting Omani agricultural crops to the State of Kuwait.

The said center made a net profit of 51,553 riyals in 1984. The floors of the center's stores have been covered with wood to protect the crops and to reduce the loss. A cold storage area has also been built in the center to preserve the bananas and vegetables.

Fund for Encouraging Fishermen

Coordination has been established between the Fund for Encouraging Fishermen and the Oman Agriculture and Fisheries Bank to meet the fishermen's requests. A total of 567 boats and 589 fishing machines have been supplied to fishermen. A total of 1,095 applications have also been examined to make sure that the applicants are entitled to such equipment and have been sent to the Oman Agriculture and Fisheries Bank to implement them. The fund management received 1,581 applications from fishermen by August 1984, in addition to 194 applications received previously by the fund.

In the southern province, a total of 183 fishing boats have been distributed, compared to 98 boats last year. A total of 133 naval [fishing] machines have been distributed this year, compared to 106 machines distributed by the directorate and 84 distributed by the bank in 1984. Pavilions have been set up for fishermen in Ra's al-Hadd, al-Ashkharah, and Mahut and other pavilions are being set up in al-Khaburah, al-Suwayq, and Liwa.

Fish Production and Marketing

The naval workshop directorate repaired the fishermen's equipment free of charge in 1984. The number of pieces of equipment arriving for repair in the various naval workshops, totaling 10 in number, has increased to 1,739 pieces. In the southern province, the workshops in Salalah, Taqah, Mirbat, and Sadah repaired 579 machines by the end of September 1984. Insofar as fish marketing is concerned, the government's share of the commercial boats' catch amounted to 1,725 tons this year and the total quantity purchased from fishermen amounted to 63 tons. Masirah Island's (share of the fish catch) amounted to 235 tons by the end of 1984, thus bringing the total volume to 2,023 tons. A total of 1,953,471 kg were sold to the outside world and at the sultanate's various outlets. The Fish Production and Marketing Directorate operates 12 fish-marketing centers in the various provinces.

Training Local Cadres

The statistics outfit is being developed by the company's [not further identified] statistics and survey experts who determine the method of obtaining the statistical data on which the work programs and plans depend. The company has gathered a group of Omani youth to train them in obtaining adequate data on fishermen, fishing equipment, and the seasons and on the problems that face fishermen. The training program started in July 1984 and was scheduled to end in July 1985.

Oman Agriculture and Fisheries Bank

The Oman Agriculture and Fisheries Bank advances further assistance embodied in short-term, medium-term, and long-term loans given to the citizens to encourage them to contribute to developing (agriculture and fishing).

The loans advanced by the bank by the end of last October to the farming and fishing sectors in the various parts of the sultanate amounted to 3,775 loans valued at 11 million riyals. The number of plows distributed to farmers amounted to 48 plows valued at 156,000 riyals. This is in addition to 957 water pumps valued at 257,000 riyals.

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OMAN

OIL DISCOVERIES, EXPLORATION EFFORTS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 9 Nov 85 p 43-44

[Article: "Omani Oil: Balance and Stability"]

[Text] Oil revenues constitute the primary source of income for financing economic development projects in the Sultanate of Oman. The petroleum production sector is considered one of the most active segments of the Omani economy, which has seen some marked changes since Sultan Qabus took over the government in 1970.

Despite the numerous crises that the marketing and production of oil have undergone in recent years because of sinking prices and reduction of the production rate, the Sultanate of Oman has been able to overcome these difficulties and maintain its sources of oil income with flexibility, by increasing production at a rate of 50,000 barrels per day, which makes the rate of production come to 400,000 barrels.

Oman has no difficulty in finding buyers for its oil, since it is loaded at the port of al-Fahl, on the Gulf of Oman. This allows the oil tankers to avoid the Strait of Hormuz.

Japan is considered the biggest purchaser of Omani oil. It is expected that Japan will buy about 65 percent of all the output of the Sultanate this year. The oil revenues for this year are estimated to be about 1.1 billion Omani riyals.

During recent years there have been several oil discoveries in Omani territory, which has raised the proportion of oil reserves to 3.5 billion barrels. This means that the Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) of which the government owns 60 percent, can keep its commitments and increase the rate of output to 450,000 barrels per day by the end of this decade.

Among the most important recent finds by PDO are five fields of light crude in central Oman. The petroleum extracted from these fields will enable the Sultanate, for a long time, to maintain the quality of its crude oil exports, with gravities of 34.5° and 35.5° (API). Omani oil exports are simply a blend of the light oil from the fields in the central and northern areas of Oman and the heavy crude from the south. Over the last few years the majority of oil discoveries have been of the heavy type, which has come from fields in the south.

Development of the fields in the central and northern areas of Oman was done in the late 60's and early 70's. Currently production from these areas is 240,000 barrels per day. This rate of production is maintained by using secondary means of extraction. Therefore, the discovery of the five wells in central Oman that produce high quality oil has come at a very appropriate time. The Elf-Aquitaine Company drilled several exploratory wells in its concession area last year. Three of these produced oil, but not in commercial amounts. This year it will drill a new well in the northern part of its concession area. Gas with a gravity of 50° API has been found in the Bukha field, offshore from Musandam. Gas reserves are estimated at about 35 billion cubic meters at a depth of more than 300 meters. The company is now conducting additional production tests. Two more wells will be drilled this year. This is to take place in the interior area of Siwan, which is within the Elf-Aquitaine concession area.

Last year the Oman Gulf Petroleum Company discovered small quantities of oil mixed with a high percentage of water. This was from Safh-1, one of the exploratory wells in its concession area at Saninah, southwest of 'Ibri. There is a second well, Safh-2 which can produce about 1,700 barrels per day but has the potential of producing more.

At the beginning of this year Occidental Petroleum Corporation replaced the Gulf Petroleum Company, by becoming one of the biggest shareholders in the Saninah concession area last year. There are three other companies that obtained concessions in 1981, and all of them have reached various stages of exploratory activity.

- The Amoco Oman Oil Company is active in two areas covering 49,000 square kilometers in the mountains of northern Oman. It hopes to achieve a special breakthrough after discovering gas in the eastern mountains.

According to the agreement signed with the company it must drill five wells before 1986. It will spend about 34 million Omani riyals during the present 5-year plan on seismic surveys and drilling activity. If oil is found Amoco will give the government 85 percent of the profits. This would go up to 87.5 percent if production exceeds 100,000 barrels per day.

- Japex Oman has completed a seismic survey of 2800 kilometers in the area of Wahinah in its concession area. This took place in the middle of 1983. It began drilling its first well 2 month later.

- The Japan Petroleum Oil Development Company of Oman has finished seismic surveys and began drilling operations last November.

The new discoveries in the central area of Oman were made at al-Zawliyah, Suwayhat, Siyalah, Fayyad and al-Wafrah. The gravity of the oil produced by them ranges between 38° and 50° API. The location of these wells near the edge of the great salt basin in Oman, which extends into Saudi Arabia increases the likelihood of discovering a great amount of petroleum in the area.

The al-Zawliya field, which produces oil with a gravity of 50° API, will begin production this year. Its production capacity is between 6,000 and 10,000

barrels per day. Production in the Suwayhat field is expected to begin in 1986. Its capacity is between 6,000 and 10,000 barrels per day. There are indications that three other fields--Rasha, Barik and al-Ghabar--could start producing in 1986 at a rate ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 barrels per day. Development of oil deposits at Siyalah and al-Wafrah is now taking place. Production there is to begin in 1986. This in addition to another field which hopefully will also begin production in 1986.

One of the recent discoveries is a large field at Nimr which produces heavy oil with a gravity of 22° API. Plans have been drawn up for developing this field in 1987.

Part of the oil increase came from the Rima field in southern Oman, which began production in 1982. Its daily production rate is currently 45,000 barrels. The oil produced from Rima is light and has a gravity of 34° API, in contrast to most of the oil produced in the southern area, which is heavy. The Rima field is considered one of the two main centers of oil production in southern Oman. It also handles the management of production at other fields.

Oil reserves in southern Oman amount to about one billion barrels. And there is another large field at Marmul that produces heavy oil with a gravity of 22° API. Its capacity is 44,000 barrels per day. The overall oil production from the Rima and Marmul fields and the smaller fields in the southern area is about 150,000 barrels per day.

Petroleum produced from the southern fields is pumped through pipelines that extend from Marmul to Nahidah, where it flows into the main oil line, which ends at the port of al-Fahal, which is considered the oil export center of Oman. Some parts of this line are to be replaced or renovated to cope with the increasing oil flow from the southern area. The operation of replacing and developing the southern line is considered part of the plan of the Oil Development Company of Oman to maintain and expand the pipeline network in general.

During 1982 46 kilometers of the main line connecting Fahud with the port of al-Fahal were repaired and renovated. In accordance with a contract signed recently there will be extensive repair work on the main pipeline.

The capacity of the new network reportedly will reach 650,000 barrels per day, pumped without using reinforcements. This can be increased to one million barrels per day by using air compressors. Petroleum Development Oman is to develop its camps at Yabal, Qarn and 'Alam. The idea of building secondary camps at al-Siyalah, Nimr and al-Khawir is also being studied.

In accordance with the 1984 plan the government has allocated 59 million Omani riyals to Petroleum Development Oman for recurring expenses, in addition to 100 million riyals to be used for investments.

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QATAR

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FRANCE GROW

Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 9 Sep 85 p 3

[Article: "Qatar Striving to Strengthen Economic Ties with France"]

[Text] The coming months will see a doubling of efforts between Doha and Paris to strengthen relations between France and Qatar. This is one of the results coming out of the deliberations that went on during the Information Day organized by the French/Arab Chamber of Commerce in Paris last Thursday, with the Qatari Chamber of Commerce participating.

This day was organized in expectation of the official visit to be made by the Amir of Qatar, Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, to France this November. It will be preceded by a meeting of the Joint French-Qatari Committee at the beginning of October.

Relations between France and Qatar have developed tangibly since Qatar's independence in 1971. Numerous agreements have been concluded between the two countries in economic, monetary, agricultural and cultural fields. Numerous joint companies have also been established, especially in the field of petrochemicals, the most prominent being those that were established in cooperation with CDF in order to build a factory in Dunkirk, France, and another factory in Umm Sa'id, Qatar, to make use of the gas resulting from liquefaction operations. A number of French companies operate in Qatar; in 1984 there were 184 French companies here.

France takes up 13.6 percent of Qatar's petroleum exports. It is second after Japan in the area of importing Qatari petroleum.

The French News Agency noted that French exports to Qatar diminished in 1983, which put France in sixth place, after being in third place in 1982. For this reason, those present from Qatar and France at this information day urged the French companies to intensify their efforts and research market conditions better to enable France to maintain its position in the Qatari market.

History of Oil Revenues

In spite of a reduction of approximately 19 percent in Qatar's income resulting from a reduction in its petroleum exports (the OPEC share for Qatar is 280,000 barrels per day during the first half of 1985, as opposed to 450,000 barrels per day for the same period of 1984), the 1985/86 budget includes expenditures valued at \$5 billion.

- The large projects continue to be retained, and work on infrastructure projects also continues. The suppression of expenditures in the nation (especially the elimination of thousands of public positions) and the purging of expenditures in general have afforded an opportunity to balance the budget again since 1982. The balance of trade and balance of payments have registered a surplus in 1984.

Work has finished in a large part of the infrastructure projects. The second phase is aimed at establishing a group of diverse industries that will ensure the achievement of self-sufficiency in necessities.

Diversifying Income Sources

Alongside the refining and natural gas liquefying industries, the production of cement and fertilizer from local primary materials, as well as the iron industry, demonstrates this desire for ensuring a sort of self-sufficiency and non-reliance on petroleum alone. From another standpoint, according to Kamil Salih, general director of the Qatar Chamber of Commerce, Qatar exports to Asian nations steel, petrochemical products (urea and ammonia gas), fertilizer, and cement. He stated, "We hope that France and Europe will import other, non-petroleum products from Qatar."

From another standpoint, all of Qatari spokesman urged the French companies and institutions to invest in Qatar, pointing out the tax advantages and the possibilities of the markets.

Though work has come to a halt at one of the large projects, building a center for water desalinization at al-Wasil, a project to build a factory to liquefy natural gas is taking advantage of gas in the vast North Field which is currently being worked. Kamil Salih noted that offers for the first phase will be submitted this week in Doha by companies that were selected previously, among them the French Technip Company. It has been decided that the production capacity of this project, the costs of which are estimated (according to the source himself) at \$6 billion, will amount to about 6 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually.

Actually associated with the project is a mixed company that brings together the Qatari National Petroleum Company (70 percent) and two foreign companies, the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles and British Petroleum, (7.5 percent each). This is by virtue of a contract signed in June 1984. The Japanese company Marubeni also signed a contract with Qatar last Thursday for a 7.5 percent share. Kamil Salih explained that there is still 7.5 percent seeking a buyer.

Gas Pipeline

As regards the gas pipeline that connects the North Field (with reserves estimated at about 6 trillion cubic meters) and Europe via Turkey, Kamil Salih explained that it is very premature to discuss this project, in view of the fact that Ankara has not yet made clear the length of the part that will pass through Turkish territory, nor the method of financing it.

SAUDI ARABIA

AL-TA'IF MAYOR REVIEWS NEW PROJECTS

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 9 Sep 85 p 4

[Interview with Dr Hasan Hujrah, mayor of al-Ta'if, by 'Abdallah al-Zahrani: "Al-Ta'if Plans New Projects; Four Huge Overpasses for Intersections of Principle Streets at Cost of 180 Million Riyals;" [date and place not given]

[Text] The local government of al-Ta'if has implemented several new development projects, tourism development programs and services, giving al-Ta'if a wonderful modern appearance. In the last few years, several road, bridge and tunnel projects have been implemented, public parks established and primary streets planted with trees, and the city has also been modernized from within and the performance level of city agencies and departments improved. According to Mayor Dr Hasan Hujrah, who has played a prominent role in developing and improving the level of services, the city is expecting new philanthropic projects. In this interview, he reveals to AL-RIYAD glorious aspects of life in the city of summer holidays and beauty, al-Ta'if.

The following is the dialogue with the mayor:

[Question] The city government is one of the institutions providing direct services to the citizen. Give us a brief idea of the future for city projects in al-Ta'if.

[Answer] Of course the city government provides important, multi-faceted services to citizens and is an efficient, important agency at the same time. It is divided into several divisions and departments, which together offer services to citizens.

As for al-Ta'if city projects, right now the Musalla al-'Id project in al-Hawiyah is being implemented. This includes asphaltting and providing sidewalks and lighting at a cost of 8 million riyals.

A temporary asphaltting project is being implemented for approximately 3 million riyals.

Some projects to be implemented are:

A project to build four-bridges--three overpasses at intersections of Waj Street with Hasan ibn Thabit and Khalid Streets and Bab al-Hazm Bridge. Some projects are already underway, such as the Khalid ibn al-Walid Bridge. The total cost of all of these projects is 186,058,000 riyals.

Projects for asphaltting and providing sidewalks and lighting include:

A. A 1405/1406 A.H. project to asphalt and provide sidewalks and lighting in the "W" region, which has handed over on 27/10/1405 A.H.

The locations of this project are:

Providing sidewalks and lighting for three streets on the circle.
Providing sidewalks and lighting for two streets in Wadi al-Naml.
Providing sidewalks and lighting at al-Ufayjaf Street and Wadi Waj.
Providing sidewalks and lighting for two streets in Umm al-'Arad.
Providing sidewalks and lighting for al-Qamariyah Square.
Providing sidewalks and lighting at Wadi Waj and linking it with Khatt Jabrah.
Providing sidewalks and lighting for Wadi Waj and linking it with al-Muthannah Street.
Asphaltting three streets in al-Shabatah quarter north of al-Shabatah's principle street.
Providing sidewalks and lighting for Sayyid al-Shuhada' Street.
Providing sidewalks and lighting around the mosque at the Amir 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-Rahman--al-Saddah project.
Asphaltting and lighting two streets in Ibn Suwaylim quarter and linking them with al-Jaysh Street and al-Sayl Road.
Lighting and asphaltting two streets in al-Faysaliyah quarter (al-Thaqafah quarter) and linking them to al-Sayl Road.
Lighting Ka'b ibn Zuhayr Street, Abu Zayd al-Hilali, Ma'bad ibn Khalid al-'Adwani and Jawhar al-Saqla in al-Muthannah.
Asphaltting and lighting 'Ukaz Street, behind the cemetery.
Asphaltting and providing sidewalks around al-Muthannah Park (1.2.3) and al-Lu'lu' Park, including surrounding streets.
Asphaltting and lighting Park No 14.15 near al-Tuyur Park.
Asphaltting and lighting al-Mu'azzam, al-Rub' al-Khali, Dhi al-Halifah and Tanta Streets, which branch off from "Ukaz Street, and linking them with al-Haras Street.
Providing sidewalks and lighting around the mosque on al-Jaysh Street.
Asphaltting and lighting around the mosque on al-Haras Street.
Asphaltting around al-Jawalan Park and linking it to the principle street.
Removing stones and asphaltting al-Nammas Street

B. Asphaltting and providing sidewalks and lighting for 1405/1406 A.H., region "H." These locations were handed over on 29/10/1405 A.H. and are as follows:

Lighting two streets behind Mu'asha Clinic.
 Asphaltting and lighting three streets at al'Rabwah project and linking them to al-Jaysh Street.
 Providing sidewalks and lighting for a park at Wadi Waj and Layla Street. A triangle at Wadi Waj near the support wall.
 Lighting park No 11.13, Wadi Waj.
 Asphaltting and providing sidewalks and lighting in front of al-Hamiyani. Center on al-Shafa Road (the street leading to the park).
 Providing sidewalks and lighting on al-Shafa Street (beginning).
 Providing sidewalks and lighting for the street leading to the city parks (in front of the hospital).
 Lighting park No 7, Wadi Waj.
 Lighting park No 12, Wadi Waj, in front of the Red Crescent Society.
 Lighting and providing sidewalks for a park in front of the girls' schools, Wadi Waj.
 Lighting al-Biyashah triangle.
 Asphaltting and providing sidewalks and lighting around a park in Umm al-'Arad--Rabi' ibn Rabi'ah.
 Lighting and asphaltting the area around a mosque at the end of al-Ka'ka project.
 Asphaltting and providing sidewalks for the park in front of Muhammad ibn Sa'ud Park in al-Shatbah.
 Asphaltting and providing sidewalks for a park near al-Imam Ibn Sa'ud Park in al-Shatbah.
 Asphaltting and providing sidewalks and lighting for gardens on the al-Nahdah project in al-Muthannah (three gardens only).
 Asphaltting and providing sidewalks and lighting for al-Radaf Park No 18.17 near Masla al-'Id in al-Radaf.
 Lighting and providing sidewalks for al-Sulaymaniyah park No 5 and al-Sulaymaniyah Triangle.
 Asphaltting Jabal Sariyat al-'Ilm park.
 Providing sidewalks and lighting for al-Nasim park No 11.10.
 Providing sidewalks and lighting for the park in al-Haras Street triangle.
 Providing sidewalks and lighting for al-Radaf park No 7.2.
 Asphaltting and providing sidewalks and lighting at the beginning of a street that intersects al-Sayl Street at al-Jaysh Street in front of Ibn Suwaylim and the end of the street that runs into Mu'asha Street.
 Asphaltting and removing stones from three streets which branch off from Hasan ibn Thabit Street.
 Asphaltting Talhah Street near al-Tilifiziyum Street.
 Asphaltting and removing rocks from al-Razi Street in Qarawa and around the mosque.
 Asphaltting in al-'Aziziyah quarter, Street No 222.8 and removing rocks.
 Asphaltting in al-'Aqiq quarter, Street No 178.176.8, linking it with al-Rabwah Street.
 Asphaltting streets in front of Electrical Company No 31.
 Removing rocks and asphaltting in front of the Society for Memorization of the Koran next to Amir Muta'ab Street.
 Asphaltting Abi ibn Ka'ab and Thabit ibn al-Ghays Streets in Umm al-'Arad No 2, linking them with asphalt.

[Question] How much attention has the city government given to creating and coordinating plant cover in the city?

[Answer] The municipal government of al-Ta'if has undertaken a new strategy to increase plant cover, since official reports show that before 14/6/1401 A.H. there were only five public parks with an area of 54,760 square meters and fewer than 2,000 trees of various types in the city.

Now there are 2,250,000 square meters of cultivated land in the city, 170,453 square meters of which have been planted. Streets totaling 350 km in length have been planted; this includes 480 parks and trees along the streets and entrances to the city, such as al-Hada, al-Shafa and al-Sayl Streets and al-Hada Street and the circle linking al-Hada and al-Shafa. The government has lighted the public parks and placed benches and statuary in the public squares, greatly beautifying the city.

[Question] In view of the city's position as a tourist site, what amusement projects are planned for al-Ta'if?

[Answer] Because al-Ta'if is the number-one summer vacation spot in the kingdom, it has an excellent future for tourist and amusement projects.

The city government has planted trees in the extended services to the tourist areas, such as al-Hada, al-Shafa and al-Radaf. A study will be made to set up lavatories, extend electrical services and provide needs of tourists and summer visitors. The municipal government is making great efforts to speed up implementation of these huge projects, which will have a great effect and be quite beneficial. We should not forget the city government's role in building lavatories in Wadi Waj and the central part of the market.

[Question] One notices different styles of buildings in different parts of the city. What is the position of the city government on setting down building styles?

[Answer] The city can only advise that old buildings be repaired and maintained. There are regulations for improving and beautifying the fronts of new buildings and regulations for certain areas of the city. For example, modern construction in the central area must be in keeping with the old--old-style windows and dormers used in modern construction in modern, attractive ways, giving an old, beautiful character to the city.

[Question] You said previously that an institution had applied to build a city project in al-Ta'if. What has happened in this regard?

[Answer] An institution did apply for permission to build an amusement park on the al-Sayl--Mecca Road. Initial approval has been given by the city government for the project, provided that its owner prepared detailed maps, which have not yet been submitted.

[Question] What is the city's position on planting trees along private streets?

[Answer] As we have said earlier, the city government is increasing the amount of green areas and beautifying the public streets with trees, whether these streets are private or public. The government of al-Ta'if places great importance on planting trees along the streets and caring for them to serve the resident, provide for his comfort in a suitable way and offer the best services.

[Question] The zoological park in al-Radaf is visited by a fair number of summer vacationers and residents. What does the future hold for development of the park?

[Answer] The total area of the park is 85,000 square meters enclosed by an iron fence. The park is being planted with various types of trees. To develop the park, the municipal government is cooperating with King 'Abd-al-'Aziz University's College of Marine Sciences. The latter has cooperated and helped build an aquarium and park. The city has built many benches in the park for people to sit and rest.

[Question] The citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the other Arab countries speak often of al-Ta'if, as do Saudi citizens. Is the city considered a tourist spot by its residents?

[Answer] Looking briefly at the city of al-Ta'if, we see that many parts of the city are very beautiful and intended as a summer resort. The city meets all the needs and requirements for vacations, since hotels are plentiful, of excellent quality, and equal to all the international hotels. Just to name two, the al-Hada Sheraton and the Masrah Intercontinental are excellent hotels offering first-rate services to vacationers. The city's restaurants are also first-rate, offer excellent service and are very clean--for example, al-Nujum al-Dhahabiyah, al-Ta'if Shangri-la and al-Najmah Promenade Gardens restaurant and outdoor cafe, as well as the rest-stops built by the city, such as Jabajib on the al-Hada--al-Ta'if Road, which is equipped with benches and playgrounds. We should not forget the promenades around the city, such as those in al-Radaf, which are also equipped for visitors. From the preceding, it is clear that al-Ta'if is a summer resort and the kingdom's top vacation spot.

[Question] What has the Ministry of Agriculture and Water done to help plant trees in al-Ta'if?

[Answer] Through its representative in al-Ta'if, the Directorate of Agriculture and Water, the ministry made praiseworthy efforts during Arbor Week.

During this week, the ministry provided 10 thousand seedlings and the services of several agricultural engineers.

[Question] Several foreign and Saudi companies operate in the city. How much do they help in beautifying the city?

[Answer] Some government agencies and departments help, and local institutions help by making the statuary in the public squares, as well as helping during Arbor Week. This is considered the duty of every resident.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

ASSOCIATED GAS USE ANALYZED

Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 11 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Fikri Bakr: "Gulf States Achieve Considerable Progress in Utilizing Associated Gas"]

[Text] During the past 10 years, Arab states have carried out several projects aimed at utilizing associated gas and at ending a process that lasted many decades, during which foreign companies with oil concessions burned off most of the gas produced with the oil. This has led to a loss of annual funds estimated at billions of dollars a year. In addition to projects starting this year or during the years 1986-87, the projects which have now been completed give an idea of the sizable efforts made in order to stop this hemorrhage. In the Gulf region an increasing percentage of associated gas is either being pumped back into the oil fields, is being used as fuel at electric plants, water desalinization stations, and petrochemical installations, or is being used to produce liquid petroleum gas.

In Algeria, which is considered the leading country in the development of dry natural gas and associated gas use, the proportion of gas burned off now represents 6 percent of the local production of associated gas. In Libya the proportion of wasted gas decreased to 15.4 percent and in Egypt to 16.2 percent.

Several Projects

There are several Arab projects aimed at reducing the percentage of wasted associated gas to a minimum. Between 1985 and 1987, several projects will be completed. In Saudi Arabia it has been decided to put into operation before the end of 1986 the final stage of the gas pipeline network which will contribute to an annual increase of 25.7 million tons in production of Saudi liquid petroleum gas and which will reduce the percentage of burned-off gas from the current level, which is still equal to two-thirds of the total gas produced.

In the United Arab Emirates, 91.8 percent of the gas produced is utilized, in comparison with the 40 percent which was utilized 7 years ago. The same progress has been made in Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. There is a great deal more than that as joint projects are being carried out effectively, especially between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which are working on gas production in the neutral zone.

A recent report presented to the last Arab energy conference, which was held last May in Algeria, shows that gas constitutes one-third of the total energy consumption in the Arab countries, compared to the 20 percent average in the rest of the world. All signs indicate that this proportion will increase rapidly in the future.

The same report indicates that the consumption of gas varies from country to country; in Qatar, gas constitutes 90 percent of the total energy consumption; in Kuwait, the proportion is 60 percent; and in Algeria the proportion is 50 percent.

Gas is considered an important source of energy in the Arab world. As of the first of January 1984, Arab natural gas reserves reached 15 trillion cubic meters. This represents 17 percent of the world's total reserves. The non-associated gas represents 55 percent of the total Arab gas reserve while associated gas represents 45 percent.

Decrease in Oil Production

There has been a decrease in associated gas production as a result of a drop in oil production in the Arab countries during the last 5 years. This decrease has led to a shortage in many of the Arab countries, which came to depend largely on gas in satisfying their local energy needs. In Kuwait, gas constitutes approximately one-half of the total energy consumption of this Gulf state, and this has forced Kuwait to reduce its production of gas, liquid petroleum, and petrochemicals and to convert several electric plants from gas to oil.

Qatar hopes to complete the first development stage of North Field over 2 or 3 years. This will enable Qatar to produce 800 million cubic feet of gas a day, which will be used to satisfy the local need for energy and which will compensate for the drop in the production of associated gas. The next stages in the development of North Field, which will cost \$12 billion, will give Qatar the opportunity to export gas to neighboring Gulf states and countries in Western Europe. The countries neighboring Qatar are studying the possibility of developing the dry natural gas fields, which they have in order first to reduce the effects of fluctuation in the production of associated gas due to increases and decreases in oil production to keep up with the rapid increase in the local consumption of energy.

A Problem Whose Solution Is Unavoidable

On the other hand, the need for the Arab countries to produce a specific quantity of petroleum in order to obtain locally needed gas is considered a serious problem. Saudi Arabia specifically called attention to this problem during the past few years as one of the reasons for which it desired to raise one more time its petroleum production to more than 4 million barrels a day. But the solution to this problem is considered very difficult because the current situation on the oil market is deteriorating and does not allow for any new increase in production, for such an increase will

inevitably lead to a drop in prices and revenues in all producing countries, a fact that will mean an elimination of monetary gains that countries might have obtained from developing gas resources. Analysts say that a reduction of \$1 in price per barrel will mean a reduction of some \$6 billion a year in total revenues for OPEC countries. This certainly means that a reduction ranging between \$3 and \$4 per barrel will totally eliminate all profits from OPEC investments in the collecting of associated gas and in production facilities.

This fact compelled Saudi Arabia to use the non-associated gas in the Khawf region in order to satisfy local energy needs until the completion of a regional gas pipeline network which will connect all Gulf states. Saudi Arabia is also in the process of converting some of its industrial plants from gas to fuel oil use. At the same time it is continuing its plans to produce associated gas which is still being burned off--63.6 percent of the total gas produced in the year 1984.

These measures will enable Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf region to lessen their reliance on associated gas in order to achieve a better balance between gas and other types of fuel in the pattern of local energy consumption. More importantly, these measures will enable Saudi Arabia and the other countries in the Gulf region to avoid having to escape from one bad situation in which associated gas is burned to another, no less evil situation in which "associated petroleum" is produced in order to obtain enough gas to satisfy local needs.

What is needed for all Arab countries is to follow a joint strategy in producing, utilizing, and exporting natural gas while maintaining the strength of the market and the price levels. The success of such a strategy depends on the realization of many aims, among which is the increase of the percentage of gas in total energy consumption and the expansion of gas utilization in Arab countries. This can be realized by installing a regional gas pipeline network that carries the gas from the producing countries to the non-producing countries, by building national distribution pipelines, and by coordinating the policies of the producing countries.

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PEOPLES' DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

RESULTS OF PARTY CONGRESS ANALYZED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 2-8 Nov 85 p 14

/Article: "Peace with Neighbors and Interests before Ideology"

/Text/ "Peace"--this word was a heading on many of the signs raised by those attending the congress in Aden, the capital of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen this past 11-15 October. In themselves, they are the epitome of this congress and its orientation.

The convening of the third general congress of the Yemeni Socialist Party answered a great many questions that arose during the period of preparation for it, revolving around whether it would meet and whether it would be a congress of collision between the contending wings of this party.

Perhaps the most important question, one that dominated others during the period of preparation for the meeting of the congress, was that concerning the role that would be played by the former secretary general of the party, 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, who had been removed from his leadership post and who had spent a long time in Moscow before returning to Aden. Some members of the congress say: "'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il's commitment to the party resolutions is evidence of his idealism and virtues. He was removed from the leadership by a decision of the Central Committee and he returned by its decision, without blood struggles."

But the leadership struggles that occurred during 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il's absence in Moscow, between the Secretary General of the party and President of the country 'Ali Nasir Muhammad on one side and the Minister of Defense 'Ali 'Antar on the other side, demonstrated that the situation in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen could not be solved easily through the continual struggles. Therefore, it was necessary to hold a congress to settle and control the situation so as not to lead the country to something worse--according to one member of the congress.

As for the role that 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il will play, all of the signs indicate that he has been assigned the ideological department (the Suslov of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). He refused this post immediately after his return to Aden at the beginning of this year. However, some indications are that he will take over the organizational office, the most important post after that of the secretariat general. Some regard this as unlikely, without giving reasons.

Politically, the most important thing noted by observers resulting from the congress is the slogan to which we referred: peace with neighbors and emphasis on a policy of peaceful coexistence and development of relations with neighboring states, in accordance with mutual respect. Many comment on this tendency saying that this means victory for the line that calls for accord in the gulf region in spite of deep ideological differences, by which general interest overcomes ideological interest.

Here it is necessary to refer to the announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Sultanate of Oman and the Soviet Union, linking them to South Yemeni policies, which allows us to deduce that a new Soviet-Yemeni policy toward the region has been drawn up, by which there will be positive action toward the states of the GCC, establishing a friendship with them based on "mutual respect."

Perhaps the "peace" for which the southern Yemenis are calling applies, above all to relations with the northern part of Yemen, in that the congress emphasized a group of points on this subject, the most noteworthy of which are: rejection of war, finally, with northern Yemen, continuation of a policy of contacts and intensive cooperation between the two halves of the homeland, continuation of meetings between the leaders of the two parts of the country through the Supreme Yemeni Council and increased coordination in the political, economic, social and cultural fields.

All of these steps, says one member of the congress, are aimed at "preparation of the best conditions for reunification of the country."

On the foreign plane, the importance of the Soviet role emerges in the reaffirmation of the strategic relationship with it. There was a focus also on broadening relations with other states, irrespective of their regims on a "basis of mutual benefit."

From the results achieved by the conferees in southern Yemen, we conclude that there is hope for new directions in relation to foreign policy moving away from "ideological sensitivity." But it centers on a sensitive point, the principle of "mutual respect," especially in light of the discovery of the gold mines, which will change southern Yemen, just as oil will change northern Yemen, into a happy Yemen.

Likewise, the compromise that was concluded between the two policies that have emerged recently, the moderate policy under the leadership of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and the radical policy under the leadership of 'Ali 'Antar and 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, points a new move toward solution of problems such as setting up organizations, or, as one of the members of the congress calls it, "the modernization of Yemen."

It remains to say that the congress returned a number of leaders to their former assignments, adding 3 members to the Politburo, specifically, 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, 'Ali Salim al-Bayd and Ahmad Bu-Sa'd /as published/, to raise its number to 15. Also, members were added to the Central Committee to create a kind of balance between the two policies. It is clear that the third congress of the party succeeded in achieving a greater degree of understanding between them.

PEOPLES' DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

NEW ROADS LINK GOVERNORATES

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 26 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by 'Isam Sa'id Salim: "Governorates of al-Mahrah, Hadramawt and Shabwah to be Linked by Network of Asphalt Roads"]

[Text] Fragmentation and the lack of interconnection has been the most prominent of the distressing phenomena that we inherited from the Anglo-Sultanic era in this half of the Yemen, that was under the control of that government for about 129 years.

This fragmentation was accompanied by, or, rather, it was reinforced by, the lack of a network of interconnection linking the various districts, with the intent insulating the various districts from each other, severing connections among their residents and removing everyone from his area, thus facilitating the tightening of the grip of the imperialist and his agents on the population. When the imperialist departed under the blows of the revolution and the revolutionaries of glorious 14 October, there were no more than 400 kilometers of narrow paved roads poorly constructed for temporary use. These were between the military bases of the army of occupation in order to have rapid communication between them when the need arose to suppress any popular uprising or revolt against imperialism or its agents.

When the last occupying soldier left the country and the first nationalist government came about, the treasury was empty. The imperialist government and some reactionary states did not fulfill the obligations that had been proposed before independence, when they--the imperialist and the reactionaries--thought that the client government would be the one to govern.

But the winds--the winds of the revolution and the revolt of the struggling people--did not produce what they had wished.

Because it was necessary for the people to eat and to put an end to the frightening unemployment that had been created as a legacy of the past era, one of the essential elements was that the revolution not bow down and its flag sink at the first stop.

It was the phase of steadfastness. It was necessary to put an end to the fragmentation, and it was necessary to build an edifice of struggle on this front.

It was necessary according to capabilities to build a network of roads. It was unjust and difficult, rather, it was a crime, for the citizens to go from one place to another, a distance of no more than 100 kilometers, in days, surrounded by dangers. Today, most of the governorates are connected with the different districts and subdistricts. Efforts are still being expended, work is still under way and the heroes in the department of roads in the ministry of construction are still laboring in open country, on mountain peaks and under the heat of the burning sun, to win one of the goals of the revolution--to put an end to the fragmentation and to achieve all possible means of comfort and ease for the people everywhere.

If just yesterday we talked about the road from (Nawbat Dakin) to (al-Habilayn), then today we are talking about another road. The story about the road is not the entire thing; the story about what is behind the road completes it.

It is work and the sweat of the workers and the support of the party and the state in spite of all circumstances. It is the achievement of a goal of which we have long dreamed and the radiant smile traced on the faces of the laborers, who have waited a long time to see this dream and to realize it.

And, succinctly it is a victory for the Yemeni people, the revolution and the party.

In the plan for the last year 1985 of the second 5-year development plan, the department of roads completed one job after another. In order to see this, we toured the projects of the fifth year of the plan. What will we find in this trip into the department?

Comrade Eng 'Abd-al-Rahman Shukri, the director general of the department of roads, and comrade Ghazi Muhammad 'Abdallah, one of the cadres of the department, were with us on this pleasant trip.

We began from the governorate of al-Mahrah, a governorate that has been isolated for a long time. In the governorate of al-Mahrah along the coast strip from Sayhut to al-Shihr in the governorate of Hadramawt a road 207 kilometers long and 6 meters wide extends. It has access roads leading to the coastal cities and villages situated between these governorates.

No doubt we can imagine the development in the fields of agriculture and fishery resources, that will affect the region connected by this road, not to mention the effect on the isolation that has been imposed on the residents of the region. This will be due to its role as a highway connecting the governorate of al-Mahrah with the other governorates of the republic.

The road cannot be viewed in an ordinary way. One cannot measure its value by the distance mentioned above, but by the labor of more than 1,200 workers, including Chinese experts, by the about 25 small and medium bridges, and by the continuous work since the foundation stone was laid for it on 22 June 1981.

As for the interior, the significance of the Sayhut--al-Chaydh road, which is 225 kilometers long, lies in its connecting the regions of the governorate

with each other and the governorate of al-Mahrah with the other governorates of the republic. It was undertaken with joint financing between the government and the Arab Fund. Work has begun on the first stage of the project. The project passes through the area of Qishn/Haswayn, which has a lot of shifting sands. It also crosses the towering elevation of the Jabal Fortak chain. It is expected that the road will include expenditures to overcome these mountains and to shorten the distance in order to link it to the new port of Nishtun.

Then we made a stop in the governorate of Hadramawt. This governorate was extremely isolated, due to its fragmentation during the rule of the Al al-Kathiri and the al al-Quayti. This was ended when it was connected to the capital of Aden by the 'AynAm--al-Mukalla road. We find many interior roads connecting the districts and subdistricts of the governorate. Perhaps the most outstanding of the roads constructed this year is the al-Shihr--Chayl BaWazir road.

This road is 12 kilometers long and was completed in April 1985.

The 'Aqabat Khaylah road is 4 kilometers long. Ground-breaking, blasting and improvement has begun on the pass to connect it to the road from Ras Huwayrah to Wadi al-Aysar in Juhur Madhun, 65 kilometers. It is appropriate to point here that this road was financed by a Yemeni expatriate abroad, Sulayman (Biqshan). Construction was begun on it in April of this past year and was completed in the middle of this year, 1985.

Then we stopped at the governorate of Shabwah. In addition to the roads built last year in 1984 such as the (al-Naqbah)--Nisab road, which is 92 kilometers long, we now find other roads under construction.

These include the Nisab--Wasit road, which is 36 kilometers long, on which work began in the beginning of 1985. This is considered a natural extension of the road from the beginning of (al-Naqbeh) at kilometer 335 of the Aden--al-Mukalla road towards Nisab through the old administrative capital of the governorate of Shabwah in the direction of Bayhan.

Finishing this road will finish the first stage of the road that has been planned between the area of Nisab and Bayhan.

This is not the end of the journey. We have not said how many millions of dinars have been spent to build this road, nor have we presented everything that we have seen, because the scope is great and exceeds the limited space. But we are able to say here a great deal about our accomplishments on the front of combatting fragmentation in order to interconnect and tie together every area of the country and its inhabitants, for whom the revolution is achieving, every day, a great many of the aspirations of which they have dreamed.

There is no doubt we are on the threshold of another, future stage that is drawn for us in the third 5-year plan and the resolutions that our party presented in its third general congress to strengthen and prepare the edifice of the revolution to shed its light on high, telling everyone, "here," in this area of the inhabited world accomplishments are being realized in spite of conditions and meager capabilities, thanks to determination, steadfastness, and wise and proper leadership of the vanguards--the Yemeni Socialist Party and the support of honest good friends distinguished by their working with this people and this revolution.

AFGHANISTAN

DEVELOPMENT OF FOODSTUFF INDUSTRY PRIORITY TASK

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 24 Oct 85 pp 1-2

[Text]

In view of the specific socio-economic conditions, development and evolution of the existing multifarious and unharmonious economy in the country as well as meeting the primary needs of the working people of Afghanistan, the growth and development of light and foodstuffs industries are extremely important and form the basis of the growth of industry in the country.

The establishment of the Ministry of Light Industries and Foodstuffs in the framework of the Council of Ministers of the DRA and the conglomeration of 30 productive light industrial institutions with this Ministry, are the basic steps taken by the state in this connection.

In the current year, the Politburo of the PDPA CC comprehensively discussed and assessed the question of taking meas-

ures towards the development of light and foodstuffs industries and increase in the production of primary consumer goods for the people. In the session held on the occasion it was stressed that "in order to improve the life of the people, considerable increase in the most essential goods needed by the people is planned, during the next five years. It is planned that the cotton textile products, jinned cotton and sugar will be more than doubled and flour and edible oil will be increased by 30 to 35 per cent. For the ministries and departments concerned the implementation of these tasks forms their minimum fulfillments."

Therefore, in addition to the efforts, made by the Ministry of Light Industries and Foodstuffs in this connection, new projects have started commissioning one after another and the production capacities of existing en-

terprises are to be expanded. The Politburo of the PDPA CC has also assigned the ministries with the task of creating enterprises of light and consumer goods. On that basis, "the ministries and departments having the technical and technological possibilities of producing the required goods, are to take active part in fulfilling their duties."

Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the PDPA CC and President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA in his speech made in this connection said, "Under the present conditions the most important task in the sphere of economy is to produce as much and as soon as possible the consumer goods for the people. This, in fact, is an economic and, in the meantime, a great political task."

Thus in view of the fact that the PDPA and the revolutionary state of the DRA attach great importance to the rapid growth and development of the light and consumer goods industries, in order to implement the planned objectives, in the long and short term plans of the Ministry of Light Industries, and Foodstuffs. Great attention has been paid to the promotion of the production of consumer goods and foodstuffs which consequently, will pave the way for the production of greater quantities of essential goods for the people. For ex-

ample, in accordance with the plans of the Ministry of Light Industries, and Foodstuffs it is planned to produce till the end of the current year (begun March 21, 1985) 25 million kw hours of electric energy, wooden products at a value of 225 million Afs., 24 thousand tons of ginned cotton, 50 tons of yarn, 50 tons of woolen thread, 55 million metres of cotton and rayon fabrics, 245 thousand metres of woolen fabrics, 80 thousand meters of blankets, 18 thousand meters of carpets, 300 tons of washed wool, 155 thousand tons of flour, 32 thousand tons of bakery products, 5,714 tons of vegetable oil, 4,6 thousand tons of sugar, 528 tons of soap for washing clothes, 8 tons of toilet soap, 290 tons of conserve and fruits, 260 thousand liters of alcoholic beverages, 8 thousand tons of dried and processed fruits, at a total value of 118,3 million Afs. of other food products and at a value of 42,2 million Afs. light industry products.

Another manifestation of the attention of the party and the revolutionary state in the sphere of economic development is that alongside their efforts in the development

and strengthening of light industries in the state sector, great attention is also being paid to the private sector and the state is seriously concerned over the growth and development of private investment in the light industry and production of foodstuffs. For example, the recent approval of 54 minor and medium industrial projects in the private sector testifies the fact that foodstuffs and goods of primary needs will be boosted in the DRA.

AFGHANISTAN

WORK ENVIRONMENT TO PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 27 Oct 85 p 4

[Text]

Providing free of charge health services for the toiling people of our revolutionary country is considered one of the significant gains of the April Revolution. Before the victory of the April Revolution there was neither a doctor nor a clinic in the workers' institution to treat patient workers. Nobody paid attention to the health of workers under the previous regimes. Any care of the common people was considered waste of money. After the triumph of the April Revolution, particularly its new and evolutionary phase, due to the keen attention of the party and the state, well-equipped health clinics were established in most productive institutions with the help of trade unions, party precincts, and also the Public Health Ministry of the DRA.

Among such institutions we can mention Aho Shoe Making Factory.

In 1984, a health clinic was set up in this institution. At present two doctors and three nurses are performing their duties.

In this clinic all the workers and staff of the factory are examined and treated if necessary.

In addition to the clinic, a pharmacy has also been opened in the factory, from which the workers can get their required medicine, free of charge, and without wasting time. Also, primary health assistance could be provided for the workers. If the clinic is not able to treat a patient, then the patient will be sent into one of the city hospitals.

Before the establishment of the health clinic in the factory, an amount of Afs 100 was given to the workers, per year, under the name of health insurance. At present that unjust method has been abolished and the workers can get their required medicine through the health clinic. If the required item of medicine is not available in the clinic, it will be purchased from market by the clinic and then put at the disposal of the patient worker. If

the worker becomes ill during the vacations and holidays and he buys medicine from the market it will be refunded by the factory after showing his prescription.

About 30-40 patients refer to the clinic daily and all of them avail themselves of the facilities provided by the clinic without any discrimination.

A source of Aho Shoe Making Factory said to a KNT correspondent: "During the first half of the current Afghan year (begun March 21, 1985) medicine, medical instruments were purchased at a value of Afs 225549, the medicine were bought from the central depots and other requirements of the clinic were provided by the Red Crescent Society, trade unions and the Public Health Ministry.

Likewise, during the first six month of the current year, 302,116 Afghans have been spent to ensure workers' health and disinfection of work environment by using various chemical substances.

IRAN

GROUND, NAVAL FORCES READY TO CONFRONT U.S. ENEMY

Probable U.S. Intervention

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] Shahrud-ETTELA'AT reporter-Colonel Sayyad Shirazi, commander of the ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, along with the deputy of the training division of the ground forces and the Shahrud people's representative in the Islamic Majlis, visited Shahrud to introduce the new commander of the Zero 2 training center.

During this trip, in an interview with an Ettela'at reporter, the commander of the ground forces expressed his views in regard to the mobilization of the combatant forces to confront larger plots, the possibility of U.S. interference in the Persian Gulf, Ashura activities and the establishment of a military airport in Shahrud.

Mobilization and Preparation of the Combatant Forces

First, he referred to Hojjat-ol Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani's speech in regard to the mobilization of human forces to confront U.S. plots in the Persian Gulf and said: "The speech of Hojjat-ol Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani is one of the apparent proofs of our readiness to confront larger plots which are on the verge of taking place. One of these plots is to make us deviate from the present fronts to another front in order to make us weaker and as a result, the enemy will become stronger. Certainly, praise to God, by truthfully following the eminent Imam's guidelines as commander-in-chief, this deviation will never occur. We still believe that the path to Qods is from Karbela and first, Saddam's government must be overthrown.

Possibility of U.S. Interference in Persian Gulf

In regard to the possibility of U.S. interference in the Persian Gulf, Colonel Sayyad Shirazi said: "It is unlikely that the U.S. will involve itself in such an action which is dangerous to itself. Certainly, at present, the carrier Enterprise is in the Oman Sea and the British even have a base in Oman, and everything is prepared in case they decide to use this base. We must consider all probabilities but must not forget that whatever the enemies impose on us, we must abide by our rights and show our faithfulness." He

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added: "We must remember that we are not confronting enemies with our financial power, and that we will continue our fight with our spiritual power and our belief incentive and we will use all the power of war technology and combat possibilities."

The commander of ground forces of the Islamic Republic Army then referred to the Ashura activities and said: "Ashura activities are among the series of activities continuing at all the fronts and our combatants are continuously inflicting blows on the enemies. Praise to God, the result of these activities has been very positive and the enemy has suffered heavy losses."

Enemies Recent Plots

In the continuation of this interview, Colonel Sayyad Shirazi, in regard to the recent activities of the enemy, said: "According to its scheme, the enemy is determined to draw us to dire circumstances as far as possible by paralyzing our economy. Since the enemy is aware of the vital role of oil exports to our economy, if oil exports are stopped, the Islamic Republic will be paralyzed. Therefore, they carried out demolition activities at Khark and praise to God, so far they have not succeeded."

In this regard he added: "If we face a serious hazard in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, we will take such actions so no power will be able to protect U.S. interests in this region and certainly we are fully prepared in this regard. The best example is the people's presence and if it is necessary that we need more power in the battlefields, we will prepare them."

Condition of Shahrud Military Airport

In regard to the Shahrud military airport he said: "The present airport is not complete and with attention to the importance of this region and its activities in the nation's affairs, examining the condition of the airport is essential."

Navy's Readiness to Resist

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Oct 85 p 2

[Text] The capable naval personnel of the Islamic Republic of Iran, neck-to-neck with the other combatants of Islam, with strength in protecting the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, will resist the aggressor enemy and its protectors.

Captain Hoseyn Kashani, deputy commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, who is visiting the specialized training centers of the navy in the port of Anzali, in an interview with an IRNA reporter elaborated on the fighting strength of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy and said: "The fighting strength of the Navy personnel with reliance on their faith and eternal belief in the might of God, is at a very high level and all the personnel of this force follow the commands of the nation's imam and commander-in-chief and are willing to offer the very last drop of their blood and are prepared to defend their Islamic homeland."

He also referred to the fact that today the strength of the naval forces in the blue waters of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz has terrified the world oppressor. He stated again: "Until attaining the final victory, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy will continue to detain all freighters containing goods bound for the aggressor regime of Iraq."

In regard to the big maneuver of the Navy in the Persian Gulf he said: "This unprecedented maneuver in the course of the history of the country showed that today, the army of Islam is able to withstand any foreign plot and aggression."

In rejecting Iraqi claims of effectiveness against the security of Iranian oil installations, the deputy of our country's Navy commander emphasized: "Oil exports from the Persian Gulf continue as before and with eye catching might and strength, the Navy is protecting the security of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz."

According to this report, he also participated in the public morning ceremony of the personnel of Qazian base.

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CSO: 4640/71

24 January 1986

IRAN

MONTAZERI'S SUCCESSION CONTESTED

Paris LIBERATION in French 5 Dec 85 p 22

[Text] The designation of Ayatollah Montazeri as the future "Guide of the Islamic Revolution" and therefore the now official successor of Ayatollah Khomeyni has apparently provoked strong opposition in Iran, and particularly in the theological circles of Qom, Mashad, Tehran, and Isfahan. Just as much as the procedure followed for this appointment, the very personality of the future "guide" is stirring up controversy.

In the hierarchy of the Iranian Shi'ite clergy, Ayatollah Montazeri occupies a relatively modest position, the seventh or eighth according to experts, in any case a long way behind the five "ayatollah-ozmah" who alone can lay claim to leading the mass of believers.

Moreover, one of their number, particularly venerated in Iran, Ayatollah Sadegh Rohani, for the first time and before a vast public, expressed in the strongest terms the opposition of the high clergy to the appointment of Montazeri.

During a speech made last 27 November in the holy city of Qom, Iranian opposition circles reported that Ayatollah Rohani sharply criticized "these experts who have gotten together behind their closed doors and have testified that the large majority of the people has chosen this man (Montazeri, NDLR) as the future guide of the revolution and have consequently appointed him as such."

"This testimony is absolutely false," the religious leader continued, "and I here solemnly declare that I am against these proceedings which are contrary to the teachings of Islamic law and which bear a curious resemblance to those of communist regimes."

According to several Iranian sources, this hostility on the part of the high clergy is the reason why Ayatollah Khomeyni, contrary to what was expected, refrained from mentioning the name of his successor last Saturday, during the public address he made on the occasion of the festival of the Prophet.

9824

CSO: 4619/14

IRAN

BAKHTIAR COMMENTS ON WAR, KHOMEYNI REGIME, COUNTRY'S FUTURE

Paris NEHZAT in Persian 24 Oct 85 pp 1-3

/Interview with Shapur Bakhtiar; place not specified/

/Paris NEHZAT in Persian; weekly organ of the Iran National Resistance Movement/

/Text/ The Free Voice of Iran Radio held a lengthy interview this week with Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, the leader of the Iran National Resistance Movement, which was broadcast yesterday.

We bring to the attention of our readers the condensed text of this interview from a tape.

Question: Dr Bakhtiar, based on the information of Free Voice of Iran, at present, meaning in the latest 3 or 4 months, the interest of most of our countrymen has been focused on you and in another sense, the hope of the majority of the people of our nation, in order to liberate themselves from the calamity of the mullah's rule, is upon you. Please tell us how you explain this visible tendency of public opinion towards yourself, the movement that you lead, and what answers you have in regard to this hope and the expectations of the nation? In other words, without any details in what way do you find it possible to overthrow the illegitimate rule of the mullahs?

Dr Bakhtiar: In my opinion, if the people continue to follow their beliefs, as time passes, they will gain more energy, and with the passing of time, we will get more recognition. For example, imagine if Dr Mossadegh had died at the age of 60, he probably would not have been the same Dr Mossadegh with whom we and the world is acquainted. The first thing I did was warn the nation of Iran about the danger of Khomeyni. When everyone or the decisive majority of the people, among them the enlightened, was fascinated by him, I insisted on my point. Certainly later, other groups started to campaign against this and some groups were former coworkers of Khomeyni himself. But in regard to the rising interest of our countrymen toward us during the recent months, I have to mention that I find it necessary to examine the opinion, beliefs and views of the nation

of Iran to find out what stage it has reached so far. Therefore, on 18 May of this year, in discussing two subjects, ending the war with Iraq and the hatred for Khomeyni's rule, I questioned the people of Iran in the form of a referendum. The answer was so positive that from that day I decided to undertake my duties more than ever for overthrowing the anti-Iranian rule of Khomeyni. I realized that I could talk in the name of the people of Iran and with the confirmation of a decisive majority to expand activities abroad and inside Iran. Our goal is not only to overthrow Khomeyni's rule but includes establishing national order, principles and beliefs based on the freedom and independence of Iran and the progress of the nation of Iran. If this regime is abolished and God forbid, another corrupt regime replaces it, the very same calamity will be repeated. This is what was said before too, and nobody listened; as much as we yelled that it is not enough to demand the Shah's overthrow, you must first see what will replace the Shah's regime. We suggested at the same time the proper execution of the constitution, the same thing that Dr Mossadegh and the National Front was after for 25 years and this law was not executed. Those events, corruption, discrimination and the circumstances that you all are familiar with, gradually disappointed the people and deviated the minds of the youth and disappointed them. In the absence of political knowledge, the people were drawn towards other fanatical groups. In any case, today we have to bear in mind that overthrowing must be accomplished as soon as possible with every means at our disposal. I hope the year 1364 /21 March 1985 - 20 March 1986/ will be the year of overthrowing the regime of Khomeyni. But at the same time I believe that we must know our destination. If this affair is not clear to the nation of Iran, our constitution will be a toy for any person or group. In my opinion, it is not worth it for a group of Iranians to be killed again and face another bitter experience for another few decades. Fortunately, today the Iranian youth is aware and this time they pay precise attention to the warnings of those who, with honesty and sincerity, have always been the defenders of Iran, and its independence, freedom and democracy.

Question: Dr Bakhtiar, at present the most important priority and absolute urgency for the nation of Iran is to liberate itself from the destructive war which the mullah's regime is not at all interested in ending. In our opinion, what is the outcome of this war and what ways do you suggest for ending it?

Dr Bakhtiar: I was against this war from the beginning and I have always mentioned that. In my opinion, any kind of dispute between Iran and Iraq must be solved according to the Algeria agreement. We do not have any fundamental difficulties or problems with Iraq. We have to be neighbors by the order of history and geography. To be neighbors creates obligations in order to live in peace and follow the good neighbor policy. Hundreds of people, and perhaps more, have lost their lives in the war. I am very sorry for all these people, especially the Iranians who have lost their lives because of stupid miscalculations by the ruling mullahs. To

defend Iran is all of our duty but to go to other countries to conquer and export the Islamic revolution and make claims in order to fool the people and to exploit the misinformed Iranian people is a crime in my opinion. Therefore, from the beginning, I was against this war and I still am, and one my two questions to the nation of Iran was whether they were in favor of ending this war immediately and their answer was positive. Therefore the nation of Iran is absolutely not in favor of the continuation of this war and with their imperfect and limited possibilities, they have expressed their desire to end the war. But Khomeyni benefits from this war. First, he has concentrated the army at the Iran-Iraq frontiers. Second, with extreme audacity, I should use harsher words, he presents the foolish thought that this war is the war of truth and falsehood, it is the war of Islam with pagans. I do not interfere with religious or common excuses for the war. Khomeyni is taking advantage of this war on his behalf in order to pretend that if there are shortages, if there are long lines for purchasing the daily necessities of life, if the agricultural condition is adverse, the reason for all of these is war, and they have imposed this war on us. Now if the world, the different nations of the world, Muslim and non-Muslim, played arbitrator in order to end this war, he would not accept it since his life, existence and durability depends on this war in bloodshed and adversity. He is incapable of reform. He is destructive and wherever he is, he must continue this wretched revolution which he has created in the name of Islam. He must expand it and more or less create the same destiny as Iran for all the other nations in order to become the emperor and caliph of all these regions. Well, when will this war end? This war will stop when Mr Khomeyni does not have any weapons. You have to have money to purchase arms and the money is provided through the sale of oil. If Khomeyni is not able to sell oil, he will not be able to purchase weapons and without weapons, it is impossible to continue the war. I have to mention that in the past, certainly many countries helped Khomeyni by selling weapons to him on the grounds that it would not make any difference whether Iranians or Iraqis were killed as long as they did their business and sold weapons. But today this question has reached a new phase. I feel, and with the information I have acquired in this regard, that the superpowers have reached an agreement. It means that they have realized that it is impossible to have any kind of agreement or peace and sincerity with Khomeyni's regime or any other regime like it. This is a hopeful sign but does not diminish duty. It is our duty with all our means, although imperfect and incomparable with other equipped nations, to fight uninterruptedly against the anti-Iranian regime. During the campaign, the main goal is not to let Iran deviate from its identity and be transformed to Omat.

Question: Dr Bakhtiar, in your first radio and television interview and your very first message to the nation of Iran after you became prime minister, you announced that you were a co-fighter and follower of the political principles and opinions of Dr Mossadegh and would continue them. At present, there are other political groups and organizations who are fighting against the illegitimate regime of Iran. They recognize themselves as related to the political ideal movement of Dr Mossadegh and in practice,

are continuing his path. Have you thought of some ways to bring all these political activities and directions together and establishing a joint front like the National Front? Have you used any efforts in this regard?

Dr Bakhtiar: Undoubtedly, from the beginning until now, I always have been the follower of the school of Dr Mossadegh and his nationalistic inclinations and respect for the constitution. But I must mention that for years, I was an effective member of the National Front. During all this time, we had many struggles, from one side with the existing government which was not giving us the minimum freedom, we were imprisoned several times. From the other side, unfortunately, the incapability and undecisiveness of those who called themselves Mossadegh's heirs and were not innocent in bringing Mr Khomeyni to power. Many of these gentlemen, who called themselves the followers of Mossadegh and the constitution for 25 years, suddenly threw themselves in the lap of Khomeyni, and by signing those documents and engaging in those activities, strengthened Khomeyni and dissipated the National Front. Then the majority of these gentlemen, whose names I do not like to mention but which the nation of Iran knows very well, for sometime, played into Khomeyni's hands. Now if their political distinction was wrong, or according to the common proverb. 'From the haste to eat the soup they fell into the pot,' or were opportunist, is all their business.

When I came here to campaign, it was within the framework of the same principles which you referred to. I was all alone then and after months, maybe years, the co-workers of Mr Khomeyni came one after another and stated that they intended to campaign. They did not confess bravely that they had made mistakes but imagined that we owed them something. The people of Iran must realize that we do not intend to be vindictive or that we demand explanations from anyone in regard to their lack of political distinction. But those who call themselves the heirs of Mossadegh, state 'Why did you make an allegiance with Satan first?' and then, when they made the oath of allegiance they became dispirited; why do they not have the courage to come forward and admit that they have made a mistake? We are still entangled with this question. Certainly a large number of these gentlemen have never been in favor of Mossadegh and on the spur of the moment, they have become pro-Mossadegh. We have some Shahallahi's and some Tudeh group which did not have any connection with Mossadegh whatsoever. The National Resistance Movement, due to the fact that it is not a party, is a place for all those who are nationalist and believe in the constitution. I have never officially accepted the Islamic Republic constitution and will never accept it. I do not understand theocratic rule and idle talk written by these ruling mullahs and I do not find them comprehensible at all. Then, if there are those who call themselves the followers of Mossadegh, they must indicate whether Mossadegh was for the constitution or not. If he was, they must follow him. But anyhow, we must be cautious. We must be prepared not to let the constitution, especially the spirit of the constitution, which is based on national sovereignty and basic freedom, to be trampled. No one can guarantee that such and such a regime will remain democratic for years. It is the daily and hourly duty of each Iranian, especially those who are

seeking leadership, to protect freedom and democracy. If these gentlemen accept these principles, I imagine I will be walking with them too, but they must put aside grudges and their improvidence.

Question: Dr Bakhtiar, from your definition of the subject, it seems that you are optimistic about the future and closeness of the day for saving our homeland. In this manner, after the establishment of a national government, what are your priorities and what is the first problem that you intend to solve? Have you thought about how to execute these affairs beforehand? Have you prepared any plan?

Dr Bakhtiar: In regard to the priorities and your propounded questions, in my opinion, Iran needs peace, tranquility and repose, respect for the people and law and order. We must be free, and accept others to enjoy freedom the same as ourselves. From a year and a half ago, we have assigned specialists to prepare plans for essential problems and also urgent and immediate affairs. I hope their work will be finished very soon. I would like to add that the top of these priorities is respect for law and respect for individuals. I would like to see that every Iranian feels he is the king in his own home. If Iran attains this stage, the way to democracy will be open too. The gradual way to democracy. We must not make unreasonable promises and we must see the realities and the possibilities. We must ask the people what they are truly able to do and not what we imagine they are able to do. I think my optimism is based on the realities that first, Iranians desire to remain Iranians, second, they want to live freely, and finally they want to be accepted and respected in their own country. These are what they neglected to do before and are not doing now. We must use all our efforts to fulfill these tasks. If we are inclined to have an Iran which will never die, it should be based on a solid and strong principle.

Question: Dr Bakhtiar, let us put aside political questions for the time being and talk about your deep interest in literature, art, and culture as a whole. Will you please tell us, do you have time to study, read or probably write or compile some work in this connection? Do you have an article or a book?

Dr Bakhtiar: When I do not have any urgent or pressing work, visits or negotiations, I spend some of my time every day in this regard. But writing a book or research needs disengaged thoughts and plenty of time. In a time when our country, Iran is driven to extremity, poverty and misfortune, no one should expect me to do any of these things. Meanwhile, I am convinced, that the first chance I have after returning to Iran, and finding Iran free and when the responsible young people have accepted their responsibilities and are working to administer the future Iran, I will spend the last part of my life in cultural activities. I do not think that anything can stop a man from pursuing what he likes to do in the world. I was active during World War II, I campaigned 35 years in my country, and I kept my obligations to my friends and acquaintances. Every cultured and knowledgeable man with a purpose is able to build a paradise on earth for himself before departure to the other world.

Question: We would like to take this opportunity and ask if you have any message for our fellow countrymen and will you send this message to them via the Free Voice of Iran?

Dr Bakhtiar: I declare 1364 /21 March 1985 - 20 March 1986/ the year for overthrowing the present wretched regime. I will use all my efforts and I expect the nation of Iran, which expressed its love, respect and trust in me on 18 May, to not let disappointment find its way into its hearts, then, the rest of the work is for us, and we will perform it in due time. Then we will inform them of the day this regime should be toppled, and we will execute it. I do not want to attract the people to the streets and bazaars without a good cause and a sound and rational scheme. We do not want without any support, which we constantly intend to provide, to create additional entanglements for the nation of Iran.

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IRAN

BAZARGAN'S SON, SUPPORTERS ATTACKED AT GROUP'S CLUB

London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 85 p 15

/London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh/

/Text/ The Iran Freedom Movement issued a notice explaining the attack on the movement's club by Hezbolahs during the ceremonies for the anniversary of the death of the prophet of Islam. The news of this attack and the injury to Eng Abdol-'Ali Bazargan, son of Engineer Bazargan, was published last week in KEYHAN. The receipt of the Freedom Movement's notice this week makes it apparent that this incident has an extensive dimension, and that also, Dr Yadollah Sahabi was injured during this event.

The office of the Freedom Movement Club was closed for 1 year and during this time, it was occupied by the Pasdaran. During the presidential election campaign, the club was handed over to the Freedom Movement at the order of Ayatollah Khomeyni, and since that date, a weekly meeting was held in a limited manner.

In regard to the last lecture at the club, the Freedom Movement stated: "During the course of the ceremonies for the occasion of the anniversary of the death of the eminent prophet and the martyrdom of Imam Hasan, the Freedom Movement Club was attacked again."

The announcement indicates: "This year, like in other years, for the occasion of the anniversary of the death of the beloved prophet in late November and the martyrdom of Imam Hasan, the Iran Freedom Movement had arranged some ceremonies in its club. During these ceremonies, as advertised in the KEYHAN newspaper, Eng Abdol-'Ali Bazargan was supposed to talk about war and peace based on the character of the beloved prophet, and Mr Chehel-Tani was to talk about the morals of the Prophet Mohammad, may God send greetings to him. At the beginning of the ceremonies, Eng Abdol-'Ali Bazargan began his speech and explained Mohammad's war against the infidels, songs, nonaggression and the peace pacts of the prophet. On the basis of this speech, he explained that none of the prophet's wars were offensive and primary, on the contrary they were defensive. During this speech, some of the people who introduced themselves as Hezbollahs by shouting slogans and questioning, tried to disturb peace and order, and finally around 10:30 pm, before the conclusion of the speech of the first speaker, the mentioned group attacked the speaker and the

audience, causing aspersion, abusiveness and beating some of the known movement personalities, disturbed the order of the ceremonies by intimidating those present and dispersing them, and preventing the continuation of the ceremony.

At the beginning of the disturbance of the ceremonies, the proper authorities of the movement informed the Ministry of Interior, the central Komiteh and the Tehran police by telephone. During this riot and disorder, the Tehran police were present at the scene and used all their efforts to calm the troublemakers, but they ignored the repeated police warnings in such a manner that one would say they were backed by some groups and had their support. The arrogance and inconsideration of the rioters to the law and its representatives, the police, was to such an extent, that when the movement representatives were leaving the club, they followed them, stopped their car, agitated and attacked them to the point that the police were forced to lead some of the audience, among them Dr Sahabi, to the Fifth Precinct in order to protect them from the attackers.

In condemning these shameful activities by a limited number of outlaws and disturbers, which discredited and disgraced the Islamic Republic of Iran in front of the people and gave excuses to the foreign news agencies, the Iran Freedom Movement complained to the government which cannot or has refused to perform its duties and protect public order and security.

This is not the first time that a lawful ceremony of the Freedom Movement was disturbed in such a manner by rioters who are disrespectful of the laws of the Islamic Republic and it will probably not be the last time either. Certainly this is the first gift of the new government to the Freedom Movement. The movement believes that if the government is not able to protect the public peace, order, security and law of the nation, and lawful gatherings, it is better to declare its weakness in this regard. We hold the government responsible for the occurrences of these incidents and demand that the proper authorities pursue and identify the violaters and punish them according to the legal laws.

9815/12228

CSO: 4640/82

IRAN

FREEDOM MOVEMENT LEADER BAZARGAN SUMMONED BY AUTHORITIES

London KEYHAN in Persian 12 Dec 85 pp 1, 14

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Tehran--Seven leading members of the Iran Freedom Movement were forbidden to leave the country. These include Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, Dr Yadollah Sahabi, Engineer 'Abd ol-'Ali Bazargan, Engineer Hashem Sabaghian, Dr Reza Sadr, Ahmad Sadr Haj Seyyed Java'i, and Abol-Fazl Bazargan. According to reports received from Tehran, the proclamation to prohibit the departure of the leaders of the Freedom Movement was sent to Iran's airports, and to the inland and coastal borders by Zarrini, Tehran Revolutionary Prosecutor.

Engineer Bazargan left Iran for ten days two months ago on a trip to Belgium and Germany.

At that time it was said that factions in the Islamic republic were unhappy and worried about Bazargan's trip abroad.

Sources close to the Freedom Movement reported that last month's attack by revolutionary guards and Hezbollahis on a meeting of the Freedom Movement's leadership on the anniversary of the Prophet of Islam's pilgrimage was orchestrated by the same faction which is run by powerful figures in the Islamic republic such as Hashemi Rafsanjani and Musavi Khu'iniha.

In recent weeks Engineer Bazargan and his friends have become very close to Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i's faction. This may have sounded the alarm for Khamene'i's rival faction of an impending coalition between Khamene'i and Bazargan. For this reason, in their reaction they sought to strike a new blow against the Freedom Movement.

Without mentioning the proclamation from the revolutionary prosecutor, Islamic republic newspapers printed only the news of Bazargan's confinement to the country by the Tehran court because

of having insulted supporters of Ayatollah Khomeyni. The newspaper EBRAR wrote that at the time of the presidential elections Bazargan had called them undemocratic and contrived, and a member of the Partisans of God filed a complaint against him with the revolutionary prosecutor for this reason.

After the release of the news of Bazargan's confinement and his appearance in court, the Iran Freedom Movement reacted immediately by issuing a statement pertaining to it.

In this statement, titled "Bazargan Appears in Court," it said:

On 26 Aban [17 Nov 1985] Engineer Bazargan was summoned to the Tehran court for spreading lies and slander against the nation of Partisans of God concerning the presidential elections.

This judicial measure took place following recent Iran Freedom Movement statements and comments by its General Secretary. At that point and in an exclusive telephone interview it was written and said that election participants had no choice except to vote for candidates with current or former membership in the ruling party, and that the people of Iran were thus deprived of the option of choosing a credible candidate of interest to them. Such monopolized and restricted elections have in practice a compulsory quality.

The Tehran prosecutor, on the basis of a complaint from a resident of Damghan to the Supreme Judicial Council, interpreted the above remarks as lies and slander against the nation of partisans of God. Engineer Bazargan was summoned as defendant and the Chief Judge and cross-examiner, while not allowing him to consult his lawyer, confirmed the accusation and requested the Secretary General of the Iran Freedom Movement to remain in the Tehran judicial precinct until the issuance of an indictment and his appearance in court.

Our esteemed and noble compatriots know that what the Freedom Movement is protesting of the government is that it always responds to legal criticism and logical protest with the enjoinder of good and prohibition of evil and by resorting to accusations, insults and threats, or with attacks, beatings, torture, and destruction. We therefore have no objection if the government wishes this time to use the law and the judicial process by referring the case to a competent court. The Freedom Movement accepts any judicial measure and legal referral, provided it is truly done in accordance with the constitution and with judicial procedures, and if the criteria of Islamic justice and truth are used events will have a favorable result. We say, let the lessons of experience be considered, but there are two matters we wish to call to public attention:

1. - In the last four years the Freedom Movement and its leaders have sent tens of complaints and announced documented violations of the law by some high government officials, organizations, and newspapers to the Supreme Judicial Council and the Tehran prosecutor's office, most of which have gone unanswered and without effect, or have received orders not to be prosecuted. This time, however, they have rapidly acted on an individual's unfounded personal complaint with unprecedented speed. The clear result of this, intended or not, is on the one hand the intensification of terrorism, suppression, and monopolization in the country, and on the other hand people who have spoken and written for implementation of the Constitution and in defense of freedom and rule of the nation are reprimanded and threatened.

It is clear to everyone that this superficially judicial measure, despite the insistence of the cross-examiner who sought to portray the matter as a private, ethical one, is a matter with political intent and meaning in the nation's most important task, the presidential elections, and in connection with the rights and lives of the lawful parties opposed to the current government.

2. - The present development is a living test for the judicial apparatus and the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran and an instructive enactment. The government will thus show its level of credibility and obligation, with respect to the law and justice, with respect to the competence and independence of the judicial power, and it will give expression in practice and visibly with respect to the nation's principles of freedom and political and humanitarian rights which are stated in the articles of the Constitution, and concerning which there is talk in official propaganda and statements.

The Iran Freedom Movement and its General Secretary, after the illegal, unfair, and inadvisable incident of the presidential candidacy, welcome this affliction and test from those in power, because it can be a turning point and a point of return to an open, truthful, and just atmosphere, or a means to greater awareness and a complete demonstration and an incentive to greater action for the nation.

In any case, the noble nation of Iran and those concerned with the revolution and Islam in the world witnessed the acts of the Tehran prosecutor and the judicial apparatus of the Islamic Republic of Iran. They will judge, and Almighty God will judge everyone.

Those Forbidden to Leave the Country

Many of those who had intended or do intend to leave the country have been forbidden to do so.

The Islamic republic has sent all the names of officials of the former regime, from the level of general manager and up, Majlis representatives, as well as company managers, to the airports in order to prevent their leaving the country.

In the last few years a great many individuals have been removed from the list of those forbidden to leave the country, but once again, all of these people and even many people who were forbidden to leave the country under the former regime must obtain authorization from the revolutionary prosecutor in order to leave the country, and company managers must also obtain a certificate of release on their tax account.

9310

CSO: 4640/106

IRAN

DISSIDENT CLERGY SAID ELIMINATED BY REVOLUTIONARY GUARD

Paris LIBERATION in French 5 Dec 85 p 22

[Text] Several members of the Iranian clergy reported "missing" on the front in the war with Iraq were actually assassinated by Pasdars (Revolutionary Guards), because they opposed the trends and methods of Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime.

The man making this serious charge is a clergyman himself, Hojjatol-Eslam Mostafa Fotowat, a former disciple and ardent supporter of Imam Khomeyni, who left Iran in 1982 for Kuwait and has recently decided to take refuge in France.

Mostafa Fotowat, who was once "Rowzeh khan" (reciter of prayers) in Khomeyni's house in Nadjaf, in Iraq, mentioned specifically the cases of Hodjatoleslam Shaykh Mohammad Hossein Emla'i, a former supporter of Khomeyni in Nadjaf, "killed by the Pasdars on a Teheran-Qom road," of Seyyed Ali Asghar Hosseini, member of the Brigade for the Mobilization of the Underprivileged, "killed in Ilam for having denounced corruption and the embezzlement of funds by religious officials," of Hodjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Alavi Trakemeh'i, "killed on the Guenaveh road in Chiraz, south of Iran," of Hojjatol-Eslam Chah-Abadi, "killed by Pasdars in Beirut," and of Shaykh Mohammad Salehi, "killed in Teheran itself."

According to Mostafa Fotowat, all were eulogized in the press as having "found a heroic death on the battle fronts." Hodjatoleslam Fotowat believes, moreover, that "at least" 5,000 mullahs, most of them "Manbaris" (preachers), are in prison for "activities against the regime and opposition to the principle of the Velayat-Efaghieh (the politico-religious system of Ayatollah Khomeyni) and that the large majority of Iranian clergy, "unfortunately silent," is now against Khomeyni as it is against Ayatollah Montazeri, who has just been officially appointed the future "guide" of the Islamic revolution.

Speaking of this succession, which has not yet been approved by Khomeyni, Mostafa Fotowat stated that after (the death of) Khomeyni, there was a risk that power would escape from the hands of the clergy. "I cannot predict who will take over, but we (the mullahs) will be the absolute losers, since the people in their entirety hate us so much as well as the so-called Islamic republic."

"Montazeri may well not have any time to rule, even if helped by "brains" like (Hachemi) Rafsanjari (president of the parliament and the regime's strong man), not only because the regime is very unpopular, but also because he himself is strongly opposed by the Ulemas."

Mostafa Fotowat, who chose to live in Kuwait after the Iranian revolution, explained that he had to leave the emirate because of threats made against him and his family by "assassins in the pay of Khomeyni." He declared that in 1982 notably he had already been the target of an armed attack by "Hezbollahi" (members of the "Party of God," formed by Khomeyni) when he used to say prayers in the mosques of Kuwait and explain to the faithful in what way Khomeyni's regime was contrary to the principles laid down by the prophet Mohamed. In Iran today, Khomeyni's former prayer leader added, many mullahs prefer to leave their homes "dressed in civilian clothes, for fear of being attacked in the street." According to him, there are "many" members of the clergy, "both great and small" who are ready to "collaborate closely" with "anyone capable of overthrowing Khomeyni and his regime because," he concluded, "what is at stake is the survival of the clergy and Shi'ism in Iran, as well as of Islam itself."

9824

CSO: 4619/14

IRAN

TURKISH STATESMEN WARNED NOT TO 'PLAY WITH PEOPLE'S BELIEFS'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 17 Nov 85 p 8

[Text] The Turkish Supreme Court has ruled that the woman's veil is an indication of opposition to the principle of republicanism, and in a published statement it approved the expulsion of girls wearing veils from the universities, affirming guidelines issued by this country's Higher Education Organization.

Of course this is not the first measure taken by the Turkish government to put pressure on Muslims. For some time there have been reports in the media of open opposition by Turkish officials to the manifestations of Islam. It could be said that the campaign against the Muslim veil for women is the top news story from this country, and the opposition in this area has become extensive.

In this summary we will not attempt to analyze the policies of the architects of the Turkish coup d'etat concerning Islam and its manifestations. We will only briefly study portions of the above statement which was recently printed in the Ankara newspaper GUN AYIDIN.

The Turkish Supreme Court's statement contained the sentence:
"The Islamic veil is worn only out of ignorance."

The simplest and clearest conclusion from the above sentence is that retaining the veil has the characteristic of ignorance. This is an accusation that goes directly back to Islamic law, and in any case it either points to the depth of the ignorance of the Turkish officials, or it shows the ultimate in enmity and irreconcilability on their part, as they lead the horse of "justice" alongside the ideology of abandoning Islam.

If the officials of the Turkish Supreme Court are Muslim (and it appears unlikely that they could be true Muslims and carelessly issue such a statement), as a Muslim you must realize that based on the clear religion of Islam, the veil is a divine obligation for the noble class of women, and the preservation of the veil

and its observation is an order that has been issued out of awareness and knowledge of sacred Islamic law, not out of ignorance.

Another part of the statement said: "It is not significant if those who are undereducated wear such clothing, but if girls studying in the higher schools insist on wearing the Muslim veil, it is in indication of their opposition to the principle of republicanism, and it is not unlawful to prevent them from entering the university.

A bit of care and reflection concerning the above sentences reveals that Turkish leaders are working to damage Islam, and to convey the impression that those who display the manifestations of Islam are backward and illiterate or semi-literate, while the so-called progressive, intellectual, and literate people are those who have freed themselves from the strictures of Islam.

If we look at the historic struggle of the combative and Muslim nation of Iran throughout the Islamic revolution and in subsequent periods, we reach the opposite conclusion, and we perceive the incorrectness of the view of the Turkish government officials concerning Islam.

If the officials of the so-called Turkish Supreme Court had looked beyond the implications of Western culture to the social role of Muslim women at the dawn of Islam and afterwards, they might have hesitated to release this shameful statement. If they have no interest in their Islamic history, at least they know that in their own neighborhood in 1358 [21 Mar 1979 - 20 Mar 1980] it was those very women with veils, along with their brothers, who uprooted the Pahlavi dynasty of Reza Khan, Ataturk's kindred spirit, in Iran.

Now the champions of progress, civilization, knowledge and education, wearing the mask of "justice," are calling the veil an obstruction to progress and education, and they are denying learning to women wearing it. This act is in itself a form of barbarism and injustice, and there is no suitable term for it other than "standing in the way of learning and education."

The recent steps taken by Turkish national officials are really an insult to the beliefs of a billion of the world's Muslims, and it is playing with the ideology of Islam. This is itself a great crime and sin, which the Muslims of the world and the Islamic countries must not take lightly, and they must not allow the sacred realm of Islam to be insulted so openly. In any case, this great insult must not go unanswered. Practicality or material affairs must not be a factor in matters of belief. First of all the Muslim people of Turkey and secondly the Muslims of the world must react to this insult to Islam from the Turkish

Supreme Court, and they must not allow such grimacing at their sacred values to be repeated by any official anywhere in the world.

Turkish government officials must study the history of governments and understand that playing with the beliefs of the people is a dangerous game which never benefits the governments who play it.

9310

CSO: 4640/107

PAKISTAN

PROMOTING 'PUNJABISM' SAID NO SOLUTION FOR PAKISTAN

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 4 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Abdul Karim Abid: "Punjabism Is Not Solution to Pakistan Problem"]

[Text] One of the characteristics of surviving nations is that they stick to their ideals. If ideological and practical changes take place, they are very cautious in their attitudes, and they do not forget their historic process and links. But when a nation is beset with evil days, then there comes into being a generation of intellectuals who start attacking well-organized social values and ideologies and put up a show of ideological and practical maneuvers. If the nation somersaults with these intellectuals, then nothing survives and destruction of everything becomes certain.

Under these circumstances, it becomes necessary to ascertain whether the frequent appearances these days of Haneef Ramay and other intellectuals like him, who are like links in this chain, are signs of good or evil days to come. As for Mr Ramay in particular, there is a suspicion that perhaps he reflects the fear of undoing his own personality, his "Pakistanism" and his "Punjabism." His crestfallen existence, which also distresses us, appears to be an effort to affirm his personality, save his "Pakistanism," and to clear the image of his "Punjabism." The name given to his efforts is his latest publication "Preface to Punjab." In this book, Mr Ramay in his frantic efforts to save Pakistan and wash away scars of defamation from the face of Punjab has advised Punjabis to become staunch and bigoted Punjabis in every respect, including language, culture, and politics. On top of this, the heated discussion that took place in the hall of Hotel Intercontinental is something that should be carefully preserved in records.

The gathering that attended the unveiling ceremony of the book consisted of despotic type of people. But voices of truth and righteousness raised by Mr Hameed Nizami seemed to do away with shortcomings, and under the impact of his statement, some of his well-wishers and sympathizers became seriously tormented. But the most tormented of all was Dr Mubashshir Hassan, who not only raised the voice of truth, but also lies and falsehoods, and in the end by mixing truth with falsehood drew applause from all around him. No doubt Mr Nizami, who had been brought to this gathering by Mr Ramay to express his displeasure, returned home in rage, because Dr Mubashshir

Hassan, by referring to previous editorials published by NAWA-I-WAQT, wanted to prove Punjab, NAWA-I-WAQT, and Majid Nizami to be criminals. Dr Mubashshir Hassan's attack of Mr Ramay was powerful, but Mr Ramay disregarded the attack and did not respond to it in his speech, which was in Punjabi. Dr Mubashshir Hassan said that he does not agree with Mr Ramay's view that Punjab, having been divided and bathed in blood, forgot its Punjabism and became Pakistani in order to do away with its feeling of deprivation. According to Dr Mubashshir Hassan, Punjab's expression of excessive sense of staunch Pakistanism was not the result of any sense of deprivation, simplicity, innocence, or misunderstanding, but simply because it was not possible to unleash a reign of exploitation and atrocities in all the territories of Pakistan by being a Punjabi. For such a form of government, it was not only necessary but extremely essential to be a Pakistani. It is for this reason that the ruling class in Punjab forgot their Punjabism and laid more stress on Pakistanism. Just as in the case of Pakistan, their love for Urdu, too, was not unbiased. They had fallen in love with Urdu for the simple reason that with the help of this language the ruling faction had the opportunity to suppress other languages and the people of other regions. Urdu, besides being a court language, also helped to fulfill the affairs of the state, as well as the demands of the rulers and the ruled. It was thus given preference over other regional languages. For the rulers of the Punjab, Pakistanism and Urdu did not have any attraction. This faction had Liaquat Ali Khan killed, defamed his wife, formed a front against officers belong to UP [United Provinces], denied Bengal its legal rights and privileges, rejoiced at the dismissal of Nizamuddin's ministry, and paid tributes to the role played by Iskander Mirza in East Pakistan. In this connection, Dr Mubashshir Hassan presented extracts from previous editorials of NAWA-I-WAQT and claimed that as a matter of fact forming a government of suppression and exploitation necessitated that Punjabism be forgotten and that this requisite condition was fulfilled.

Dr Mubashshir Hassan discussed the part played by the rulers of the Punjab. Apart from the fact as to what that role was and why it was played, the question was whether Pakistan was formed by the ruling faction of Punjab and whether or not the people of Punjab, too, played any role in its formation. You are secretly evaluating the love of Punjab's ruling faction for Urdu, but what can the assessment mean when Pakistan did not exist. Even then the territory that really loved Urdu was Punjab. The newspapers, journals, and bookshops had adopted Urdu with a fondness never before exhibited for Punjabi. The ruling faction did not ever love Urdu, and irrespective of whether it was from Punjab or it belonged to the UP, the ruling faction did not ever allow Urdu to become the national language. It was the people of Punjab and not the ruling faction that had affection for Urdu. Today, if there is talk about severing relations with Urdu, again it is not the people of Punjab but the ruling faction.

This matter does not concern Punjab alone. Sind, Frontier, Baluchistan, and Bengal all said that they wanted Pakistan and Urdu, and this fact is duly on record. Now it is being said that Pakistan is a mistake, so is Urdu. The question now is whether nullifying our past history will allow us to reach some goal, or whether it will lead us astray. Decisions on a

nation's life are not made so as to be changed every 30 or 40 years, and the new decisions made be exactly the opposite of the earlier ones. While speaking in the gathering, Mr Nizami said that now in 1985 you cannot forsake Urdu and adopt Punjabi, he was stating the truth. He said that if this is what they wanted, they should have done it much earlier. In the present situation, Mr Ramay, who is advising that Punjabi should be adopted, is compelled to write his book in Urdu, and all the speeches are being made in Urdu. Mr Nizami made another factual remark. He said that neither can any future be built nor any honor and dignity be gained in the name of Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi, or Pathan and warned them of the danger of losing everything by losing Pakistanism in their madness for Punjabism.

Mr Nizami said that Mr Ramay looks upon Ranjeet Singh and Mirza Ghulam Ajmed as his heroes, then they are his heroes alone, they cannot be the heroes of the Muslims of Punjab. Since such is the state of affairs in Punjab, how can we complain about G.M. Syed, who looks upon Raja Dahir as his hero.

For people like Dr Mubashshir Hassan, who is a Communist, G.M. Syed, a regionalist, or leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha, the real evil they see in Urdu is that it represents Islamic literature, Islamic thinking, and Islamic disposition. Urdu has been the language of the freedom movement, the Khilafat movement, and the Pakistan movement. Freedom and politics are enshrined in this language. To suppress the freedom of the nation, it is essential for the ruling faction to make it mute or deprive it of the apparatus of expression. This is why Ayub Khan planned Roman script for Urdu. There is no doubt that the ruling faction exhibited wrong mentality and wrong attitude with respect to Urdu. If this Anglo-Mohammedan group used Urdu, Pakistan, and Islam as a political instrument, now it is not possible for us to renunciate Urdu, Pakistan, and Islam, and in lieu of Islamism start instilling the concept of Punjabi nationalism. Even if we were to succeed in our efforts, the people of Punjab will not buy it. Punjab, because of its particular mentality, disposition, history, and economy, is constrained to adopt a universal and pan-Islamist attitude rather than be confined to narrow concept of regionalism. Punjab cannot remain in solitary isolation, and neither can any power force Punjab to live in solitude. The same is true not only of Punjab, but the Pakhtoons of the Frontier. Similarly, it is not possible for Sind to remove all non-Sindhis from its frontiers, and Baluchistan, too, is dependent on non-Baluchi Pathans and others for its prosperity and development. Thus, this rules out the possibility of the concept of regionalism. Whether Pakistan survives or is destroyed, the notion of regionalism found in the mentality of some people cannot become a reality. Undoubtedly, what we do need is a democratic system of government consisting of the elected representatives of every region speaking different languages. Such a system of government was the cherished goal from the very beginning but, sad to say, up till this day has not been realized.

Mr Ramay's statement that the people of Punjab have nothing to do with the activities of the Punjab military and the bureaucracy does not mean anything. The fact is that the advantages gained by the military and the bureaucracy were passed on to the people of Punjab. Thus, the government,

by the military and bureaucracy, while providing benefits to the people of one region proved to be harmful to the people of other regions, thus weakening the structure of Pakistan. In order to strengthen Pakistan, we have to do away with the destruction caused by slogans of regionalism and establish a government based on a fair and just political and economical system capable of creating hopeful expectations among the people of various regions, or else if the Punjabi nationalism takes the place of Pakistani nationalism, it will satisfy neither the people of Punjab nor the people of other provinces.

9315/13046

CSO: 4656/15

PAKISTAN

ANTIREGIME TRIBAL CHIEFS PROFILED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 12 Dec 85 p 6

[Unsigned article: "Wali Khan Kukikhel and Nadir Khan Zakhakhel"]

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Dec. 11: Malik Wali Khan Kukikhel and Malik Nadir Khan Zakhakhel, the antagonist tribal chieftains who have emerged as the leading figures in the current Khyber Agency conflict, have striking similarities in more than one way. Both are Afridis and also Mafiks. Both have spent a considerable number of years in Kabul as state guests of the Afghanistan Government. Both had a love-and-hate relationship with the Pakistan Government, alternating and switching sides in the pro-and anti-Pakistan camps. Both staged a ceaseless, and at times embarrassing, propaganda campaigns against Pakistan from their sanctuaries in the Afghan capital, but then both of them returned from their exile to a boisterous and highly publicised welcome by the Pakistani authorities.

But there the similarities end, for Wali Khan Kukikhel is an aged man of 74 years compared to the much younger Nadir Khan Zakhakhel who is in his early fifties. Unlike the socialite and free-spending Nadir Khan, Wali Khan is sober and reserved. The tall and rather bulky Kukikhel Sardar looks much younger than his ripe age as against the short-statured Zakhakhel chief whose wheatish complexion and greying hair make him look an older man.

Wali Khan presides over his Kukikhel Afridi sub-tribe of about 70,000 from his headquarters in Ghundal in Jamrud tehsil, while Nadir Khan's Zakhakhelis are a little fewer than the Kukikhels. Both sub-tribes are among the biggest of the Afridi tribe after the Qamberkhel and Malikdinkhel. The Nadir Khan Kalay, where the Zakhakhel Sardar lives lies on the main road leading to Torkham. His area forms part of the Landikotal tehsil where the Shinwari tribe

predominates. Son of Malik Abdul Jabbar Khan and nephew of Zaman Khan who was the Nawab of the Afridis, Wali Khan Kukikhel is the biggest landlord of Khyber Agency. He is not very literate but has had some religious education. He learned Persian during his Kabul stay and picked up a smattering of Urdu as a member of Pakistan's National Assembly in the 1960s. He has a large family with more than one wife and about eight sons.

Attaullah Jan is the chosen son who will most likely succeed his father as the Kukikhel chief. One pointer to his rising stature was his presence in Kabul recently as an exalted guest at the head of a tribal delegation to the Afghan Lail Jirgah. Another son, Zail Khan, was a Deputy Secretary in the Federal Government. Humayun Khan still another son, was recently removed from his position as an Area Administrator in the Afghan Refugees Organisation.

It may only be coincidental that among the Afridis who accompanied Wali Khan to Kabul in 1953 after his escape from Pakistan following the bombardment of his village and "Lashkar" by the then NWFP Chief Minister Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, was Malik Said Ahmad, the father of Nadir Khan. It is ironical that the son of Wali Khan's friend and collaborator is now his adversary. The Kukikhel chief lived for about five years in Afghanistan and it is generally agreed that apart from his vociferous espousal of the cause of Pakhtunistan from there he did not smear his hands with corruption.

Wali Khan Kukikhel returned to a hero's welcome in 1958 after the military take-over by Ayub Khan and became an MNA from Khyber Agency in the 1962 elections.

One memorable occasion which is still recalled was his strong

opposition in the Assembly to the American base in Badaber near Peshawar, which he contended was threatening the peace and sanctity of the area. An attempt on his life during those days by the notorious outlaw, Mir Aslam, is termed by Wali Khan's partisans as a direct corollary of his outspokenness in the Assembly. Even his opponents concede that Wali Khan is a bold and straight-forward man. He retired to a quiet life in the late 1960s and throughout 1970s. His visits to the Political Agent whose unbridled powers almost make him a king in the Agency, became fewer and fewer. It was only in the late 1980's that the aged Kukikhel Sardar was aroused from his semi-retirement when the Khyber Agency was flooded with money and arms in the wake of the war against narcotics, the advent of the Afghan refugees into tribal territory, and the official patronage of Nadir Khan Zakhakhel.

Nadir Khan's father had died in Kabul and the son was actually brought up there during his prolonged stay in Afghanistan. Nadir Khan even contracted marriages for his children there and the bridal procession of one of his daughters started from Khyber to drive all the way to Kabul. He also had relations with some high-rank-

ing officials in the ruling regimes after the Saur Revolution of April 1978. But coming to power of the PDPA. Communist leaders did not augur well for Nadir Khan, who was used to ostentatious living as the 'Raees-e-Qabail'. Therefore, he decided to return to Pakistan.

Arriving here in 1979 to a roaring welcome accompanied by a lot of fanfare, he was lavishly entertained by the local authorities, and reportedly put up in the Khyber House in Peshawar as a state guest. He was also rewarded with money and grant of land in Dera Ismail Khan. His opponents allege that he brought with him more than 100 Klashnikovs gifted by the Afghan government on the condition that he would organise the Khyberites against Pakistan. Not much is known about those guns but if one were to believe the critics, these were sold at a high price to interested tribesmen.

The two chieftains were soon on a collision course as their personalities and postures on tribal affairs clashed. Before that, they surprisingly espoused the same cause in that they both opposed the revolution in Afghanistan. But, their ways parted soon thereafter and they are now fitted in opposing camps.

/12851

CSO: 4600/156

PAKISTAN

TRIBAL ORGANIZATIONS OFFER HELP IN KHYBER AGENCY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 12 Dec 85 p 6

[Article by Rahimullah Yusufzai: "Tribesmen's Organisation Offers to Help Resolve Problems"]

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Dec. 10 The tribal areas of Pakistan are 'like an arsenal where in addition to about 1,000 Klashnikovs, there are thousands of mortars, missiles, rocket-launchers, timebombs and even anti-aircraft guns.

"Most of these deadly weapons have been bought from the Afghan refugees who must have sold 50 per cent of the total arms in their possession", claimed the leaders of the Tehrik-e-Ittehad-e-Qabail in an interview with the Muslim.

The tribal leaders disclosed that tribesmen had become exhausted after their buying spree. The people in the settled areas have taken off from where the tribals had left. The craze for arming themselves with the latest weaponry was now affecting not only the people in NWFP, but also in the other three provinces. In the process, every other property is being sold to purchase arms and ammunition.

With so much weapons at their disposal, the Tehrik-i-Ittehad-e-Qabail leaders feared, the situation in the tribal belt could flare-up on the slightest provocation. Syed Yusuf Hussain, Sailab Mahsud and Kundal Khan Afridi argued that the Khyber Agency operation should be viewed in this context because the tribesmen living all along the Pak-Afghan border could be provoked by the turn of events.

They felt that the use of force and the intervention in Khyber Agency had contributed to heightening the fear in the tribesmen that the Government was bent upon ending the independent and separate status of the tribal territory.

Terming it as a plan fraught with dangers, the tribal leaders made it

clear that nothing was dear to the tribesmen's heart than a distinct personality. Syed Yusuf Hussain, the Convenor of the Tehrik who belongs to Kurram Agency, maintained that no sane tribesman would like to become part of the administrative system in vogue in Pakistan which suffered from maladministration and corruption. Citing the example of the former Swat State where people now fervently recall the good old days prior to the merger, he said another fallout of the extinction of the tribal territory would be the loss of Pakhto, which is the hallmark of a tribal Pakhtun's life.

The Tehrik-e-Ittehad-e-Qabail convenor and his two colleagues, Sailab Mahsud from South Waziristan and Kundal Khan Afridi from Khyber Agency maintained that they did approve of an outright demise of the political system now in force in the seven tribal agencies. Saying that they would not like to be encumbered by the presence of an overbearing Deputy Commissioner in place of the Political Agent, they proposed that an elected Agency Council should come into being on the basis of universal adult franchise instead of the nominated Councils now functioning. They also wanted the setting up of an Institution of Advisory Council to the Governor of NWFP.

The tehrik leaders argued that all the ills and evils attributed to the tribal areas were basically the bane of the modern civilisation which had crept into the hitherto moralistic tribal society. But they contended that more afflicted were the tribal agencies nearer to the big urban centres, in particular the Khyber Agency because of its

nearness to Peshawar. They maintained that vices like abduction, car-lifting, narcotics and the screening of nude films flourished in Khyber Agency only because of its proximity to a city and also due to the connivance of the administration of the settled areas. They said the six other agencies, namely North and South Waziristan, Kurram, Bajaur, Mohamand and Orakzai were saved from the outside world.

Contending that the situation in the tribal belt could turn explosive if the Khyber Agency continued to be encircled, the Tehrik leaders cautioned against the involvement of the Afghan refugees in this conflict. They said in certain Agencies like Kurram, where the refugees outnumbered the locals, the situation could take a turn for the worst if the issue was not handled carefully.

Describing the blockade of

Khyber Agency as unprecedented to which even the colonialist British had not resorted during their long years of dealings with the tribesmen, the tribal leaders claimed that this action had led to scarcity of food in the Agency and exposed patients to difficulties due to lack of medicare.

The Tehrik-e-Ittehad-e-Qabail leaders offered the services of their organisation to negotiate an agreement with a Wali a Khan Kukikhel, they said their only prior conditions were the withdrawal of the security forces and an end to the blockade. They claimed their organisation, having 43 branches in the seven tribal Agencies and the three frontier regions attached to the Bannu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan districts considered the Khyber Agency problem a minor issue which could be easily resolved provided the government was serious.

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PAKISTAN

LONDON DEMONSTRATION DEMANDS PALEJO'S RELEASE

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 12 Dec 85 p 10

[Article by Maleeha Lodhi: "London Demo Demands Palejo's Release"]

[Text]

LONDON, Dec. 11 Amid growing concern for the deteriorating health of Awami Tehrik leader, Rasul Bakhsh Palejo, the London-based Release Palejo Committee has stepped up its campaign in the UK and Europe. On Tuesday, it organised, appropriately enough on International Human Rights Day, what turned out to be a remarkable demonstration outside the Pakistan Embassy in London. It was extraordinary because apart from having all-party support, never have so many prominent political exiles been present at such a demonstration. Among those present were Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Mumtaz Bhutto and Abdul Hafiz Pirzada. Representatives of the PPP and PNP were also among the protestors. The demonstration lasted for over an hour, during which slogans were raised demanding Palejo's immediate and unconditional release as well as the release of other political prisoners in Pakistan.

The Release Palejo Committee has also mobilised the support of key British trade unions. The representative of a Trade Union Council, which represents 18,000 trade unionists in London's inner city area, was also present and handed in a petition addressed to Pakistan's Ambassador, expressing concern at Palejo's condition and urging his release.

The Awami Tehrik Chief has been in continuous detention since 1979. He was arrested in October

1979 and a few days later tried and sentenced by a military court to one year's imprisonment for "making objectionable speeches and raising slogans at illegally convened meetings". He was not released when he completed this sentence in October 1980, and has since been held without charge or trial, under Martial Law Order No. 78.

Palejo has been seriously ill for several years. Apart from an alarming deterioration in his eyesight, Palejo, according to Amnesty International, suffers from an unusual and as yet undiagnosed ailment which produces an "intense sensation of cold".

According to details released by the Palejo Release Committee, two medical boards were reportedly set up, one by the provincial government and the other by the Federal government to examine him, but both failed to diagnose his condition, recommending that he be sent abroad for medical treatment. A bed in Hammersmith Hospital in north-west London was even arranged and put by for him by his well-wishers here. But Palejo was never allowed to leave.

Members of the Release Palejo Committee fear that the Awami Tehrik leader faces a slow death.

Meanwhile Channel four has agreed to give three minutes on television in its programme 'Comment' for the Committee to address an appeal for Palejo's release.

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